The Archidamian War: 431-421 BC

• The Archidamian War was the first phase of the second Peloponnesian War
• Named the "Archidamian" war after the King who led the Spartans during the first phases of the war, King Archidamus
• The Archidamian War composes the bulk of the second Peloponnesian War

Timeline

• 431-429 BC - Pericles vs Archidamus
• 429 BC - Plague in Athens and the deaths of Pericles and Archidamus
• 428-426 BC - Rise of the Demagogues
• 425 BC - the Battle of Pylos and Sphacteria
• 424-422 BC - Cleon vs Brasidas
• 422 BC - The Battle of Amphipolis
• 421 BC - The Peace of Nicias

Zeal for War

The war between Sparta and Athens stirred all of Greece into a frenzy - the two greatest powers of the Greek world were fighting for supremacy:

"And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this particular occasion the Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading cities. No private or public effort that could help them in speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not himself see to it. So general was the indignation felt against Athens, whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were apprehensive of being absorbed by it." - Thucydides, 2.8

Strategies: Archidamus vs Pericles

Archidamus' Strategy:

• To gather the entire Peloponnesian army (some 60,000 men) and march straight into Attica
• Operate a scorch-earth policy: burn Athenian crops and farmsteads, crush any towns around Athens that resisted
• Force the Athenian army out into the open plain in defence of their city
• Defeat the Athenian army in a pitched-battle
• Reliance on Sparta's land-based military power

Pericles' Strategy:

• Rely on the long-walls of Athens and the fact the Spartan army was inexperienced in siege warfare
• Bring imports of grain and food from the sea and into the Piraeus to make up for losses in Attica
• Whilst the Peloponnesian Army wasted time in Attica, the Athenian navy could sail out and attack the Peloponnesian coast
• Reliance on Athenian naval power and her superior wealth

First Invasion of Attica

• When King Archidamus of Sparta led the Peloponnesians into Attica for the first time, the Athenians took Pericles' advice and brought their women, children and household property into Athens, where most of them...
• "had to settle down in those parts of the city that had not been built over and in the temples and shrines of the heroes except the Acropolis, in the temple of Eleusinian Demeter, and some other places that were strictly forbidden" - Thucydides
• A number also settled in the towers of the walls, between the Long Walls and in the Piraeus. They sent their livestock to Euboea
• However, when they saw that 'their land was being laid waste in front of their very eyes', they felt outraged - especially the young, who wanted to march out and stop it. Violent discussions ensued and the city was in a thoroughly excited state. The Athenian people were furious with Pericles
• According to Plutarch, Pericles:
• 'behaved like the helmsman of a ship, who, when a storm sweeps down upon it in the open sea, makes everything fast, takes in sail and relies on his own skill and takes no notice of the fears and entreaties of the sea-sick and terrified passengers' - Plutarch
• Thucydides said that Pericles was so 'convinced of the rightness of his views about not going out to battle' that he endured the criticisms calmly and did not summon any assemblies for fear the people would make some foolish decision in their anger. He then sent out minor cavalry patrols, saw to the defences of the city and sent off a fleet of 100 ships to raid the coast of the Peloponnese
• Archidamus, realising the Athenians would not come out to face the Peloponnesians in the field, stuck to his own strategy of burning the Attic countryside, and did not make an attack upon Athens
• 'This delay brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of the war he had credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half measures he had advocated' - Thucydides 2.18
• Both leaders were clearly struggling against their own people as well as each-other

Pattern of War

• Between 431 and 425 the conduct of the war followed a basic pattern:
• Sparta used her superior military forces in land-based actions, including the annual invasions of Attica (except in 429 and 426)
• Athens, following Pericles' strategy of relying on her long walls and her navy, refused to meet Sparta on land, but made raids on the coast of the Peloponnese and on the coasts of Sparta's allies. The fleet, active on the coasts of western Greece, won over Cephallenia and some coastal towns of Acarnania

Disaster Strikes Athens: Plague 429

Despite the initial successes of Pericles' strategy, an unexpected plague would ravage Athens two years into the war in 429 BC

• This was exacerbated by Pericles' strategy, which crammed Athens to its maximum capacity
• Up to 1/5 of the entire male population of Athens was killed in a year, the Spartans did not even invade Attica after hearing word of the outbreak
• Bubonic plague, typhus or typhoid have been the assumed culprits, although we are uncertain
• Thucydides himself suffered from the plague, and it ultimately killed Pericles
• Its effects on Athens' morale were devastated
• 'Its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to endure. Heavily did it weigh on the Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without' - Thucydides 2.54

Pericles Under Attack

• The Athenian people, angered by Pericles' strategy and its seemingly detrimental effect on Athens, turned on their leader
• Terrified that the attacks now being levied against him would lead to his own ostracism from the city. Pericles stood in front of the Athenian assembly and addressed the people:

What arguments does Pericles make to justify his strategy and leadership to the Athenian people? Thucydides 2.61-63

• His plan involved suffering - the long term effects hadn't been felt yet
• In times of crisis people panic and rash decisions will be made as a result - he does acknowledge that the plague was a crisis
• The Athenians took his advice and followed it consciously - they voted for him knowing what they were in for
• "You took my advice when you had not suffered misfortune"
• "Your empire is now a tyranny. It may have been wrong to take it, it is now certainly dangerous to give it up"
• "With your navy as it is today nobody can stop you"
• "Those who are politically apathetic can only survive if they are supported by those who take action"
• "You Athenians cannot enjoy the privileges of an empire unless you also shoulder the burden"

The Death of Pericles

• Pericles' arguments subsided the Athenian's hatred of him, however he was still fined for misconduct . Ironically, he was then reinstated as strategos for the war.
• In a rather terrible sense of irony, the plague, which was still ravaging Athens, eventually claimed Pericles' life

Thucydides 2.65

1. What strengths does Thucydides identify in Pericles as a leader?
• Pericles had 'wisely led and firmly guarded' Athens for years. He had 'accurately estimated' Athens' strength at the start of the war, and his foresight continued to persist. He knew Athens should continue to take care of its navy, not attempt to expand the empire during the war, and not risk the city
• 'Pericles, because of his position, his intelligence, his known integrity, could respect the liberty of the people and at the same time hold them in check'.
• 'He never sought power for any wrong motive' so was able to speak frankly and honestly to the Athenians. He would cheer them up when they were too discouraged, and make them aware of danger when they were too optimistic
• While Athens was normally a democracy, 'power was really in the hands of the First Citizen'. 'He led them rather than being led by them'
2. What does Thucydides say happened to Athenian political and military leadership following Pericles' death?
• They went after personal glory and profit. When their policies were successful, they benefitted individuals, but when they failed they endangered the whole state. They fought and quarrelled, each in pursuit of the top spot, confusing state policy in the process. They were led by the people, rather than leading the people
• 'his successors...adopted methods of demagogy which resulted in their losing control over the actual conduct of affairs

The Beginning of the Second Peloponnesian War: Preparations

Spartan and Corinthian Preparation

Athenian Preparations

Archidamus suggested they invade and ravage Attica, drawing the Athenians out so that they could be defeated The Corinthians emphasised caution, not getting too confident They suggested building fortified positions in Athenian territory from which to launch raids (Epiteichismus) Build up Peloponnesian naval power (Corinthians had the most ships in the Peloponnese with about 100, Athens had 300-400) In the short term, entice Athens' foreign and mercenary sailors to defect with higher pay Finally begin to contribute money to the Peloponnesian League for a navy Foster revolts among Athens' allies to cut off their revenue

Pericles realised that if Archidamus spared his property, he would be under suspicion, so he declared that he would donate all of his property to the state if it were spared Pericles said that they should remain in the city, using the Long Walls for defence, and use their huge financial reserves (including 6,000 talents in savings and a golden statue) to ride out the war until the Spartans couldn't afford to carry on They should abandon the countryside; this completely counters Sparta's tactic Use the navy to keep a 'firm hand' on their allies; again, countering the Corinthian plan of inciting revolt They had thousands of soldiers and 300 triremes Thucydides was a general. His account of Athens' preparations can therefore be trusted

The Debate at Sparta and the Spartan Ultimatum

The Debate at Sparta

• Purpose of assembly = to hear the complaints of Sparta's allies and anyone who claimed to have suffered Athenian aggression
• The Spartans and the Peloponnesian League could then consider whether war against the Athenians and the Delian League was justified
• Key term in the Thirty Years Peace: "Neither side was allowed to make an armed attack on the other, if the latter wished to go to arbitration"

Corinth Denounces Athenian Imperialism (1.69)

"For all this you (Sparta) are responsible. You it was who first allowed them to fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect the long walls-you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not only those who have as yet been your allies. For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not so much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it but has the means to prevent it"

Who do the Corinthians blame for Athenian imperialism? Does this seem like a legitamate charge from the Corinthians based on what we have seen?

Corinth Speech Continued: The "National Character" of Sparta and Athens (1.70)

"The great contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as far as we can see, you have little perception, having never yet considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough... they are never at home, you are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil from a reverse. Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their country's cause; their intellect they jealously husband to be employed in her service"

Athens: Innovators, swift in executing plans, never at home (brave), swift to follow up success, sacrifice themselves for their country

Sparta: Procrastinators, too conservative, slow to act, too scared of losses

What contrasts does Corinth make between Sparta and Athens? Why do you think they deliberately characterise both states in this way?

Corinth's Threat

"Do not sacrifice friends and kindred peoples to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance"

• The Corinthians clearly hint towards the Delian League as the "other alliance", suggesting that if the Spartans do not act now the Athenians will begin to conquer Peloponnesian allies too
• This clearly plays to Sparta's fears of Athenian imperialism, and strongly hints at Corinthian manipulation of the Spartans in foreign policy

Athenian Rebuttal (1.75)

"Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed during the Persian Wars, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command. And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest afterwards came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest"

What arguments do the Athenians make to justify their empire?

Athenian Justification of their Empire

"You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been law that the strong do what they can and the weak endure what they must. Men's resentment, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior. At all events they contrived to put up with much worse treatment than this from the Persians, yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least is certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and taking our place, you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us has invested you, if your policy of today is at all to tally with the sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command against the Mede. Not only is your life at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible with those of others, but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognised by the rest of Hellas"

What arguments do the Athenians make to justify their empire?

Spartan Discussion following the Congress

Discussion took place but ended in divided opinion

1. Athens' alliance with Corcyra could not be considered illegal in the light of the Peace of 445 BC
2. Potidaea was a complicated issue: if there was to be someone to blame it was Corinth

King Archidamus and the Doves

"A man who had a reputation for both intelligence and moderation"

• He pointed out the dangers in rushing unprepared into a war against a much wealthier, better-armed naval power
• He suggested that the Spartans should not declare war immediately - rather approach Athens with their allies' grievances and in the meantime make new allies with financial and naval forces

"And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise moderation"

Sthenelaidas and the Hawks

"The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they are injuring our allies and the Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double punishment for having ceased being good and for having become bad. We meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise, disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put of till tomorrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer today. Others have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up to the Athenians"

What arguments does the Spartan Sthenelaidas make as to why war should be declared?

Final Decision put to the Assembly of Sparta

• Majority of Spartan votes indicated their belief that the Thirty Years' Peace had been broken
• War could only be declared by a majority decision of the Peloponnesian League - this was immediately called

"The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them" (1.88)

Sparta's Main Concern

• There were no legal grounds for Sparta to declare war
• Athenian ambitions were to be feared and Athens had shown an unfriendly attitude towards Megara and the influence it could already exert across the Aegean
• What influenced Sparta was the need to maintain her own prestige with an ascendancy over her allies
• Her allies had been so insistent about Sparta staying inactive that if this were to continue she could no longer be their leader

The Spartan Ultimatum

Though war had been decided upon, the Spartans headed to Athens with one last ultimatum which:

1. "Ordered Athens to raise the siege of Potidaea"
2. Demanded that Athens "respect the independence of Aegina"
3. Said "That war may be prevented by the revocation of the Megarian Decree"
4. Ordered them to drive out the "Curse of the Alcmaeonidae" as in the family, of which Pericles was a member

Pericles Convinces the Athenian Assembly to Reject the Ultimatum

"There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold dearest, and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. Now it was clear before that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still more clear now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping the tone of reason and adopting that of command. I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals"

What reasons does Pericles give as to why the Spartan ultimatum must be rejected by Athens?

Athenian Refusal

• Athens sent the Spartan envoys away with the message that:
1. They would give the Megarians access to their markets when Sparta ceased expelling strangers from her cities and restored full independence to her own allies
2. They offered to accept arbitration on the various complaints under the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace Treaty on a fair and equal basis
• The Spartan envoys never returned to Athens, and could not submit to arbitration as she had declared the treaty was broken and would not risk the loss of her allies by taking such a step

War

War broke out in 431 BC when Thebans attacked Athens' ally Plataea

"In this affair of Plataea the treaty had quite obviously been broken, and now the Athenians made ready for war, as did the Spartans and their allies"

The Megarian Decree

• During the First Peloponnesian War, Megara had defected from the Peloponnesian League to the Delian League, and then back to the Peloponnesian League just before the end of the war. The Megarians had committed sacrilege by cultivating sacred land, and, in response, the Athenians banned Megara from trading with any Athenian ally
• The Megarians, though, claimed that the embargo would cripple them and create famine. They went to the Spartans, who decided that, having heard complaints from Corinth and now Megara, they would call a conference to decide how to react to Athens. They told the Athenians that, unless they lifted the embargo, they'd go to war
• Thucydides was very biased in favour of Athens, believing the Megarian Decree to be an excuse to go to war

Modern Interpretations

• Many historians, such as Robinson and Hornblower, believe that the decree was meant to economically ruin Megara, and that the Athenians were the aggressors
• Others, mainly de Ste. Croix, believe that the decree was relatively minor, and that the Peloponnesians made such a big deal out of it as an excuse to go to war. This view is shared by Thucydides

1. To what extent could Pericles and the Athenians be blamed for causing the war because of the decree?
• Thucydides: Pericles didn't want to make any concessions to Sparta and the Athenians were mostly against repealing the decision - The Megarians had cultivated sacred land, Sparta were going to war over a 'trifle' - the Spartans repeatedly refused to submit to arbitration and just pushed for war over Megara
• Aristophanes: Pericles did cause the famine, though his reasoning is made up for comedic effect - Pericles was upset that Megarians had stolen some prostitutes of Aspasia's so he invoked the Megarian Decree as a punishment - "Olympian Pericles" was too proud to revoke the decree and forced the Spartans, as the Megarians were starving
• Plutarch: Claims the decree was due to imperialistic ambitions of Pericles - wanted to punish Megara for defecting from the Delian League and his stubbornness forced the Spartans into war
2. What are the limitations of the ancient sources for understanding the significance of the Megarian Decree?
• Thucydides was a pro-Athenian general, Aristophanes was a comedian and Plutarch was not a contemporary historian

The "Grounds for Complaint": 460-403 BC

Setting the scene

• The Peloponnesian war was fought in ancient Greece from 431 to 404 BC between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian League, an alliance of city-states led by Sparta
• For approximately fifty years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 431 BC, the city-state of Athens had accumulated enormous monetary reserves and extensive political influence in the Aegean region and beyond
• Athens' political supremacy led to an empire and her traditional enemies, as well as some of her vessels, viewed Athenian ascendancy with suspicion. Opposition to Athenian empire united around Sparta, the nucleus of the Peloponnesian League
• For several years political tensions mounted as various diplomatic failures occurred until hostilities broke out. The war sputtered into life as Athens and Sparta took opposing sides in several minor local outbreaks

Thucydides' Assessment

"The Persian War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy conclusion in two battles by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it was, it was short without parallel for the misfortunes it brought upon Greece. Never had so many cities been taken and laid desolate, either by the barbarians, or by fellow Greeks (the old inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others); never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, either on the field of battle or in political strife. All this came upon Greece with the late war, which was begun by Athenians and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made after the conquest of Euboea" - Thucydides 1.23

"I think that the truest explanation (prophasis), but the one that was least made public, was that the growth of Athens' power and the fear that this caused among the Spartans made war inevitable. But the grounds of complaint (aitiai), which were openly stated by each side and led them to break the peace and go to war, were as follows" - VERY IMPORTANT SO REMEMBER

Thucydides 1.23

In these words Thucydides was attempting to single out an underlying cause of the Peloponnesian War beyond the publicly expressed grounds of complaint. His use of the words "prophasis" and "aitiai" has led to a dispute among historians about the actual meaning of this passage, since these words can have different meanings in different contexts - "prophasis" can mean false excuse and "aitiai" true explanations.

However, the use of the qualifying words 'truest' with "prophasis" and 'openly stated' with "aitiai" strongly suggests that Thucydides was giving his own judgement on the real reason why Sparta went to war in 431 BC

• The Spartans would never dare to make this reason public because this was not a valid ground for breaking the peace treaty, and because it would be a shameful admission from such a powerful military state
• Therefore the Spartans concentrated on the grounds of complaint, which affected their allies rather than themselves, in order to press their claims that Athens had broken the Thirty Year Peace. This is further reinforced by Thucydides' explanation of the Spartans' motives for the despatch of three embassies in the months preceding the outbreak of the war

"During this time they kept sending embassies to the Athenians and making complaints so that they might have the best excuse to make war, if the Athenians paid no heed to them" - Thucydides 1.126.1

• However, it is important to review the events that led up to the outbreak of the war in the light of the terms of the Thirty Year Peace. In this way it will be possible to assess the accuracy of Thucydides' statement and to determine the degree of blame that each side should incur for infringing the terms of the peace treaty

The Grounds of Complaint (Aitiai)

• Having stated the "truest explanation" for the outbreak of the war, Thucydides then deals at length with (in his opinion) the two major openly stated grounds of complaint between the combatants - 
• Athens' alliance with Corcyra (1.31-55) and
• The dispute over Potidaea (1.56-65)
• The complaints of the Aeginetans who protested to the Spartans that their promised autonomy had been infringed, and
• Those of the Megarians who referred to an Athenian decree that banned them from the ports in the Athenian Empire and the market of Athens (1.167)

Revolt in Samos

• In 440 BC, Samos, one of the three remaining independent ship-suppliers, clashed with Miletus over the possession of Priene. The Athenians stepped in, resolved the dispute in Miletus' favour, changed the Samian constitution from oligarchic to democratic, placed oligarchic hostages on Lemnos, installed a garrison and returned home
• However, the oligarchs who had escaped earlier, making use of Persian aid, regained control of Samos and revolted from Athens. After a long and arduous campaign the Athenians crushed the revolt in 439 BC, confiscated the Samian fleet, pulled down their walls, took hostages and forced them to pay an indemnity (1.115.2-117.3)
• The dispute with Samos should have been an internal Athenian affair, as Samos was a listed ally of Athens, but there is strong evidence that the Spartans had intended to exploit Athens' problems and launch an attack. The evidence comes from the Corinthian speech to the Athenians in 433 BC

"For when the Samians were in revolt and the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes whether they should help them, we did not cast our vote against you; we clearly spoke against that, saying each state should punish its own allies" - Thucydides 1.40.5

Activity: The Revolt of Samos

Thucydides 1.115-117

Lactor 1: 89 Plutarch, Pericles 28.1-3

Lactor 1: 88 Diodorus

1. What conditions were imposed on the Samians following the revolt? What might be the Athenians' logic behind these conditions?
• Thucydides, Plutarch and Diodorus: the Samian fleet was confiscated, their walls and fortifications were pulled down and a democratic government was established
• Thucydides: Athens took hostages
• Diodorus: Athens demanded war reparations
• Pulling down the walls and taking the fleet left Samos exposed, which meant that it was defenceless and so much less likely to revolt - also made Samos reliant on Athens for protection
• Changing the government aligned Samos with Athens (democracy) over Sparta (oligarchy)
• Taking hostages put pressure on Samos to remain loyal
• Reparations made Samos financially dependent on Athens
• Plutarch: says that Douris of Samos claims that Pericles brought the trierarchs (naval commanders) into the main square and bludgeoned them to death - Plutarch doubts that this is true
2. Who do the Samians turn to for support in their revolt? Why is this significant?
• Thucydides - Samian oligarchs turned to Persia for financial support, which was agreed by the governor of Sardis, Pissuthnes
• shows that Persia still had a desire to involve itself in Greek affairs
3. What are the Corinthians suggesting about how Sparta and the Peloponnesians reacted to the revolt at Samos?
• Thucydidies - claims that the Peloponnesians were planning to assist Samos
• clear violation of the Thirty Years Peace Treaty
• The vote was split, but Corinth reminded the Peloponnesians that under the treaty every state has a right to punish its own allies

Dispute of Epidamnus

• Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra (modern Corfu), which in turn was a colony of Corinth. The democrats had seized power in Epidamnus but the exiled oligarchs, aided by foreign allies, were laying siege to the city
• The democrats appealed to Corcyra, their mother-city, for help but the Corcyraeans refused to become involved (1.24.5-7) The democrats then approached the Delphic oracle to ask if they should hand over their city to Corinth, which, in accordance with tradition, had supplied the leader of the Corcyraeans,  who were about to found the colony of Epidamnus, the Delphic oracle agreed (1.35.2-3)
• The Corinthians willingly accepted on the grounds that they regarded Epidamnus as belonging as much to them as to the Corcyraeans and "at the same time because of their hatred of the Corcyraeans who, although they were colonists of Corinth, did not pay them respect" - Thucydides 1.25.3

Issues

• The Corinthians' hatred was fuelled by the Corcyraeans' disdain for them and their belief in the superiority of their navy, which numbered one hundred and twenty ships. It was this hatred that was to be such an underlying motive for the Corinthians' aggressive behaviour
• The Corinthians sent out a force of troops and settlers to Epidamnus, which in turn led to the Corcyraeans besieging the city (1.26)
• Corinth then prepared a relief force and declared a new colony of Epidamnus, inviting people to volunteer to become new colonists (1.27)
• With the backing of Sparta and Sicyon, the Corcyraeans made a generous offer to the Corinthians that, if they were not willing to give up their claims to Epidamnus and recall their troops, the whole matter should be submitted to arbitration, using as arbitrators either mutually agreed cities in the Peloponnese or the oracle at Delphi
• They particularly urged the Corinthian not to start a war as this would force the Corcyraeans against their wishes to seek military help from elsewhere - a clear hint of seeking an alliance with Athens (1.28)

Corinthian Response

• The Corinthians refused this offer of arbitration and sent out a force of seventy-five ships and 2,000 hoplites to Epidamnus
• The battle of Leucimme (435) resulted in a decisive victory for the Corcyraeans, who also gained control of Epidamnus on the same day (1.29)
• This should have been the end of the matter - the Corinthians, led on by ambition and hatred of the Corcyraeans, had tried to extend their power, but their adventurism had ended in failure. However, the Corinthians were not prepared to let the matter rest

Athens' alliance with Corcyra

• Following their defeat at Leucimme in 435, the Corinthians set about building a new fleet and hiring mercenaries in order to exact revenge against Corcyra
• News of these military preparations caused alarm among the Corcyraeans, and so in 433 BC they sent an embassy to Athens to seek an alliance
• The Corinthians, fearing that the combined navies would prevent them from dealing a decisive blow against Corcyra, also sent an embassy to dissuade the Athenians from making an alliance with Corcyra (1.31)
• A meeting of the Ecclesia was held and both sides were given the opportunity to put their case

Activity: The Dispute over Corcyra

1. [1.33,35] - What reasons do the Corcyraeans give as to why they should be admitted into the Athenian alliance?
• Corcyra played victim (tbf Corinth was even told off by Sparta for being too aggressive)
• Athens would have Corcyra's undying gratitude
• Athens would gain control of the second greatest navy in Hellas
• It would make the Athenians look generous
• Sparta and Corinth were attempting to undermine Athens- conflict inevitable so extra resources would be needed
• Corcyra was neutral so Athens wouldn't have been breaking the treaty
2. [1.40-1] - What rebuttals do the Corinthians give to Corcyra's argument? Why should Athens not admit Corcyra into their alliance?
• Neutral states could ally with Athens, but doing so to hurt other powers would break the treaty
• They said that it was prohibited to accept a state that had revolted from another power, and said that Corcyra had been violent
• When Samos revolted, Corinth had spoken against attacking Athens and had even given them 20 ships (so really Athens should pay them back)
• Said that they had just as much right to attack Corcyra as Athens did to put down Samos
3. [1.44] - What was the response of the Athenians to this debate? What were Athens' terms?
• They had two meetings, one airing towards an alliance with Corinth, the second airing towards an alliance with Corcyra
• The alliance was defensive, so would only come into effect if Corcyra was directly attacked, to avoid total war
• War with the Peloponnesian League seemed inevitable, but Athens was willing to let Corcyra and Corinth weaken each other to give them the largest navy
4. [1.55] - What was the outcome of this dispute?
• Corcyra remained undefeated, thanks to the Athenian fleet driving the Corinthians away during a battle
• However, this gave Corinth a reason for war with Athens
• On their return voyage, the Corinthians took Anactorium, which both Corcyra and Corinth had claims to
• They sold 800 Corcyraean prisoners, but kept 250 who held sway in Corcyra and treated them well

Corinthians' Biggest Flaw

• The greatest difficulty for the Corinthians was to produce an argument to counter-act the Corcyraeans' convincing statement that the Athenians had a legal and legitimate right to make an alliance with themselves, as it was specifically laid down in the treaty that a neutral state was free to ally itself with whatever side it wished
• The Corinthians attempted to cloud and obscure the issue by equating Corcyra's position with that of Samos. On their interpretation Corcyra was a Corinthian ally that had revolted, and this they should have the right to discipline their recalcitrant ally without outside interference, as they themselves had argues to the Peloponnesians at the time of Samos' revolt in 440 BC
• The fallacy in the Corinthians' argument was that Corcyra, although being a colony of Corinth, was not an ally and therefore could not be in revolt - thus there was no comparability between Corcyra and Samos

Athenians Actions

• Sent ten ships and three generals as a reinforcement to Corcyra. Such a small force would have done little to calm Corcyraean fears, especially as the Corinthians were equipping a fleet of 150 ships
• However, this small fleet with its large number of generals (the same number as on the Sicilian expedition in 415 BC), including Lacedaimonius, the son of Cimon and proxenos of Sparta, revealed Athens' true objective:
• their preferred means for resolving their difficulties with Corinth was diplomacy and not military force
• "The Athenians ordered the generals not to fight a sea-battle with the Corinthians unless they should sail against Corcyra and were about to land there or at some other point in their territory - then they were to prevent it as best as possible. They gave these orders in order to avoid breaking the treaty" - Thucydides 1.45.3

Athens' treatment of Potidaea

• The next ground of complaint, in 432 BC, concerned Potidaea and its inhabitants:
• "who lived on the isthmus of Pallene and, although colonists of the Corinthians, were phoros-paying allies of the Athenians" - Thucydides 1.56.2
• The Thraceward region was of immense importance to the Athenians. Apart from its richness in natural resources and its favourable trading position, it was the man safeguard against the eastward expansion of Macedon, which at that time was under the control of Perdiccas
• The relationship between the Athenians and Perdiccas was constantly changing from friendship to enmity, since the motivating force on both sides was expediency
• At the time of the Potidaean affair, he was hostile to the Athenians due to their support of his rivals, Philip and Deucas, and consequently played an important supportive role in the revolt of Potidaea (1.57.2-5)

Why Potidaea became an issue

• Potidaea was an ally of Athens, but a colony of Corinth
• The Athenians demanded that the Potidaeans:
• pull down their wall on the side of Pallene
• hand over hostages, and
• banish and not receive in the future the magistrates that Corinth usually sent each year
• These were tough demands on a state that had done no wrong, and this harsh treatment was bound to upset the Corinthians who had retained such warm, close ties with their colony

Activity: The Dispute over Potidaea

1. [1.56-7] What caused the dispute over Potidaea?
• It was a colony of Corinth 
• Perdiccas of Macedonia was angered that Athens had supported his rivals
• Corinth was openly hostile
• Athens was worried that Potidaea would revolt with the support of Corinth and Perdiccas
• Athens sent 30 ships and 1,000 hoplites to Macedonia to take Potidaean hostages and demanded that the Potidaeans tear down their defences and banish the Corinthian magistrates
• The Potidaeans pleaded with Athens to lessen the severity of the punishment, but were refused
2. [1.58] - What did the Spartans promise the Potidaeans if they revolted? Why is this significant?
• The Corinthians brought Potidaea's complaints to Sparta
• Spartans agreed to invade Attica if Athens attacked Potidaea, which was significant as it would put them at war with Athens
• Sparta breaking the treaty in two ways:
• not submitted to arbitration
• the treaty also stipulated that one side could not interfere or assist the other side's allies
• Corinthians send a mercenary and volunteer force to Potidaea - 1600 hoplites and 400 light troops
3. [1.60-61] Which city had more grounds for complaint over this dispute in Potidaea? Athens or Corinth?
• Athens:
• Their concerns over Potidaea were justified, with it having support from several enemies of Athens, and the threat from Sparta could not be understated
• Legally, Athens could do whatever it wanted to Potidaea - it was their ally
• Corinthians and Spartans completely ignored arbitration and resorted immediately to war
• Corinth and Sparta had broken the treaty by interfering in Athens' alliance
• Corinth:
  
• The force they sent out was a volunteer force, along with mercenaries
• Athens were being far too harsh to Potidaea, as they had done nothing wrong
• Potidaea was their colony - the Potidaens were their kin
• The Corinthians had a moral obligation to be involved

• Even if Athen's behaviour was harsh and unjustified, Sparta and Corinth had no more legal right to intervene directly in Potidaea than they had in Samos
• Their main available legal redress was to demand that the issue be submitted to arbitration, but instead the Corinthians actively urged the Potidaeans to seek military help from Sparta, and the Spartans (whether the authorities or the Assembly) promised an invasion of Attica, thus encouraging the Potidaeans to revolt from Athens
• The Athenians had sent out Archestratos with thirty ships and one thousand hoplites to carry out their demands, but they arrived to find that a full-scale revolt had broken out:
• "Meanwhile the Corinthians, since the Potidaeans had revolted and that Athenian ships were close to Macedonia, being afraid for the place and thinking that the danger was their own responsibility, sent out volunteers of their own and by the use of pay, sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops from the other Peloponnesians" - Thucydides 1.60-1
• Therefore, the Athenians sent out forty ships and 2,000 hoplites under Callias, and, after making another cynical alliance with Perdiccas, descended upon Potidaea. There the Athenians fought a battle against the Potidaeans, the Corinthian volunteers and the Peloponnesians, resulting in an Athenian victory and the beginning of the siege of Potidaea that lasted to 429 BC (1.62-4)
• The use of Corinthian troops in battle to support an Athenian listed ally exposed Corinth once again to the charge of acting in defiance of the terms of the treaty. However, if these Corinthian fighters were genuine volunteers and were acting independently of the state of Corinth, then Corinth could have been exonerated on this issue. But the above quotation speaks of 'the Corinthians' sending out the volunteers and these 'Corinthians' must be the government of the state of Corinth
• In addition, when the Peace of Nicias was signed in 421 BC, the Corinthians refused to abide by its conditions:
• "They made as their excuse the fact that they could not betray their allies in Thrace. For they had independently sworn oaths with them, when they had first revolted with the Potidaeans, and later" - Thucydides 5.30.2
• It is clear from these words that the oaths had created some form of military alliance between the Corinthians and the Potidaeans and, most probably, the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans who had revolted together in 432 BC, since Thucydides twice refers to the enemy forces in 432 BC as 'the Potidaeans and their allies' (1.63.3, 1.64.1)
• Oaths of alliance could not be made 'unofficially', but only between states, and therefore the Corinthians had sworn oaths of alliance with three groups of Athenian listed allies and were officially supplying military help against the Athenians - a clear breach of the treaty

The Peace of Kalias and Thirty Years Peace: 449 BC - 445 BC

479-445 BC, Four politicians wrestle for dominance in Athenian political life

Aristeides (530-468BC) "The Just"

Called "the wisest and most honourable man in Athens" by Herodotus. Aristeides was strategos in Athens during the Persian Wars, where he led the Athenian forces at Plataea. After the wars he earned his nickname "the just" for his role in creating the Delian League and his fair treatment of Athens' allies

Kimon (c.510-450 BC)

Son of Miltiades, victor of Marathon, Kimon served as strategos following the Persian Wars. Known for his pro-Spartan, conservative foreign policy. He was ostracised by the Athenians in the 460s BC, but returned in the 450s. Kimon's most famous achievement is the victory at the Eurymedon River against the Persian fleet, which effectively marked the end of the Persian Wars

Democrats

Kallias (dates unknown)

Supporter of Pericles, he acted as a diplomat for Athens and the Delian League during the period following the Persian Wars. Most notably he secured the peace that marked the end of the Persian Wars in 450 BC - the "Peace of Kallias"

Pericles

Rising star in Athenian politics during this period. Pericles was a radical democrat and imperialist who led Athens during her golden age into the Peloponnesian War. His most lasting achievement is the building of the Parthenon

Athenian Actions against the Persians

In the mid 450s, a five-year truce was signed between the Athenians and Spartans; freeing up the Delian forced to go on the offensive against the Persians:

Eurymedon River 466 BC:

Delian navy - some 200 strong - under Kimon win a stunning victory against Persian forces in 466 BC, though are unable to press their attack due to events back home

Cyprus c.453-450 BC:

A fleet of 200 ships under the command of Kimon sailed to Cyprus, where multiple victories against the Persians allowed the Athenians to liberate the island. The loss was enough to force the Persians to the negotiating table. The "Peace of Kallias" was signed not long after this campaign

449 BC: Peace of Kallias signed

Persians: shocked by series of defeats by Athenian navy

Athenians: losses in Egypt and at Tanagra to the Spartans had changed popular opinion on continuing the war

Questions: Using Lactor 1:33, 51-54 (pp. 46-47)

1.  Outline the conditions agreed upon in the Peace of Kallias 
1. Plutarch - The Persians had to keep a 'horse's journey' from the Greek sea
2. Diodorus - The Persian Satraps were not to come any closer than 3 days' journey to the coast
3. Diodorus - Greek cities in Asia Minor given their autonomy
4. (Plutarch and Diodorus) - Persian warships will not sail in the Greek sea
5. Diodorus - The Athenians agreed to stop invading the Persian King's land
2. To what extent can Kimon be considered the most responsible for securing peace between the Greeks and the Persians?
1. Plutarch - no one did more to humble the Great King's pride than Kimon
2. Plutarch - he remained hard on the Persian's heels - not letting them gain their breath
3. Plutarch - Kimon's "famous victory" led to the treaty
4. Plutarch - he completely cleared Asia of Persian arms from Ionia to Pamphylia
3. What problems with regards to the reliability of the sources for the Peace of Kallias can you identify?
1. No mention of the treaty in Thucydides - our most comprehensive, well researched, contemporary source
2. Plutarch - Callisthenes (a fourth century historian) claims that the terms were not agreed upon but the Persian King acted as if they had been (out of fear)
3. Theopompus - the treaty was written in the wrong Greek language for the time (Ionic when it should have been Attic)

Thirty Years Peace

-in 446/5 a Thirty Year Peace was agreed between Athens and Sparta on the following terms:

1. Athens had to give up control of Nisaea, Pagae, Troezen and Achaea (1.115.1)
2. There should be a list of allies of each side, and each side should keep what it possessed at the time of the treaty with the exception of those mentioned in clause 1 (1.140.2). If any ally were to revolt and be received into the other side's alliance, then the alliance which received the revolting ally would be deemed to have broken the treaty
3. Any state not listed was deemed to be a 'neutral' and therefore was free to join either alliance, if it wished (1.35.2)
4. Neither side was allowed to make an armed attack on the other, if the latter wished to go to arbitration (1.85.2)
5. Argos, although unlisted, was exempt from clause 3. No military alliance was to exist between Argos and Athens, although diplomatic relations were allowed
6. There may have been a clause guaranteeing the autonomy of Aegina within the Athenian Empire (1.67.2)

The Thirty Years Peace Treaty

The Thirty Years' Peace was a treaty, signed between the Greek city-states Athens and Sparta, in the year 446/445 BCE. The treaty brought an end to the conflict commonly known as the First Peloponnesian War, which had been raging since c.464 BCE
The primary purpose of the treaty was to prevent another outbreak of war. Ultimately, the peace treaty failed in achieving its goal. With the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War, in 431 BCE

Term of the Treaty	Who benefitted more from the Agreement?	Why?
Athens had to give up control of Nisaea, Pagae, Troezen and Achaea (1.115.1)	Sparta	Athens gave up control of all city states in the Peloponnese
There should be a list of allies of each side, and each side should keep what it possessed at the time of the treaty with the exception of those mentioned in clause 1(1.140.2). If any ally were to revolt and be received into the other side's alliance, then the alliance which received the revolting ally would be deemed to have broken the treaty	Athens	If an ally revolts, the Spartans can not intervene and try to help them
Any state not listed was deemed to be a 'neutral' and therefore was free to join either alliance, if it wished (1.35.2)	Both (Although according to Thucydides, Athens benefitted the most)	Greek states may prefer to join Sparta rather than falling victim to Athenian Imperialism Both sides could gain new allies - Athens gained Corcyca as an ally Athens may have benefitted the most as it gave them free reign to continue expanding
Argos, although unlisted, was exempt from clause 3. No military alliance was to exist between Argos and Athens, although diplomatic relations were allowed	Sparta	Athens and Argos couldn't ally themselves against Sparta
There may have been a clause guaranteeing the autonomy of Aegina within the Athenian Empire (1.67.2)	Sparta/Aegina	Athens could not control or take tribute from Aegina