The "Grounds for Complaint": 460-403 BC

Setting the scene

• The Peloponnesian war was fought in ancient Greece from 431 to 404 BC between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian League, an alliance of city-states led by Sparta
• For approximately fifty years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 431 BC, the city-state of Athens had accumulated enormous monetary reserves and extensive political influence in the Aegean region and beyond
• Athens' political supremacy led to an empire and her traditional enemies, as well as some of her vessels, viewed Athenian ascendancy with suspicion. Opposition to Athenian empire united around Sparta, the nucleus of the Peloponnesian League
• For several years political tensions mounted as various diplomatic failures occurred until hostilities broke out. The war sputtered into life as Athens and Sparta took opposing sides in several minor local outbreaks

Thucydides' Assessment

"The Persian War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy conclusion in two battles by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it was, it was short without parallel for the misfortunes it brought upon Greece. Never had so many cities been taken and laid desolate, either by the barbarians, or by fellow Greeks (the old inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others); never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, either on the field of battle or in political strife. All this came upon Greece with the late war, which was begun by Athenians and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made after the conquest of Euboea" - Thucydides 1.23

"I think that the truest explanation (prophasis), but the one that was least made public, was that the growth of Athens' power and the fear that this caused among the Spartans made war inevitable. But the grounds of complaint (aitiai), which were openly stated by each side and led them to break the peace and go to war, were as follows" - VERY IMPORTANT SO REMEMBER

Thucydides 1.23

In these words Thucydides was attempting to single out an underlying cause of the Peloponnesian War beyond the publicly expressed grounds of complaint. His use of the words "prophasis" and "aitiai" has led to a dispute among historians about the actual meaning of this passage, since these words can have different meanings in different contexts - "prophasis" can mean false excuse and "aitiai" true explanations.

However, the use of the qualifying words 'truest' with "prophasis" and 'openly stated' with "aitiai" strongly suggests that Thucydides was giving his own judgement on the real reason why Sparta went to war in 431 BC

• The Spartans would never dare to make this reason public because this was not a valid ground for breaking the peace treaty, and because it would be a shameful admission from such a powerful military state
• Therefore the Spartans concentrated on the grounds of complaint, which affected their allies rather than themselves, in order to press their claims that Athens had broken the Thirty Year Peace. This is further reinforced by Thucydides' explanation of the Spartans' motives for the despatch of three embassies in the months preceding the outbreak of the war

"During this time they kept sending embassies to the Athenians and making complaints so that they might have the best excuse to make war, if the Athenians paid no heed to them" - Thucydides 1.126.1

• However, it is important to review the events that led up to the outbreak of the war in the light of the terms of the Thirty Year Peace. In this way it will be possible to assess the accuracy of Thucydides' statement and to determine the degree of blame that each side should incur for infringing the terms of the peace treaty

The Grounds of Complaint (Aitiai)

• Having stated the "truest explanation" for the outbreak of the war, Thucydides then deals at length with (in his opinion) the two major openly stated grounds of complaint between the combatants - 
• Athens' alliance with Corcyra (1.31-55) and
• The dispute over Potidaea (1.56-65)
• The complaints of the Aeginetans who protested to the Spartans that their promised autonomy had been infringed, and
• Those of the Megarians who referred to an Athenian decree that banned them from the ports in the Athenian Empire and the market of Athens (1.167)

Revolt in Samos

• In 440 BC, Samos, one of the three remaining independent ship-suppliers, clashed with Miletus over the possession of Priene. The Athenians stepped in, resolved the dispute in Miletus' favour, changed the Samian constitution from oligarchic to democratic, placed oligarchic hostages on Lemnos, installed a garrison and returned home
• However, the oligarchs who had escaped earlier, making use of Persian aid, regained control of Samos and revolted from Athens. After a long and arduous campaign the Athenians crushed the revolt in 439 BC, confiscated the Samian fleet, pulled down their walls, took hostages and forced them to pay an indemnity (1.115.2-117.3)
• The dispute with Samos should have been an internal Athenian affair, as Samos was a listed ally of Athens, but there is strong evidence that the Spartans had intended to exploit Athens' problems and launch an attack. The evidence comes from the Corinthian speech to the Athenians in 433 BC

"For when the Samians were in revolt and the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes whether they should help them, we did not cast our vote against you; we clearly spoke against that, saying each state should punish its own allies" - Thucydides 1.40.5

Activity: The Revolt of Samos

Thucydides 1.115-117

Lactor 1: 89 Plutarch, Pericles 28.1-3

Lactor 1: 88 Diodorus

1. What conditions were imposed on the Samians following the revolt? What might be the Athenians' logic behind these conditions?
• Thucydides, Plutarch and Diodorus: the Samian fleet was confiscated, their walls and fortifications were pulled down and a democratic government was established
• Thucydides: Athens took hostages
• Diodorus: Athens demanded war reparations
• Pulling down the walls and taking the fleet left Samos exposed, which meant that it was defenceless and so much less likely to revolt - also made Samos reliant on Athens for protection
• Changing the government aligned Samos with Athens (democracy) over Sparta (oligarchy)
• Taking hostages put pressure on Samos to remain loyal
• Reparations made Samos financially dependent on Athens
• Plutarch: says that Douris of Samos claims that Pericles brought the trierarchs (naval commanders) into the main square and bludgeoned them to death - Plutarch doubts that this is true
2. Who do the Samians turn to for support in their revolt? Why is this significant?
• Thucydides - Samian oligarchs turned to Persia for financial support, which was agreed by the governor of Sardis, Pissuthnes
• shows that Persia still had a desire to involve itself in Greek affairs
3. What are the Corinthians suggesting about how Sparta and the Peloponnesians reacted to the revolt at Samos?
• Thucydidies - claims that the Peloponnesians were planning to assist Samos
• clear violation of the Thirty Years Peace Treaty
• The vote was split, but Corinth reminded the Peloponnesians that under the treaty every state has a right to punish its own allies

Dispute of Epidamnus

• Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra (modern Corfu), which in turn was a colony of Corinth. The democrats had seized power in Epidamnus but the exiled oligarchs, aided by foreign allies, were laying siege to the city
• The democrats appealed to Corcyra, their mother-city, for help but the Corcyraeans refused to become involved (1.24.5-7) The democrats then approached the Delphic oracle to ask if they should hand over their city to Corinth, which, in accordance with tradition, had supplied the leader of the Corcyraeans,  who were about to found the colony of Epidamnus, the Delphic oracle agreed (1.35.2-3)
• The Corinthians willingly accepted on the grounds that they regarded Epidamnus as belonging as much to them as to the Corcyraeans and "at the same time because of their hatred of the Corcyraeans who, although they were colonists of Corinth, did not pay them respect" - Thucydides 1.25.3

Issues

• The Corinthians' hatred was fuelled by the Corcyraeans' disdain for them and their belief in the superiority of their navy, which numbered one hundred and twenty ships. It was this hatred that was to be such an underlying motive for the Corinthians' aggressive behaviour
• The Corinthians sent out a force of troops and settlers to Epidamnus, which in turn led to the Corcyraeans besieging the city (1.26)
• Corinth then prepared a relief force and declared a new colony of Epidamnus, inviting people to volunteer to become new colonists (1.27)
• With the backing of Sparta and Sicyon, the Corcyraeans made a generous offer to the Corinthians that, if they were not willing to give up their claims to Epidamnus and recall their troops, the whole matter should be submitted to arbitration, using as arbitrators either mutually agreed cities in the Peloponnese or the oracle at Delphi
• They particularly urged the Corinthian not to start a war as this would force the Corcyraeans against their wishes to seek military help from elsewhere - a clear hint of seeking an alliance with Athens (1.28)

Corinthian Response

• The Corinthians refused this offer of arbitration and sent out a force of seventy-five ships and 2,000 hoplites to Epidamnus
• The battle of Leucimme (435) resulted in a decisive victory for the Corcyraeans, who also gained control of Epidamnus on the same day (1.29)
• This should have been the end of the matter - the Corinthians, led on by ambition and hatred of the Corcyraeans, had tried to extend their power, but their adventurism had ended in failure. However, the Corinthians were not prepared to let the matter rest

Athens' alliance with Corcyra

• Following their defeat at Leucimme in 435, the Corinthians set about building a new fleet and hiring mercenaries in order to exact revenge against Corcyra
• News of these military preparations caused alarm among the Corcyraeans, and so in 433 BC they sent an embassy to Athens to seek an alliance
• The Corinthians, fearing that the combined navies would prevent them from dealing a decisive blow against Corcyra, also sent an embassy to dissuade the Athenians from making an alliance with Corcyra (1.31)
• A meeting of the Ecclesia was held and both sides were given the opportunity to put their case

Activity: The Dispute over Corcyra

1. [1.33,35] - What reasons do the Corcyraeans give as to why they should be admitted into the Athenian alliance?
• Corcyra played victim (tbf Corinth was even told off by Sparta for being too aggressive)
• Athens would have Corcyra's undying gratitude
• Athens would gain control of the second greatest navy in Hellas
• It would make the Athenians look generous
• Sparta and Corinth were attempting to undermine Athens- conflict inevitable so extra resources would be needed
• Corcyra was neutral so Athens wouldn't have been breaking the treaty
2. [1.40-1] - What rebuttals do the Corinthians give to Corcyra's argument? Why should Athens not admit Corcyra into their alliance?
• Neutral states could ally with Athens, but doing so to hurt other powers would break the treaty
• They said that it was prohibited to accept a state that had revolted from another power, and said that Corcyra had been violent
• When Samos revolted, Corinth had spoken against attacking Athens and had even given them 20 ships (so really Athens should pay them back)
• Said that they had just as much right to attack Corcyra as Athens did to put down Samos
3. [1.44] - What was the response of the Athenians to this debate? What were Athens' terms?
• They had two meetings, one airing towards an alliance with Corinth, the second airing towards an alliance with Corcyra
• The alliance was defensive, so would only come into effect if Corcyra was directly attacked, to avoid total war
• War with the Peloponnesian League seemed inevitable, but Athens was willing to let Corcyra and Corinth weaken each other to give them the largest navy
4. [1.55] - What was the outcome of this dispute?
• Corcyra remained undefeated, thanks to the Athenian fleet driving the Corinthians away during a battle
• However, this gave Corinth a reason for war with Athens
• On their return voyage, the Corinthians took Anactorium, which both Corcyra and Corinth had claims to
• They sold 800 Corcyraean prisoners, but kept 250 who held sway in Corcyra and treated them well

Corinthians' Biggest Flaw

• The greatest difficulty for the Corinthians was to produce an argument to counter-act the Corcyraeans' convincing statement that the Athenians had a legal and legitimate right to make an alliance with themselves, as it was specifically laid down in the treaty that a neutral state was free to ally itself with whatever side it wished
• The Corinthians attempted to cloud and obscure the issue by equating Corcyra's position with that of Samos. On their interpretation Corcyra was a Corinthian ally that had revolted, and this they should have the right to discipline their recalcitrant ally without outside interference, as they themselves had argues to the Peloponnesians at the time of Samos' revolt in 440 BC
• The fallacy in the Corinthians' argument was that Corcyra, although being a colony of Corinth, was not an ally and therefore could not be in revolt - thus there was no comparability between Corcyra and Samos

Athenians Actions

• Sent ten ships and three generals as a reinforcement to Corcyra. Such a small force would have done little to calm Corcyraean fears, especially as the Corinthians were equipping a fleet of 150 ships
• However, this small fleet with its large number of generals (the same number as on the Sicilian expedition in 415 BC), including Lacedaimonius, the son of Cimon and proxenos of Sparta, revealed Athens' true objective:
• their preferred means for resolving their difficulties with Corinth was diplomacy and not military force
• "The Athenians ordered the generals not to fight a sea-battle with the Corinthians unless they should sail against Corcyra and were about to land there or at some other point in their territory - then they were to prevent it as best as possible. They gave these orders in order to avoid breaking the treaty" - Thucydides 1.45.3

Athens' treatment of Potidaea

• The next ground of complaint, in 432 BC, concerned Potidaea and its inhabitants:
• "who lived on the isthmus of Pallene and, although colonists of the Corinthians, were phoros-paying allies of the Athenians" - Thucydides 1.56.2
• The Thraceward region was of immense importance to the Athenians. Apart from its richness in natural resources and its favourable trading position, it was the man safeguard against the eastward expansion of Macedon, which at that time was under the control of Perdiccas
• The relationship between the Athenians and Perdiccas was constantly changing from friendship to enmity, since the motivating force on both sides was expediency
• At the time of the Potidaean affair, he was hostile to the Athenians due to their support of his rivals, Philip and Deucas, and consequently played an important supportive role in the revolt of Potidaea (1.57.2-5)

Why Potidaea became an issue

• Potidaea was an ally of Athens, but a colony of Corinth
• The Athenians demanded that the Potidaeans:
• pull down their wall on the side of Pallene
• hand over hostages, and
• banish and not receive in the future the magistrates that Corinth usually sent each year
• These were tough demands on a state that had done no wrong, and this harsh treatment was bound to upset the Corinthians who had retained such warm, close ties with their colony

Activity: The Dispute over Potidaea

1. [1.56-7] What caused the dispute over Potidaea?
• It was a colony of Corinth 
• Perdiccas of Macedonia was angered that Athens had supported his rivals
• Corinth was openly hostile
• Athens was worried that Potidaea would revolt with the support of Corinth and Perdiccas
• Athens sent 30 ships and 1,000 hoplites to Macedonia to take Potidaean hostages and demanded that the Potidaeans tear down their defences and banish the Corinthian magistrates
• The Potidaeans pleaded with Athens to lessen the severity of the punishment, but were refused
2. [1.58] - What did the Spartans promise the Potidaeans if they revolted? Why is this significant?
• The Corinthians brought Potidaea's complaints to Sparta
• Spartans agreed to invade Attica if Athens attacked Potidaea, which was significant as it would put them at war with Athens
• Sparta breaking the treaty in two ways:
• not submitted to arbitration
• the treaty also stipulated that one side could not interfere or assist the other side's allies
• Corinthians send a mercenary and volunteer force to Potidaea - 1600 hoplites and 400 light troops
3. [1.60-61] Which city had more grounds for complaint over this dispute in Potidaea? Athens or Corinth?
• Athens:
• Their concerns over Potidaea were justified, with it having support from several enemies of Athens, and the threat from Sparta could not be understated
• Legally, Athens could do whatever it wanted to Potidaea - it was their ally
• Corinthians and Spartans completely ignored arbitration and resorted immediately to war
• Corinth and Sparta had broken the treaty by interfering in Athens' alliance
• Corinth:
  
• The force they sent out was a volunteer force, along with mercenaries
• Athens were being far too harsh to Potidaea, as they had done nothing wrong
• Potidaea was their colony - the Potidaens were their kin
• The Corinthians had a moral obligation to be involved

• Even if Athen's behaviour was harsh and unjustified, Sparta and Corinth had no more legal right to intervene directly in Potidaea than they had in Samos
• Their main available legal redress was to demand that the issue be submitted to arbitration, but instead the Corinthians actively urged the Potidaeans to seek military help from Sparta, and the Spartans (whether the authorities or the Assembly) promised an invasion of Attica, thus encouraging the Potidaeans to revolt from Athens
• The Athenians had sent out Archestratos with thirty ships and one thousand hoplites to carry out their demands, but they arrived to find that a full-scale revolt had broken out:
• "Meanwhile the Corinthians, since the Potidaeans had revolted and that Athenian ships were close to Macedonia, being afraid for the place and thinking that the danger was their own responsibility, sent out volunteers of their own and by the use of pay, sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops from the other Peloponnesians" - Thucydides 1.60-1
• Therefore, the Athenians sent out forty ships and 2,000 hoplites under Callias, and, after making another cynical alliance with Perdiccas, descended upon Potidaea. There the Athenians fought a battle against the Potidaeans, the Corinthian volunteers and the Peloponnesians, resulting in an Athenian victory and the beginning of the siege of Potidaea that lasted to 429 BC (1.62-4)
• The use of Corinthian troops in battle to support an Athenian listed ally exposed Corinth once again to the charge of acting in defiance of the terms of the treaty. However, if these Corinthian fighters were genuine volunteers and were acting independently of the state of Corinth, then Corinth could have been exonerated on this issue. But the above quotation speaks of 'the Corinthians' sending out the volunteers and these 'Corinthians' must be the government of the state of Corinth
• In addition, when the Peace of Nicias was signed in 421 BC, the Corinthians refused to abide by its conditions:
• "They made as their excuse the fact that they could not betray their allies in Thrace. For they had independently sworn oaths with them, when they had first revolted with the Potidaeans, and later" - Thucydides 5.30.2
• It is clear from these words that the oaths had created some form of military alliance between the Corinthians and the Potidaeans and, most probably, the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans who had revolted together in 432 BC, since Thucydides twice refers to the enemy forces in 432 BC as 'the Potidaeans and their allies' (1.63.3, 1.64.1)
• Oaths of alliance could not be made 'unofficially', but only between states, and therefore the Corinthians had sworn oaths of alliance with three groups of Athenian listed allies and were officially supplying military help against the Athenians - a clear breach of the treaty

The Peace of Kalias and Thirty Years Peace: 449 BC - 445 BC

479-445 BC, Four politicians wrestle for dominance in Athenian political life

Aristeides (530-468BC) "The Just"

Called "the wisest and most honourable man in Athens" by Herodotus. Aristeides was strategos in Athens during the Persian Wars, where he led the Athenian forces at Plataea. After the wars he earned his nickname "the just" for his role in creating the Delian League and his fair treatment of Athens' allies

Kimon (c.510-450 BC)

Son of Miltiades, victor of Marathon, Kimon served as strategos following the Persian Wars. Known for his pro-Spartan, conservative foreign policy. He was ostracised by the Athenians in the 460s BC, but returned in the 450s. Kimon's most famous achievement is the victory at the Eurymedon River against the Persian fleet, which effectively marked the end of the Persian Wars

Democrats

Kallias (dates unknown)

Supporter of Pericles, he acted as a diplomat for Athens and the Delian League during the period following the Persian Wars. Most notably he secured the peace that marked the end of the Persian Wars in 450 BC - the "Peace of Kallias"

Pericles

Rising star in Athenian politics during this period. Pericles was a radical democrat and imperialist who led Athens during her golden age into the Peloponnesian War. His most lasting achievement is the building of the Parthenon

Athenian Actions against the Persians

In the mid 450s, a five-year truce was signed between the Athenians and Spartans; freeing up the Delian forced to go on the offensive against the Persians:

Eurymedon River 466 BC:

Delian navy - some 200 strong - under Kimon win a stunning victory against Persian forces in 466 BC, though are unable to press their attack due to events back home

Cyprus c.453-450 BC:

A fleet of 200 ships under the command of Kimon sailed to Cyprus, where multiple victories against the Persians allowed the Athenians to liberate the island. The loss was enough to force the Persians to the negotiating table. The "Peace of Kallias" was signed not long after this campaign

449 BC: Peace of Kallias signed

Persians: shocked by series of defeats by Athenian navy

Athenians: losses in Egypt and at Tanagra to the Spartans had changed popular opinion on continuing the war

Questions: Using Lactor 1:33, 51-54 (pp. 46-47)

1.  Outline the conditions agreed upon in the Peace of Kallias 
1. Plutarch - The Persians had to keep a 'horse's journey' from the Greek sea
2. Diodorus - The Persian Satraps were not to come any closer than 3 days' journey to the coast
3. Diodorus - Greek cities in Asia Minor given their autonomy
4. (Plutarch and Diodorus) - Persian warships will not sail in the Greek sea
5. Diodorus - The Athenians agreed to stop invading the Persian King's land
2. To what extent can Kimon be considered the most responsible for securing peace between the Greeks and the Persians?
1. Plutarch - no one did more to humble the Great King's pride than Kimon
2. Plutarch - he remained hard on the Persian's heels - not letting them gain their breath
3. Plutarch - Kimon's "famous victory" led to the treaty
4. Plutarch - he completely cleared Asia of Persian arms from Ionia to Pamphylia
3. What problems with regards to the reliability of the sources for the Peace of Kallias can you identify?
1. No mention of the treaty in Thucydides - our most comprehensive, well researched, contemporary source
2. Plutarch - Callisthenes (a fourth century historian) claims that the terms were not agreed upon but the Persian King acted as if they had been (out of fear)
3. Theopompus - the treaty was written in the wrong Greek language for the time (Ionic when it should have been Attic)

Thirty Years Peace

-in 446/5 a Thirty Year Peace was agreed between Athens and Sparta on the following terms:

1. Athens had to give up control of Nisaea, Pagae, Troezen and Achaea (1.115.1)
2. There should be a list of allies of each side, and each side should keep what it possessed at the time of the treaty with the exception of those mentioned in clause 1 (1.140.2). If any ally were to revolt and be received into the other side's alliance, then the alliance which received the revolting ally would be deemed to have broken the treaty
3. Any state not listed was deemed to be a 'neutral' and therefore was free to join either alliance, if it wished (1.35.2)
4. Neither side was allowed to make an armed attack on the other, if the latter wished to go to arbitration (1.85.2)
5. Argos, although unlisted, was exempt from clause 3. No military alliance was to exist between Argos and Athens, although diplomatic relations were allowed
6. There may have been a clause guaranteeing the autonomy of Aegina within the Athenian Empire (1.67.2)

The Thirty Years Peace Treaty

The Thirty Years' Peace was a treaty, signed between the Greek city-states Athens and Sparta, in the year 446/445 BCE. The treaty brought an end to the conflict commonly known as the First Peloponnesian War, which had been raging since c.464 BCE
The primary purpose of the treaty was to prevent another outbreak of war. Ultimately, the peace treaty failed in achieving its goal. With the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War, in 431 BCE

Term of the Treaty	Who benefitted more from the Agreement?	Why?
Athens had to give up control of Nisaea, Pagae, Troezen and Achaea (1.115.1)	Sparta	Athens gave up control of all city states in the Peloponnese
There should be a list of allies of each side, and each side should keep what it possessed at the time of the treaty with the exception of those mentioned in clause 1(1.140.2). If any ally were to revolt and be received into the other side's alliance, then the alliance which received the revolting ally would be deemed to have broken the treaty	Athens	If an ally revolts, the Spartans can not intervene and try to help them
Any state not listed was deemed to be a 'neutral' and therefore was free to join either alliance, if it wished (1.35.2)	Both (Although according to Thucydides, Athens benefitted the most)	Greek states may prefer to join Sparta rather than falling victim to Athenian Imperialism Both sides could gain new allies - Athens gained Corcyca as an ally Athens may have benefitted the most as it gave them free reign to continue expanding
Argos, although unlisted, was exempt from clause 3. No military alliance was to exist between Argos and Athens, although diplomatic relations were allowed	Sparta	Athens and Argos couldn't ally themselves against Sparta
There may have been a clause guaranteeing the autonomy of Aegina within the Athenian Empire (1.67.2)	Sparta/Aegina	Athens could not control or take tribute from Aegina

The First Peloponnesian War, 460-445 BC, Thucydides 1.103-114

              

Theatre of War	States Involved	Individuals Involved	Battles Fought	Outcome
Megara	Athens Megara Corinth	Myronides - Athenian in command of the Magarian garrison	Athenians land at Haliae, engaged by Corinthians and Epidaurians, Corinthians were victorious Later naval engagement at Cecryphalia, at which the Athenians were victorious The Corinthians seize Geraneia and move into Megarid, Athenians gather a force of old and young reserves	Athens helps Megara build long walls down to Nisaea "This act caused bitter hatred by Corinth for Athens" Indecisive battle fought, both sides think they have won, Corinthians send out a force to set up a trophy, which is surrounded and massacred - decisive blow to Corinthians
Egypt	Athens Libya/Egypt Persian Empire	Psammetichus, king of Libya Megabazus - Persian envoy to Sparta	Fleet of 200 ships sent from Athens to assist the Egyptian rebels Initially Athenians and Egyptian rebels gain ground against the Persians "masters of Egypt" Megabazus invades Egypt with a Persian relief force, defeats the Egyptians in battle and drive the Athenians from Memphis	Megara defects from Delian League and re-joins the Peloponnesian league at the very end of the conflict Megabazus tries to bribe the Spartans into invading Attica, but is unsuccessful After six years the Athenians were besieged in Prosopitis and destroyed, only a few escaped Egypt remains in Persian control
Aegina	Athens Aegina	Leocrates - commander of Athenian force	Big sea battle off the coast of Aegina, with the support of allies on both sides Peloponnesians land on Aegina with 300 hoplites in an attempt to relieve the siege	Athenians win the naval engagement, land and besiege Aegina 70 Aeginetan ships were captured The hoplites helped Aegina to remain unconquered, but it was deprived of military strength
Doris	Phocians Dorians Spartans	Nicomedes - Spartan commander	1,500 Spartan hoplites and 10,000 Peloponnesian allies sent to help the Dorians	Spartans compel Phocis to give back towns they had taken Spartans forced to cross back into the Peloponnese inland, since they feared an attack at sea Spartans had to stay in Boeotia
Boeotia	Athens Sparta	Myronides - Athenian commander	Battle fought at Tanagra "whole Athenian army" 14,000 troops including 1,000 Argive hoplites vs 1,500 Spartans and 10,000 allies Battle at Oenophyta, between Athenians and Boeotians Athenians then sailed round the Peloponnese under Tolmides and burnt the the Spartan dockyards before capturing Chalcis from Corinth	"Great losses on both sides" but Sparta and their allies were victorious Spartans marched down into Megarid, and after cutting down plantation trees returned home Athenians victorious, conquer all of Boeotia and Phocis, pull down fortifications at Tanagra and take hostages Eventually, the Athenians driven out by the Boeotians, lose their territorial possessions
Thessaly	Athens Thessaly	Orestes, exiled king of Thessaly Pericles	Athenians and a force of Boeotian/Phocian allies marched into and dominated the Thessalian countryside Pericles landed at Pegae and captured towns in Acarnania	Athenians could not conquer the country though due to the Thessalian cavalry "returned home again not having achieved any results"
Cyprus	Athens Persian Empire	Cimon, son of Miltiades - Athenian commander	200 ships sent out as an expedition Battle fought against a force of Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians - Eurymedon River	Athenians victorious - Peace of Kallias signed with Persia
Euboea	Euboeans Athens	Pericles - Athenian general	Euboeans revolt from Athenian empire, thinking they could be successful as Athens was at war on so many fronts	Pericles arrived with a substantial force, and subdued the island again - Euboea reduced to a subject territory of Athens

                            

Dissolution of the Hellenic League: 479-464 BC

Historical Problems

• Unlike the opening decades of fifth century BC, we have no detailed historical accounts of this period
• Herodotus finishes his account on the aftermath of Mycale
• Thucydides, his successor, begins his work exactly where Herodotus finishes - with Greek movements after Mycale
• However, he only provides brief overviews of events , and other writers who cover this period either contradicted Thucydides or give accounts of completely different events

After Mycale: Thucydides 1.89

• After Plataea and Mycale, the Peloponnesians headed home
• However, troops from Athens, Ionia and the Hellespont moved north to the Persian stronghold of Sestos, on the European side of the Hellespont
• They successfully besieged the city, under the command of Athenian general Xanthippus

Athens: Recaptured, Rebuilt

• Knowing that the Persian threat was over, the Athenians reoccupied their city and began the long process of rebuilding
• Themistocles, wishing to permanently strengthen Athens' defensive position in case of further attacks, decided on a vast series of fortifications that would link the city of Athens proper with its main port called the Piraeus
• The Spartans, hearing that the Athenians were strengthening their position, sent a delegation to Athens to oppose the decision

The Long Walls: Thucydides 89-93

What arguments do the Spartans give as to why the Athenians should not fortify their city? Do these seem genuine?

•  According to Thucydides, the Spartans "would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other had walls" and "feared not only the greatness of their (Athenian) navy...but also their courage shown against the Persians"
• The Spartans sent ambassadors to advise the Athenians to "not build their walls but rather join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing...not discovering their meaning and the jealousy they had of the Athenians, but pretending this:" - they basically said that it would be best to tear down all fortifications so the Persians wouldn't have a stronghold for their operations if they came back
• "If the barbarian returned he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war...and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire and from whence to withstand the war"
• As Thucydides writes, the Spartans feared the greatness of the Athenian navy and the courage of the Athenians, which means that it is very unlikely that the Spartans would be genuine in their advice. Thucydides blatantly claims that the Spartans were jealous of the Athenians and "pretended" that they had other reasons for their advice

How do the Athenians deal with/respond to Sparta's demands?

•  The Athenians "dismissed them presently" and said that they would send ambassadors to Lacedaemon. Themistocles wanted to go and willed the ambassadors to stay until the walls were big enough to fight from. He said that he would "do the rest" at Lacedaemon
• He went to Lacedaemon, but delayed announcing himself and told those in his office who asked that the ambassadors had been held up and that he was waiting for them to arrive. He said that he "wondered they were not come already"
• The Athenians kept the Spartan ambassadors at Athens "for he (Themistocles) feared lest the Lacedaemons, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go"
• The Lacedaemons "made no show of being angry" when they found out about the Athenians building the wall, as they had sent ambassadors to ADVISE them not to build the wall, not to demand it "yet they were inwardly offended"
• The ambassadors on both sides "returned without complaint"
• Once the walls were finished, Themistocles told the Spartans that building the walls was for the good of Greece

What does this incident reveal about Spartan/Athenian relations?

•  It is painstakingly obvious that there is constant tension between Athens and Sparta. Both sides have no trust in the other and so dance around each other under the pretext of friendship. It seems obvious to me that their alliance is purely out of necessity and has always been fragile, as they constantly undermine each other and refuse to trust each other out of fear that the other will betray them
• Themistocles said that the Spartans should treat Athens as if she is able to make her own decisions outside of Sparta's sphere of influence - "if the Spartans or their allies wanted to send embassies to Athens on any subject, they should in future go there prepared to recognise that the Athenians were capable of making up their own interests and about the interests of the rest of Hellas"

Ionians Reject Spartan Leadership

• In the mid 470s BC, the Greeks still remained in Ionia to crush any last Persian resistance in Greek-occupied lands
• The Spartans were still in charge, including Pausanias - the victor of Plataea, who led a Peloponnesian Fleet to help in the liberation of Ionia
• Very quickly however, Pausanias was recalled from duty by the Spartan government
• There had been accusations of Medising and collaborating with the Persians, of unlawful military operations, of extortion of the Ionian allies, and of wishing to establish himself as a tyrant in the Chersonese
• Pausanias was acquitted of some of the more serious crimes, but on other counts was found guilty
• Eventually he sought refuge in a Temple to Hera, but he was starved out of the sanctuary and died on the temple steps

Thucydides 1.94-95 

What caused the Ionian Greeks to reject Spartan leadership of the Hellenic League following the Persian Wars?

• Pausanias had been acting like a tyrant and dictator - for the Ionians they were replacing one overlord with another (Persia for Sparta)
• There were accusations that Pausanias planned to medise and set himself up as a tyrant with Persian backing

Why were the Spartans happy at this time to allow the Athenians to take leadership over the Greeks?

•  It allowed them to shift the burden of defence on Athens
• They saw the Athenians as being capable of continuing the war with Persia
• The Spartans feared that their officers were becoming corrupt when they were sent overseas
• They feared how much unpopularity Pausanias had stirred amongst the Greeks
• Athens was still on friendly terms with Sparta

Lactor 1.1  and Aristeides 23, Plutarch

What caused the Ionian Greeks to reject Spartan leadership of the Hellenic League following the Persian Wars?

• Spartan commanders had treated the Ionians harshly, with contempt
• The Spartans had refused the other Greeks their supplies and sometimes gave harsh beatings
• The Athenian commander treated them in a kindly and considerate manner
• "Pausanias always met the allied commanders with a short temper and rough treatment, and he punished the troops with beatings and making them stand holding an iron anchor all day"
• "[23.3] No one was allowed to fetch bedding or fodder or approach a spring to get water before the Spartans did, servants with whips driving away those who tried"
  

Why were the Spartans happy at this time to allow the Athenians to take leadership over the Greeks?

•  "[23.7] it was here that Sparta's wisdom revealed itself as remarkable. For when they became conscious that their commanders were being corrupted by the amount of power they were exercising, they willingly gave up the leadership and stopped sending generals to the war; they chose to have citizens who were self-controlled and continued to behave according to traditional values rather than to rule the whole of Greece"
• It seems that the Spartans recognised Pausanias' cruelty and so willingly gave up their claim

The Delian League: Organisation

What arrangements were made by Athens for the organisation of the Delian League?

Thucydides 1.96-101

• The Athenians "assessed the various contributions to be made for the war against Persia"
• They decided who would contribute what (ships, money, soldiers etc)
• Officials known as "Hellenic Treasurers" were appointed to receive the tributes
• "The original sum fixed for the tribute was 460 talents"

Diodorus, 11.46-47, 50

• People much preferred Aristeides to Pausanias - and so "he made them all incline...to the Athenians"
• "He advised all the allies to choose Delos as their common treasury"
• "and to impose a levy on all cities according to their means for the war"
• The total collected was 560 talents
• Aristeides was given the nickname 'Aristeides the Just'
  

Plutarch Aristeides, 23, 24.1-5

• Aristeides was instructed to "consider the land and income of each city and to fix the contributions according to the resources of each"
• "Aristeides' assessment was 460 talents: Pericles added practically a third to this, for Thucydides says [111] that at the beginning of the [Peloponnesian] war 600 talents were coming in to the Athenians from their allies"
  

What demands are made of the allies in the league and what actions did the Athenians make when a member state (such as Naxos and Thasos) refused to submit to these demands?

Thucydides 1.96-101

• "the history of these years will show how the Athenian Empire came into being"
• "The leadership of the Athenians began with allies who were originally independent states and reached their decision in general congress"
• "The member states had to contribute money, soldiers or ships
• "Naxos left the League and the Athenians made war on the place"
• The main reasons for the revolts were disputes over the tributes (some failed to produce the right amount) - some even outright refused
• The Athenians "made themselves unpopular by bringing the severest pressure to bear on allies who were not used to making sacrifices and did not want to make them"
• The revolt in Thasos was caused by a dispute over the markets on the mainland opposite in Thrace (and over a mine)
• The Athenians sailed to Thasos with their fleet and won a naval engagement - then they fought on land
• The people of Thasos, defeated and now besieged, appealed to Sparta for help (they wanted the Spartans to invade Attica)
• Before the Spartans could help, there was a massive earthquake which led the helots to revolt
• Since the Spartans were preoccupied, in the third year of the siege, the Thasians had to agree to the Athenian terms
• "their walls were demolished and their navy surrendered"
• "they were ordered to pay an immediate indemnity and to pay tribute in the future
• "they surrendered their rights on the mainland and also the mine there"

Diodorus, 11.46-47, 50

• Nothing that I could find
  

Plutarch Aristeides, 23, 24.1-5

• "Even while the Spartans were leading them, the Greeks made contributions towards the war."
• "Wanting the burden on each city to be moderate, they asked the Athenians for Aristeides' help, and instructed him to consider the land and income of each city and to fix the contributions according to the resources of each."

• Aristeides' assessment was 460 talents: Pericles added practically a third to this, for Thucydides says [111] that at the beginning of the [Peloponnesian] war 600 talents were coming in to the Athenians from their allies; [24.5] after Pericles' death, the demagogues [popular political leaders] increased it little by little until they brought the total to 1,300 talents. They did this not so much because of the length and fortunes of war, but because they enticed the people into distributions of money, payments for public shows [theorika], and constructing cult statues and temples"
  

How do Sparta react to Athenian actions at this stage?

Thucydides 1.96-101

• The Spartans promised the people of Thasos that they would help them to fight the Athenians, but at that time there was a huge earthquake and the helots revolted, so they were delayed for a long time (which subsequently led to the Athenians winning)
• "the people of Thasos, who had been defeated in battle and were now besieged, appealed to Sparta and urged her to come to their help by invading Attica. The Spartans, without informing Athens of their intentions, promised to do so, and would have done so if they had not been prevented by the earthquake which happened then and by the simultaneous revolt and secession to Ithome of the helots and some of the perioeci... So Sparta had a war on her hands"

Diodorus, 11.46-47, 50

• "In this year [475], the Spartans showed their resentment that they had lost command of the sea for no good reason"
• "the Spartans debated whether to go to war with the Athenians over the command by sea"
• When the Assembly met, some (mainly the young men) were "ambitious" to get the command back
• Hetoimarides said that the Spartans shouldn't war with the Athenians over the command of the sea - he managed to convince the Spartans not to 

Plutarch Aristeides, 23, 24.1-5

• Nothing that I could find

What do these instances reveal about the nature of the Delian League in this period?

• These instances show the Delian League to be ingenuine, and an alliance of necessity alone. The constant betrayals, tensions, and lies show that the individual Greek states were selfish, and that the arrangement had been unstable from the start

Revolt of Thasos (TH.1.100.2-3)

• Thasos had long dominated the northern Aegean coast opposite its island
• Athenian activities in the Amphipolis region further conflicted with Thasian interests
• Thasos revolted from the Delian League, 465-463 BC
• The Spartans at this stage had even planned an invasion of Attica during this revolt, to stop Athenian aggression toward her allies. However, a Helot revolt against the Spartans at Messene put this invasion on hold

Helot Revolt at Ithome, 464 BC

• In 464 BC, an earthquake in Laconia decimated Sparta
• The city of Sparta was very poorly built, due to Sparta's focus on military training rather than civil administration, and so only a few houses survived this disaster
• Historical sources suggest that the death toll may have been as high as 20,000, although modern scholars suggest that this figure is likely an exaggeration
• The earthquake sparked a revolt of the JHelots, who took the opportunity to throw off the yoke of their Spartan overlords
• Events surrounding this revolt led to an increase in tension between Sparta and their rival Athens

Athenian Assistance, 1.102-103

• A resistance force of Helots retreated to Messenia, their original home, and occupied Mt Ithome in the south-west of the island
• The Spartans, inexperienced with siege warfare, appealed to their allies for assistance
• Themistocles had been ostracised by the Athenians at this stage (for mostly the same reasons as Pausanias), and leadership was under the conservative Cimon, who held pro-Spartan sentiments
• Cimon arrived at Sparta with a force to lend assistance to Sparta, but instead were summarily dismissed. As Thucydides says "this was the first open quarrel between Sparta and Athens".