Wednesday, 5 February 2020

The "Grounds for Complaint": 460-403 BC

Setting the scene
  • The Peloponnesian war was fought in ancient Greece from 431 to 404 BC between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian League, an alliance of city-states led by Sparta
  • For approximately fifty years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 431 BC, the city-state of Athens had accumulated enormous monetary reserves and extensive political influence in the Aegean region and beyond
  • Athens' political supremacy led to an empire and her traditional enemies, as well as some of her vessels, viewed Athenian ascendancy with suspicion. Opposition to Athenian empire united around Sparta, the nucleus of the Peloponnesian League
  • For several years political tensions mounted as various diplomatic failures occurred until hostilities broke out. The war sputtered into life as Athens and Sparta took opposing sides in several minor local outbreaks
Thucydides' Assessment
"The Persian War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy conclusion in two battles by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it was, it was short without parallel for the misfortunes it brought upon Greece. Never had so many cities been taken and laid desolate, either by the barbarians, or by fellow Greeks (the old inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others); never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, either on the field of battle or in political strife. All this came upon Greece with the late war, which was begun by Athenians and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made after the conquest of Euboea" - Thucydides 1.23

"I think that the truest explanation (prophasis), but the one that was least made public, was that the growth of Athens' power and the fear that this caused among the Spartans made war inevitable. But the grounds of complaint (aitiai), which were openly stated by each side and led them to break the peace and go to war, were as follows" - VERY IMPORTANT SO REMEMBER
Thucydides 1.23

In these words Thucydides was attempting to single out an underlying cause of the Peloponnesian War beyond the publicly expressed grounds of complaint. His use of the words "prophasis" and "aitiai" has led to a dispute among historians about the actual meaning of this passage, since these words can have different meanings in different contexts - "prophasis" can mean false excuse and "aitiai" true explanations.
However, the use of the qualifying words 'truest' with "prophasis" and 'openly stated' with "aitiai" strongly suggests that Thucydides was giving his own judgement on the real reason why Sparta went to war in 431 BC
  • The Spartans would never dare to make this reason public because this was not a valid ground for breaking the peace treaty, and because it would be a shameful admission from such a powerful military state
  • Therefore the Spartans concentrated on the grounds of complaint, which affected their allies rather than themselves, in order to press their claims that Athens had broken the Thirty Year Peace. This is further reinforced by Thucydides' explanation of the Spartans' motives for the despatch of three embassies in the months preceding the outbreak of the war
"During this time they kept sending embassies to the Athenians and making complaints so that they might have the best excuse to make war, if the Athenians paid no heed to them" - Thucydides 1.126.1
  • However, it is important to review the events that led up to the outbreak of the war in the light of the terms of the Thirty Year Peace. In this way it will be possible to assess the accuracy of Thucydides' statement and to determine the degree of blame that each side should incur for infringing the terms of the peace treaty
The Grounds of Complaint (Aitiai)
  • Having stated the "truest explanation" for the outbreak of the war, Thucydides then deals at length with (in his opinion) the two major openly stated grounds of complaint between the combatants - 
    • Athens' alliance with Corcyra (1.31-55) and
    • The dispute over Potidaea (1.56-65)
    • The complaints of the Aeginetans who protested to the Spartans that their promised autonomy had been infringed, and
    • Those of the Megarians who referred to an Athenian decree that banned them from the ports in the Athenian Empire and the market of Athens (1.167)
Revolt in Samos
  • In 440 BC, Samos, one of the three remaining independent ship-suppliers, clashed with Miletus over the possession of Priene. The Athenians stepped in, resolved the dispute in Miletus' favour, changed the Samian constitution from oligarchic to democratic, placed oligarchic hostages on Lemnos, installed a garrison and returned home
  • However, the oligarchs who had escaped earlier, making use of Persian aid, regained control of Samos and revolted from Athens. After a long and arduous campaign the Athenians crushed the revolt in 439 BC, confiscated the Samian fleet, pulled down their walls, took hostages and forced them to pay an indemnity (1.115.2-117.3)
  • The dispute with Samos should have been an internal Athenian affair, as Samos was a listed ally of Athens, but there is strong evidence that the Spartans had intended to exploit Athens' problems and launch an attack. The evidence comes from the Corinthian speech to the Athenians in 433 BC
"For when the Samians were in revolt and the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes whether they should help them, we did not cast our vote against you; we clearly spoke against that, saying each state should punish its own allies" - Thucydides 1.40.5

Activity: The Revolt of Samos
Thucydides 1.115-117
Lactor 1: 89 Plutarch, Pericles 28.1-3
Lactor 1: 88 Diodorus
  1. What conditions were imposed on the Samians following the revolt? What might be the Athenians' logic behind these conditions?
    • Thucydides, Plutarch and Diodorus: the Samian fleet was confiscated, their walls and fortifications were pulled down and a democratic government was established
    • Thucydides: Athens took hostages
    • Diodorus: Athens demanded war reparations
      • Pulling down the walls and taking the fleet left Samos exposed, which meant that it was defenceless and so much less likely to revolt - also made Samos reliant on Athens for protection
      • Changing the government aligned Samos with Athens (democracy) over Sparta (oligarchy)
      • Taking hostages put pressure on Samos to remain loyal
      • Reparations made Samos financially dependent on Athens
    • Plutarch: says that Douris of Samos claims that Pericles brought the trierarchs (naval commanders) into the main square and bludgeoned them to death - Plutarch doubts that this is true
  2. Who do the Samians turn to for support in their revolt? Why is this significant?
    • Thucydides - Samian oligarchs turned to Persia for financial support, which was agreed by the governor of Sardis, Pissuthnes
      • shows that Persia still had a desire to involve itself in Greek affairs
  3. What are the Corinthians suggesting about how Sparta and the Peloponnesians reacted to the revolt at Samos?
    • Thucydidies - claims that the Peloponnesians were planning to assist Samos
      • clear violation of the Thirty Years Peace Treaty
    • The vote was split, but Corinth reminded the Peloponnesians that under the treaty every state has a right to punish its own allies
Dispute of Epidamnus
  • Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra (modern Corfu), which in turn was a colony of Corinth. The democrats had seized power in Epidamnus but the exiled oligarchs, aided by foreign allies, were laying siege to the city
  • The democrats appealed to Corcyra, their mother-city, for help but the Corcyraeans refused to become involved (1.24.5-7) The democrats then approached the Delphic oracle to ask if they should hand over their city to Corinth, which, in accordance with tradition, had supplied the leader of the Corcyraeans,  who were about to found the colony of Epidamnus, the Delphic oracle agreed (1.35.2-3)
  • The Corinthians willingly accepted on the grounds that they regarded Epidamnus as belonging as much to them as to the Corcyraeans and "at the same time because of their hatred of the Corcyraeans who, although they were colonists of Corinth, did not pay them respect" - Thucydides 1.25.3
Issues
  • The Corinthians' hatred was fuelled by the Corcyraeans' disdain for them and their belief in the superiority of their navy, which numbered one hundred and twenty ships. It was this hatred that was to be such an underlying motive for the Corinthians' aggressive behaviour
  • The Corinthians sent out a force of troops and settlers to Epidamnus, which in turn led to the Corcyraeans besieging the city (1.26)
  • Corinth then prepared a relief force and declared a new colony of Epidamnus, inviting people to volunteer to become new colonists (1.27)
  • With the backing of Sparta and Sicyon, the Corcyraeans made a generous offer to the Corinthians that, if they were not willing to give up their claims to Epidamnus and recall their troops, the whole matter should be submitted to arbitration, using as arbitrators either mutually agreed cities in the Peloponnese or the oracle at Delphi
  • They particularly urged the Corinthian not to start a war as this would force the Corcyraeans against their wishes to seek military help from elsewhere - a clear hint of seeking an alliance with Athens (1.28)
Corinthian Response
  • The Corinthians refused this offer of arbitration and sent out a force of seventy-five ships and 2,000 hoplites to Epidamnus
  • The battle of Leucimme (435) resulted in a decisive victory for the Corcyraeans, who also gained control of Epidamnus on the same day (1.29)
  • This should have been the end of the matter - the Corinthians, led on by ambition and hatred of the Corcyraeans, had tried to extend their power, but their adventurism had ended in failure. However, the Corinthians were not prepared to let the matter rest
Athens' alliance with Corcyra
  • Following their defeat at Leucimme in 435, the Corinthians set about building a new fleet and hiring mercenaries in order to exact revenge against Corcyra
  • News of these military preparations caused alarm among the Corcyraeans, and so in 433 BC they sent an embassy to Athens to seek an alliance
  • The Corinthians, fearing that the combined navies would prevent them from dealing a decisive blow against Corcyra, also sent an embassy to dissuade the Athenians from making an alliance with Corcyra (1.31)
  • A meeting of the Ecclesia was held and both sides were given the opportunity to put their case
Activity: The Dispute over Corcyra
  1. [1.33,35] - What reasons do the Corcyraeans give as to why they should be admitted into the Athenian alliance?
    • Corcyra played victim (tbf Corinth was even told off by Sparta for being too aggressive)
    • Athens would have Corcyra's undying gratitude
    • Athens would gain control of the second greatest navy in Hellas
    • It would make the Athenians look generous
    • Sparta and Corinth were attempting to undermine Athens- conflict inevitable so extra resources would be needed
    • Corcyra was neutral so Athens wouldn't have been breaking the treaty
  2. [1.40-1] - What rebuttals do the Corinthians give to Corcyra's argument? Why should Athens not admit Corcyra into their alliance?
    • Neutral states could ally with Athens, but doing so to hurt other powers would break the treaty
    • They said that it was prohibited to accept a state that had revolted from another power, and said that Corcyra had been violent
    • When Samos revolted, Corinth had spoken against attacking Athens and had even given them 20 ships (so really Athens should pay them back)
    • Said that they had just as much right to attack Corcyra as Athens did to put down Samos
  3. [1.44] - What was the response of the Athenians to this debate? What were Athens' terms?
    • They had two meetings, one airing towards an alliance with Corinth, the second airing towards an alliance with Corcyra
    • The alliance was defensive, so would only come into effect if Corcyra was directly attacked, to avoid total war
    • War with the Peloponnesian League seemed inevitable, but Athens was willing to let Corcyra and Corinth weaken each other to give them the largest navy
  4. [1.55] - What was the outcome of this dispute?
    • Corcyra remained undefeated, thanks to the Athenian fleet driving the Corinthians away during a battle
    • However, this gave Corinth a reason for war with Athens
    • On their return voyage, the Corinthians took Anactorium, which both Corcyra and Corinth had claims to
    • They sold 800 Corcyraean prisoners, but kept 250 who held sway in Corcyra and treated them well
Corinthians' Biggest Flaw
  • The greatest difficulty for the Corinthians was to produce an argument to counter-act the Corcyraeans' convincing statement that the Athenians had a legal and legitimate right to make an alliance with themselves, as it was specifically laid down in the treaty that a neutral state was free to ally itself with whatever side it wished
  • The Corinthians attempted to cloud and obscure the issue by equating Corcyra's position with that of Samos. On their interpretation Corcyra was a Corinthian ally that had revolted, and this they should have the right to discipline their recalcitrant ally without outside interference, as they themselves had argues to the Peloponnesians at the time of Samos' revolt in 440 BC
  • The fallacy in the Corinthians' argument was that Corcyra, although being a colony of Corinth, was not an ally and therefore could not be in revolt - thus there was no comparability between Corcyra and Samos
Athenians Actions
  • Sent ten ships and three generals as a reinforcement to Corcyra. Such a small force would have done little to calm Corcyraean fears, especially as the Corinthians were equipping a fleet of 150 ships
  • However, this small fleet with its large number of generals (the same number as on the Sicilian expedition in 415 BC), including Lacedaimonius, the son of Cimon and proxenos of Sparta, revealed Athens' true objective:
    • their preferred means for resolving their difficulties with Corinth was diplomacy and not military force
  • "The Athenians ordered the generals not to fight a sea-battle with the Corinthians unless they should sail against Corcyra and were about to land there or at some other point in their territory - then they were to prevent it as best as possible. They gave these orders in order to avoid breaking the treaty" - Thucydides 1.45.3
Athens' treatment of Potidaea
  • The next ground of complaint, in 432 BC, concerned Potidaea and its inhabitants:
    • "who lived on the isthmus of Pallene and, although colonists of the Corinthians, were phoros-paying allies of the Athenians" - Thucydides 1.56.2
  • The Thraceward region was of immense importance to the Athenians. Apart from its richness in natural resources and its favourable trading position, it was the man safeguard against the eastward expansion of Macedon, which at that time was under the control of Perdiccas
  • The relationship between the Athenians and Perdiccas was constantly changing from friendship to enmity, since the motivating force on both sides was expediency
  • At the time of the Potidaean affair, he was hostile to the Athenians due to their support of his rivals, Philip and Deucas, and consequently played an important supportive role in the revolt of Potidaea (1.57.2-5)
Why Potidaea became an issue
  • Potidaea was an ally of Athens, but a colony of Corinth
  • The Athenians demanded that the Potidaeans:
    • pull down their wall on the side of Pallene
    • hand over hostages, and
    • banish and not receive in the future the magistrates that Corinth usually sent each year
  • These were tough demands on a state that had done no wrong, and this harsh treatment was bound to upset the Corinthians who had retained such warm, close ties with their colony
Activity: The Dispute over Potidaea
  1. [1.56-7] What caused the dispute over Potidaea?
    • It was a colony of Corinth 
    • Perdiccas of Macedonia was angered that Athens had supported his rivals
    • Corinth was openly hostile
    • Athens was worried that Potidaea would revolt with the support of Corinth and Perdiccas
    • Athens sent 30 ships and 1,000 hoplites to Macedonia to take Potidaean hostages and demanded that the Potidaeans tear down their defences and banish the Corinthian magistrates
    • The Potidaeans pleaded with Athens to lessen the severity of the punishment, but were refused
  2. [1.58] - What did the Spartans promise the Potidaeans if they revolted? Why is this significant?
    • The Corinthians brought Potidaea's complaints to Sparta
    • Spartans agreed to invade Attica if Athens attacked Potidaea, which was significant as it would put them at war with Athens
    • Sparta breaking the treaty in two ways:
      • not submitted to arbitration
      • the treaty also stipulated that one side could not interfere or assist the other side's allies
    • Corinthians send a mercenary and volunteer force to Potidaea - 1600 hoplites and 400 light troops
  3. [1.60-61] Which city had more grounds for complaint over this dispute in Potidaea? Athens or Corinth?
    • Athens:
      • Their concerns over Potidaea were justified, with it having support from several enemies of Athens, and the threat from Sparta could not be understated
      • Legally, Athens could do whatever it wanted to Potidaea - it was their ally
      • Corinthians and Spartans completely ignored arbitration and resorted immediately to war
      • Corinth and Sparta had broken the treaty by interfering in Athens' alliance
    • Corinth:
      • The force they sent out was a volunteer force, along with mercenaries
      • Athens were being far too harsh to Potidaea, as they had done nothing wrong
      • Potidaea was their colony - the Potidaens were their kin
      • The Corinthians had a moral obligation to be involved
  • Even if Athen's behaviour was harsh and unjustified, Sparta and Corinth had no more legal right to intervene directly in Potidaea than they had in Samos
  • Their main available legal redress was to demand that the issue be submitted to arbitration, but instead the Corinthians actively urged the Potidaeans to seek military help from Sparta, and the Spartans (whether the authorities or the Assembly) promised an invasion of Attica, thus encouraging the Potidaeans to revolt from Athens
  • The Athenians had sent out Archestratos with thirty ships and one thousand hoplites to carry out their demands, but they arrived to find that a full-scale revolt had broken out:
    • "Meanwhile the Corinthians, since the Potidaeans had revolted and that Athenian ships were close to Macedonia, being afraid for the place and thinking that the danger was their own responsibility, sent out volunteers of their own and by the use of pay, sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops from the other Peloponnesians" - Thucydides 1.60-1
  • Therefore, the Athenians sent out forty ships and 2,000 hoplites under Callias, and, after making another cynical alliance with Perdiccas, descended upon Potidaea. There the Athenians fought a battle against the Potidaeans, the Corinthian volunteers and the Peloponnesians, resulting in an Athenian victory and the beginning of the siege of Potidaea that lasted to 429 BC (1.62-4)
  • The use of Corinthian troops in battle to support an Athenian listed ally exposed Corinth once again to the charge of acting in defiance of the terms of the treaty. However, if these Corinthian fighters were genuine volunteers and were acting independently of the state of Corinth, then Corinth could have been exonerated on this issue. But the above quotation speaks of 'the Corinthians' sending out the volunteers and these 'Corinthians' must be the government of the state of Corinth
  • In addition, when the Peace of Nicias was signed in 421 BC, the Corinthians refused to abide by its conditions:
    • "They made as their excuse the fact that they could not betray their allies in Thrace. For they had independently sworn oaths with them, when they had first revolted with the Potidaeans, and later" - Thucydides 5.30.2
  • It is clear from these words that the oaths had created some form of military alliance between the Corinthians and the Potidaeans and, most probably, the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans who had revolted together in 432 BC, since Thucydides twice refers to the enemy forces in 432 BC as 'the Potidaeans and their allies' (1.63.3, 1.64.1)
  • Oaths of alliance could not be made 'unofficially', but only between states, and therefore the Corinthians had sworn oaths of alliance with three groups of Athenian listed allies and were officially supplying military help against the Athenians - a clear breach of the treaty