Tuesday, 28 April 2020

The Aftermath of the Peace of Nicias

Nicias knew "that the Spartans had for some time been anxious for peace while the Athenians no longer had the same appetite for war" so he made every effort to reconcile them

Athenian Reasons
  • Loss of confidence over recent defeats at Delium and Amphipolis
  • Apprehensive about allies - fear of revolts
  • Regretting their rejection of peace after Pylos
Spartan Reasons
  • Anxiety to get back Spartan prisoners taken during Pylos campaign
  • Sparta's territory was being raided from Pylos and Cythera
  • Helots likely to revolt
  • Thirty Years' Peace with Argos coming to an end
Terms of the Treaty - Thucydides 5.17
  1. It was to last 50 years
  2. Delphi was to be free
  3. Disputes were to be settled by law and alterations to the treaty made by mutual consent
  4. Chalcidice was to be independent
  5. Amphipolis and Panactum were to be given back to Athens
  6. Pylos, Cythera and Methana were to be returned to Sparta
  7. All prisoners were to be exchanged
Thucydides' View of the Period: Shifting Alliances 5.25-6
  • "The states which had accepted the treaty were at peace; but the Corinthians and some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb the settlement, a fresh agitation was instantly commenced by the allies against Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, became suspected by the Athenians through their not performing some of the provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten months they abstained from invasion of each other's territory, yet abroad an unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the most effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the treaty made after the ten years' war and to have recourse to open hostilities"
  • "Only a mistaken judgment can object to including the interval of treaty in the war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be rationally considered a state of peace, where neither party either gave or got back all that they had agreed, apart from the violations of it which occurred on both sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and other instances, and the fact that the allies in the direction of Thrace were in as open hostility as ever, while the Boeotians had only a truce renewed every ten days"
  • In Thucydidies' view, though peace was signed, hostility still continued in the Greek world
Changing Alliances 421-416 BC
Discontent of Sparta's Allies
  • Refusal to ratify the treaty:
    • Corinth - lost possession with no compensation
    • Megara - Chief harbour Nisaea still in Athenian hands
    • Boeotia - refused to give back Panactum
  • Sparta's reactions: Formed an alliance with Athens. The treaty was never fully implemented
    1. Amphipolis not returned to Athens [objections by the inhabitants]
    2. Pylos not returned to Sparta
  • Thucydides 5.17, 5.25
New Alignment of Powers
  • The resentment of the Spartan allies lead to political upheaval and alliance reshuffling i.e: joining a secret unofficial alliance with Argos
  • "The Corinthians pointed out that Lacedaemon could have no good end in view, but only the subjugation of Peloponnese, or she would never have entered into treaty and alliance with the once detested Athenians, and that the duty of consulting for the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon Argos" - Thucydudes 5.27
  • Aware of the coalition Sparta implemented plans to get her allies back - risking a break of the Athenian alliance
In Athens: Alcibiades
  • After the death of Cleon at Amphipolis, Nicias held the greatest authority over the Athenians
  • However, he would face a new challenge from among the demagogues, in the form of Alcibiades:
    • Born into one of the famous aristocratic families of Athens, the Alcmaeonidae (shield-signallers at Marathon)
    • Famed for his beauty, charm and wit - he was the student of the famous philosopher Socrates, who saved his life at the Battle of Potidaea
    • Pericles acted as a guardian after his father, Cleinias, died at the Battle of Coronea (between Athens and Boeotia during the First Peloponnesian War)
Writers' Views of Alcibiades
  • "You shall not rear a lion cub in the city, but if one is brought up, accommodate its ways" - Aristophanes
  • "He was exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. The position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on would contribute to the ruin of the Athenian state" - Thucydides
  • "Although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city" - Thucydides
  • "His character displayed many inconsistencies and marked changes, as was natural amid his vast undertakings and varied fortunes. He was naturally a man of many strong passions, the mightiest of which were the love of rivalry and the love of pre-eminence." - Plutarch
Alcibiades Undermining the Peace
  • Aim of Alcibiades - Discard the alliance, win over Argos risking war with Sparta
  • Historical thought on Alcibiades' motivation:
    • Thucydides - Alcibiades believed the Spartans could not be trusted (5.43)
    • Plutarch - Alcibiades aimed to violate the treaty out of sheer jealousy of Nicias' success and fame (14-15)
Thucydides, 5.43
"The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians having gone thus far, the party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty, immediately put themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that personal resentment had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he was offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient connection of his family with them as their proxeni, which, renounced by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his attentions to their prisoners taken at Sphacteria. Being thus, as he thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first instance spoken against the treaty, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, but that they only sough an alliance in order to be enabled by this means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack Athens alone; and now, immediately upon the above occurring, he sent privately to the Argives, telling them to come as quickly as possible to Athens, accompanied by the Mantineans and Eleans, with proposals of alliance; as the moment was propitious and he himself would do all he could to help them."

Athenian/Argive Alliance
  • In order to sow discord for Sparta, Alcibiades arranged an agreement between Argos, Athens, Mantinea and Elis
  • What is the strategic importance of this manoeuver?
  • Corinth and Megara decided to re-join the Spartan Alliance for protection purposes
Role of Agis
  • After realising that the Peloponnesian allies were beginning to turn against their Spartan leaders, King Agis of Sparta decided to march against Argos with her full army as well as the Tegeans and some other allies from Arcadia
  • They were joined by other Peloponnesian Allies = 11,000 Boeotians, 2,000 Corinthians; Phliasians = entire force
  • With such a considerable force, it was thought the Spartan coalition would crush the Argives and reassert Spartan dominance. However, King Agis took an unusual step:
    • He met with a few representatives of the Argives and concluded a four month truce without consulting the other Peloponnesian allies
    • Consequence - Agis severely criticised and forced to accept a 10 man board of special advisors to prevent further political blunders
  • "The Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general out of respect for the law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed Agis for going away from so fair a field (the enemy being hemmed in on every side by infantry and cavalry) without having done anything worthy of their strength" - Thucydides, 5.60
Truce Broken
  • Not long after it was signed, the Argives break the truce signed with Agis and the Spartans and continue hostilities. Why?
    • "The Argives blamed the persons who had concluded the truce without consulting the people, themselves thinking that they had let escape with the Lacedaemonians an opportunity such as they should never see again; as the struggle would have been under the walls of their city, and by the side of many and brave allies" (5.60)
    • "Alcibiades told the Argives and the allies that they had no right to make a truce at all without the consent of their fellow confederates, and now that the Athenians had arrived so opportunely the war ought to be resumed" (5.61)
    • The Argives began incursions into Laconia, forcing the Spartans and King Agis once again to march out and meet them - though this time without the support of their other allies, who had all been sent home
Battle of Mantinea 418 BC
  • Spartan alliance vs Athenian/Argive Coalition met on the battlefield near Mantinea in 418 BC:
  • Spartan Alliance:
    • 3,500 Spartiates
    • 600 Skiritae
    • 2,000 Helots
    • Neodamodeis
    • 3,000 Tegean infantry and cavalry
    • Roughly 9,000 in total
  • Argive Alliance:
    • 3,000 Argives
    • 1,000 Athenians
    • 2,000 Mantineans
    • 1,000 Arcadian Mercenaries
    • 1,000 other allied infantry and cavalry
    • Roughly 8,000 in total
  • The battle ended with a Spartan victory over Argos and Athens
  • "The imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time, whether of cowardice on account of the disaster at Sphacteria, or of mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this single action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men themselves were the same as ever" Thucydides 5.75
  • Outcome:
    • Sparta and Argos concluded a 50 year alliance [begun 415 BC]
    • Mantineans re-join the Spartan Alliance [stronger by 417 BC]

Brasidas and the Thracian Campaign: 424 - 422 BC

Role of Brasidas: The Spartans Change Tactics
Brasidas, the Spartan general, with a Peloponnesian force of 1700 hoplites (including 700 helots), marched north to Thrace in 424 BC at the request of Perdiccas of Macedonia and the Thracian towns, who were alarmed at Athenian success
Brasidas had already distinguished himself numerous times up to this point:
  • He rescued the town of Methone from an Athenian sea raid in the first year of the war
  • He was elected Eponymous Ephor (head of state) in 430 BC - likely as a result of his victory at Methone
  • He led the Spartan assault upon the Athenian beach positions at Pylos, suffering a near-mortal wound in the process
  • He saved Megara from an Athenian surprise attack that almost captured the entire city
  • He planned a night raid on Piraeus and planned to sneak into Athens, but his plans were detected and instead he defeated Athenian forces on Salamis
Activity
Thucydides 4.80-81
  1. What were the reasons for the Spartans sending Brasidas north into Thrace?
    • "Largely because it was his own wish"
    • They welcomed the opportunity to send away a bunch of helots
    • Chalcidians were "eager to have him"
    • Side note - they had the helots select their best men, convinced them that they were being freed, but then killed them all as they were the most dangerous
  2. What personal strengths are identified in Brasidas? How did these become advantageous to the Spartans?
    • "His upright and moderate conduct towards the cities which caused most of them to revolt and enabled him to take over by treachery"
    • His reputation "left a conviction on both sides that the rest were like him" - suggesting that he helped to heal Sparta's reputation
    • Said to have "gallantry"
    • Created "pro Spartan feeling" in the Athenian allies
    • "valuable to his country"
Initial Successes
  • Brasidas won over the town of Acanthus by oratory and diplomacy
  • He then took the important Athenian city of Amphipolis by offering moderate terms, guaranteeing the people full political rights and continued possession of their property
  • Any who wished to leave were free to do so within five days
  • Many more Athenian allies joined Brasidas, spurred on by the moderate terms he was offering
  • He also always claimed he was there as a liberator, unlike the Athenians who had enslaved them through force
The Role of Thucydides
  • Thucydides, who at the time was an Athenian general stationed at Thasos, was keeping an eye on Athens' interests in the north-west when Brasidas made his attempt on Amphipolis
  • Thucydides failed to prevent this and the Athenians banished him, but his exile enabled him to write his great history of the Peloponnesian War
  • Brasidas appealed for reinforcements and began building triremes. Torone went over to Sparta by treachery, but once Brasidas entered the city he guaranteed the citizens their civil rights, with no reprisals
Activity: The Fall of Amphipolis
Thucydides 4.108
  1. Why did the fall of Amphipolis cause great alarm for the Athenians?
    • The place was "useful" as it supplied timber for shipbuilding and brought in revenue
    • The Spartans could travel no further than Strymon unless they controlled the bridge, due to Athenian triremes and the great lake they had to cross. "Now, however, the difficulties appeared to have been removed"
    • They feared that their allies would revolt
  2. How did Athenian allies in the region react to the fall of Amphipolis to Brasidas?
    • They "eagerly embraced the idea of a change" and so wanted Brasidas to come into their territories
    • They were excited at the thought of liberation
    • "the excitement of the moment" the chance to see the Spartans act "with real energy"
    • "They made overtures to him, begging him to march on into their territory, and vied with each other in being the first to revolt"
    • Thucydides believed that their confidence that Athens would do nothing was "wishful thinking" due to the Athenians being defeated in Boeoti and an "untrue but attractive" claim from Brasidas that they had not dared to attack his army
  3. Why did the Spartans not send reinforcements to Brasidas despite his successes?
    • "Their leading men were jealous of him"
    • "What they really wanted was to recover the prisoners made on the island and to end the war"
Allies Revolt
  • In 423 an armistice was signed between Athens and Sparta
  • 'The Athenians calculated that in this way Brasidas would not be able to win over any more of their dependencies before they had had time to take measures for their security'
  • However, while these negotiations were in progress, the people of Scione revolted against Athens. Brasidas praised them for their courage and resolution and assured them that as such loyal friends of Sparta, he would honour them in every way
  • When news of the truce arrived Brasidas refused to give up to Scione, even though it had been taken after the armistice was signed. The Athenians were furious; Cleon proposed that it should be recaptured and the death penalty be imposed upon the inhabitants
Cleon's Failure
  • Mende also revolted against Athens and Brasidas accepted the citizens as allies, despite the infringement of the truce. The Athenians made preparations, under Nicias, to attack both cities. Mende was retaken (the Athenian troops had to be restrained from slaughtering the inhabitants) and Scione was placed under siege
  • After the armistice, Cleon sailed out with a force of 1500 against the Thracian towns. During Brasidas' absence, he took Torone and made slaves of the women and children, while the men were sent to Athens
  • In 422 BC Cleon attempted to besiege the city of Amphipolis, but when he marched in front of the walls he realised his position was too exposed and turned his phalanx to retreat - Brasidas, who was waiting in ambush nearby, launched a surprise attack on Cleon's flank with his picked Spartan forces
  • The battle for Amphipolis was lost by Cleon and the Athenians, who were disorganised, panic-stricken and thrown off balance by the audacity of Brasidas. Both Brasidas and Cleon died - one in battle and the other, according to Thucydides, fleeing from the scene. Now "Cleon and Brasidas were dead - the two people who on each side had been most opposed to peace"
The Peace of Nicias 421 BC
  • The disaster at Amphipolis completely changed Athenian public opinion on the war, and with Cleon dead, the main proponent of continuing the war was gone from Athenian politics
  • The Athenians also suffered defeat at Delium against the Boeotians, in a battle that recorded the the first instances of friendly fire and a flamethrower in history
  • Soon after delegates from Sparta arrived in Athens, and talks for peace began
  • Within a few months, peace was agreed upon, named the "Peace of Nicias" after the Athenian general and politician Nicias, who had led the "peace faction" in Athens during Cleon's time in power, and who now negotiated the peace with Sparta
Activity
Thucydides 5.13-17
  1. Outline the reasons why both Athens and Sparta desired peace at this stage of the war
    • Athens:
      • As Brasidas had died, reinforcements "turned back home, thinking that the time for action had passed"
      • "They themselves were not capable of carrying out the plans which Brasidas had had in mind"
      • The Athenians had suffered a "serious blow" at Delium, and another at Amphipolis
      • "They no longer possessed the same confidence in their strength which had induced them to reject previous offers of peace"
      • "They were also apprehensive about the allies, fearing that they might be encouraged by these defeats to revolt on a more serious scale"
    • Sparta:
      • Sparta was collapsing from the inside, as more and more Helots deserted them
      • The Spartans "had found that the war had gone very differently from what they had imagined" - they had thought that they could have destroyed the power of Athens in a few years, simply by laying waste her land
      • The Thirty Years Peace Treaty between Sparta and Argos was expiring. The Spartans suspected that some of the states in the Peloponnese would switch sides.
      • They didn't want to fight both Athens and Argos at once
      • They were "desperate" to get their men back who had been captured at Pylos
  1. Why did both Brasidas and Cleon wish for the war to continue?
    • Brasidas:
      • "because of the success and honour which had come to him through war"
    • Cleon:
      • "because he thought that in a time of peace and quiet people would be more likely to notice his evil doings and less likely to believe his slander of others"
  2. What were the motives of the two new leaders Nicias and Pleistoanax behind desiring peace?
    • Nicias:
      • Had an "unblemished" career and wanted to keep it that way, but could only do that by "leaving as little to fortune as possible" which was only possible in peace time
      • "to find immediate release from toil and trouble both for himself and his fellow citizens, and to leave behind the name of one whose service to the state was successful from start to finish"
    • Pleistoanax:
      • Was being accused and slandered constantly and believed that in peace time such accusations would stop and that with the prisoners back, his opponents wouldn't be able to blame him for their captivity
      • "enemies would have no bases from which to attack him"
      • He had taken a bribe from Pericles years previously and had been exiled because of it.

Tuesday, 21 April 2020

The Battle of Pylos and Sphacteria

In the years following the death of Pericles and Archidamus, the war escalated in its brutality, 428-425 BC:
Sparta
  • When Archidamus dies c. 428 BC, command of the war passed to his son King Agis
  • Agis was young and energetic, and decided to attempt more daring strategies against the Athenians, whilst sticking to the invasion tactics of his father
  • In 428-427 BC the Spartans and Thebans attacked Plataea, hoping to draw the Athenians out to help their oldest ally
  • The Plataeans pleaded with the Spartans, drawing on the fact they had served loyally during the Persian wars. The Spartans promised to leave Plataea alone so long as they remained neutral
  • Plataea instead remained loyal to Athens, and with no possible assistance after a bloody siege Plataea was captured, the Thebans destroyed the city and many of the defenders were massacred
Athens
  • With the death of Pericles, the democracy turned to the demagogues, led by Cleon 
  • Cleon had risen in Athens' political scene by setting himself up as anti-Periclean in his strategy, and was known for "the violence of his character" according to Thucydides
  • In 427 BC the city of Mytilene on Lesbos revolted from the Delian League
  • Cleon advised that the Athenians make an example of Mytilene and massacre the entire population - men, women and children
  • Amazingly the Athenians voted for this. But the next day had a change of conscience and recalled the assembly to vote again
  • After a heated debate, the Athenians (thankfully) changed their minds and cancelled the plan
Overview
  • The battle of Sphacteria (425 BC) was the second part of a two-part battle which shocked Sparta and the Greek world
  • The chain of events that led to this almost unprecedented disaster began when an Athenian force under the command of Demosthenes landed on the rocky headland of Pylos, in the south-west of the Peloponnese and fortified their position after weathering a storm
  • The Peloponnesian army under King Agis abandoned their short invasion of Attica and returned to the Peloponnese, while the forces already at Sparta moved west to deal with the new threat

Initial Problems
  • For a brief period Demosthenes was in serious trouble:
    • The Spartans summoned their fleet to Pylos, and he found himself besieged by land and sea
    • The Athenian position was on a headland at one end of the Bay of Pylos
  • The island of Sphacteria ran across the mouth of the bay, and was occupied by the Spartans The Spartan fleet moved into the bay, trapping the Athenians and preventing any supplies from reaching them
  • In the resulting battle of Pylos the Athenians managed to hold off a two-pronged Spartan assault, but they were really saved by the arrival of an Athenian fleet
  • This fleet inflicted a heavy defeat on the Spartan fleet inside the bay, in the process lifting the blockade of Pylos
  • The tables were not turned on the Spartans. A force of 420 Spartan hoplites, under the command of Epitades, son of Molobrus was trapped on Sphacteria
  • The Spartans responded by sending senior members of their government to Pylos to examine the situation. When it becomes clear that they could not hope to get supplies onto the island or rescue the hoplites, they asked the Athenians for an armistice
  • The biggest weakness in the Spartan system was the shortage of full citizens, and they could hardly afford to lose 420 full Spartans. This was reflected in the terms they agreed with the Athenians:
    • Every warship that had taken part in the earlier fighting and every warship in Laconia was to be handed over to the Athenians for the duration of the armistice
    • The Spartans were to stop all attacks on Pylos, while the Athenians stopped attacking Sphacteria, and allowed a fixed amount of food onto the island
    • The armistice would stay in place while Spartan representatives went to Athens to offer peace terms
Activity: Spartan Negotiation
Thucydides, 4.19-20
What arguments do the Spartans make as to why peace should be made?
  •  "if peace was ever desirable for both parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally"
  • "No lasting settlement can be made in a spirit of revenge"
  • "thinking it better for both sides that the affair should not proceed to the bitter end"
  • "if we, Athens and Sparta, stand together, you can be sure that the rest of Hellas, in its inferior position...will show us every possible mark of honour"
  • "for sense of honour... and men are more inclined to act in this way towards their greatest enemies"
  • "for this they will think that it is you rather than we whom they have to thank"
  • "the enemy is already under obligation to pay back good for good"
  • "while you have won glory and can have our friendship as well"
  • "by accepting our proposals you can have the firm friendship of Sparta"
  • "when one side gets the better of things in war and forces its opponent to swear to carry out the terms of an unequal treaty"
Failed Negotiations
  • The peace negotiations and their aftermath do not reflect well on the Athenians. They demanded the return of lands lost at the end of the First Peloponnesian War, and when the negotiations broke down they refused to honour the terms of the armistice and kept the Spartan warships. The armistice lasted twenty days
  • After the failure of the negotiations the fighting resumed. The Spartans continued their attacks on the Athenians on Pylos, while the Athenians maintained the naval blockade of Sphacteria
  • Both sides were effectively under siege, but at first it was the Spartans who put the most effort into getting supplies to their troops. Volunteers were asked to try and get supplies onto the island, with a cash reward for free men and freedom as the rewards for helots. Any boats used in the operation were valued beforehand, so it did not matter if they were lost. Some men waited for the right weather and effectively rammed the island at full speed, damaging their boats but winning the reward. Others swam in under water, towing supplies protected by skins
Cleon and Nicias
  • As the siege dragged on the Athenian people became concerned that the Spartans would escape
  • The politician Cleon, who had played a major role in convincing the people to reject the Spartan peace offer, became increasingly unpopular. In an attempt to restore his popularity he tried to blame the general, Nicias (son of Niceratus) for the failures, claiming that a true leader would have easily captured the island by now. This badly backfired, for the Athenian people began to ask why Cleon was not leading the army if it was that simple
  • Nicias added to his problems by giving him permission to take any troops that he required and take command of the siege. Eventually Cleon was backed into a corner, and had no other choice than to go to Sphacteria. He now raised the stakes once again by announcing that he would take the island in twenty days, without using any fresh Athenian troops
  • Cleon times his arrival at Sphacteria perfectly. Demosthenes had been unwilling to risk a landing on the island because it was covered in thick woodland, with no paths, and he believed that this would give the Spartans too big an advantage
  • Just before Cleon arrived, one of the Spartans accidently set the woods on fire, and most of the trees burnt down. The fire also revealed a number of landing points, and that there were more Spartans on the island than previously believed, making them an even bigger prize
  • The two Athenian generals began by sending a herald to the island to ask the Spartans to surrender on generous terms. When this offer was rejected, they waited for a day and then launched a surprise attack on the island
  • The Spartans were divided into three camps
    • The main camp, under their commander Epitades, was in the centre of the island. This was both the most level and best provided with water
    • A guard of thirty hoplites was at the end of the island the Athenians chose to attack (probably the southern end)
    • Another small detachment was posted at the opposite end, facing the headland of Pylos. This was the rockiest end of the island, and was topped with an old fort that the Spartans hoped to use as a final refuge
  • This attack came on the seventy-second day after the naval battle that had trapped the Spartans
New Tactics
  • The Athenians caught the Spartans out by loading their 800 hoplites onto the ships while it was still dark. The ships then put out to sea as if they were about to mount their normal daily patrols, but instead landed on the island
  • The first Spartan post was overwhelmed. This allowed Demosthenes to bring over the rest of his army - 800 archers, at least 800 peltasts, the Allied contingents and the crews of the seventy Athenian warships. This army was them divided into groups of around 200, and these groups were posted on high ground all around the main Spartan position
  • The Greeks are often accused of being unimaginative in warfare, relying entirely on simple clashes between hoplites, but here we see Demosthenes using a different tactic. The Spartans would find themselves in a trap. If they attempted to attack any part of the Athenian line they would be exposed to attack from the rear, while the lightly armed Athenian troops would be able to retreat from the heavily armoured Spartan hoplites
  • When Epitades realised that the Athenians had landed on the island he formed up his men and moved to attack the Athenian hoplites, expected the standard clash between two lines of similar troops
  • Instead the Spartans found themselves being harried from both flanks by the bowmen, peltasts and stone throwers. The Athenian hoplites refused to come forward and fight, so the Spartans were denied their main target. They were sometimes able to close up with the light troops, but not crush them
  • Eventually they were forced to retreat back up the island to the fort. The Athenians followed, and launched a series of frontal assaults on the fort, but this time the advantages were with the Spartans, and these attacks failed to push the Spartans out of their final defensive lines before the fort itself
  • The stalemate was broken by the commander of the Messenian contingent. He asked Cleon and Demosthenes to give him some archers and light troops. He then picked his way around the rocky coastline of the island, until he was in position on some high ground behind the fort. When these troops appeared behind them the Spartans abandoned their outer lines and pulled back
Round 2: Negotiations
  • At this point Cleon and Demosthenes called a halt to the fighting, and once again sent a herald to offer surrender terms
  • By now the Spartans had lost Epitades, who had been killed, while their second in command, Hippagretas was badly wounded and believed falsely to be dead. This left the third in command, Styphon son of Pharax, in charge
  • According to Thucydides most of the Spartans lowered their shields and made it clear that they wanted to surrender when they first heard the heralds, so Styphon had no choice other than to enter into surrender negotiations. After consulting with the Spartans on the mainland, who gave him no useful advice ("make your own decision about yourselves, so long as you do nothing dishonourable"), Styphon and the Spartans decided, to the shock of the entire Greek world, to surrender
Activity: The Effects of the Battle
Thucydides 4.40-1
What were the effects of the battle of Sphacteria for Sparta?
  •  The Greek world was shocked, as the Spartans were renowned for never surrendering
  • "It was hard to believe that those who had surrendered were the same sort of people as those who had fallen"
  • The Spartans repeatedly sent representatives to Athens to try and get their 120 soldiers back, but returned every time empty handed
  • If the Peloponnesians attacked, the Athenians would kill the Spartan prisoners
  • Delian troops carried out raids using the tactic of epiteichismos.They were helped by the fact that they spoke the same dialect, as Pylos was in what used to be Messania The Spartans had no experience of this type of guerrilla warfare, and as the helots began to desert "they feared the spread of a revolution... and became exceedingly uneasy about it" 
Effects of Surrender
  • The Athenians had captured a very valuable prize. Of the 440 hoplites who had been trapped on the island, 292 were captured and taken to Athens. Of these 120 were full Spartans, a sizable proportion of a very small group
  • The surrender of the Spartans caused shockwaves across the Greek world. Spartans were not expected to surrender, but to fight to the death, regardless of the odds against them
  • The surrender also caused great despondency in Sparta, and triggered a series of peace offers. The prisoners were still a major factor four years later, when the Peace of Nicias (421 BC) did actually end the war for a short period. One of the clauses of the peace treaty saw the Athenians return all Spartans in prison in Athens or in any Athenian dominion