The Sicilian Expedition 415-412

"This was the greatest Hellenic action that took place during this war, and in my opinion, the greatest action that we know of in Hellenic history - to the victors the most brilliant of successes, to the vanquished the most calamitous of defeats" - Thucydides

Background to the Sicilian Campaign

• The Athenians were becoming more interested in western trade and colonisation from the time of Themistocles
• By 446 BC there was trouble in the Athenian empire (Megara and Euboea had revolted)
• Many politicians believed that Athens should make its political influence felt among the Ionian cities of Sicily and Italy
• In 443-442 BC Athens concluded alliances with Rhegium in Italy and Leontini in Sicily, to keep a check on Syracuse:
1. There were city-state rivalries between the Dorians led by the Corinthian Syracuse and the Ionians led by Leontini
2. Athens founded the colony of Thurii in southern Italy in 444 BC - this caused alarm in Syracuse
3. Western trade rivalry with Corinth had been one of the significant causes of conflict leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War
• With the death of Pericles there was a much more aggressive attitude to the west and in 427 BC an embassy from Leontini appealed to the Athenians for help against Syracuse. Leontini wanted to prevent the unification of Sicily under Syracuse, stop any western help getting to Sparta, cut off supplies from Sicily to the Peloponnese and stroke a blow at the trade of their hated rival Corinth - The Athenians agreed
• Laches led the expedition, but achieved little beyond patrolling the straits and renewing the old alliance with Segesta
• Two years later another expedition was dispatched under Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon. It was delayed for some time at Pylos
• Hermocrates, a Syracusan general, appealed to the Sicilians for unity and in 424 BC a conference was held at Gela, where the cities agreed on peace. The Athenians were no longer needed and so returned home. However, public opinion in Athens, influenced by Cleon, fined Eurymedon and banished his colleagues for dereliction of duty
• In 416 BC Segesta appealed to Athens for help in her dispute with Selinus, an ally of Syracuse, and offered to supply the funds to finance the expedition. Athenian envoys, who were sent to investigate the claims of the Segestaeans regarding their wealth, returned with 60 talents as payment for a fleet with considerable enthusiasm about Segesta's resources. They had been deceived

Segesta Appeal to Athenians

• The main argument used by the Segestaeans, was that if Syracuse was left unchecked, it could grow in power, conquering the rest of Sicily and eventually being able to conquer Athens itself
• When the crews of the Athenian ships were received, the Segestaeans had rounded up as many gold and silver cups as they could find in town and the neighbouring cities and presented them at parties as if they belonged to the host
• "Those who had been deceived in turn misled others, and they were all held responsible by the troops when word got out that Segesta did not have any money"

The Athenian Assembly's Decision

• The radical Assembly was easily influenced by Alcibiades, who "persuaded them to abandon these piecemeal attempts, sail out to Sicily and try to subdue the island completely by means of an invasion on the grand scale"
• The people were influenced by:
• The thought of rich rewards (corn, wheat, minerals);
• The hope of striking a decisive blow against the Peloponnesians by cutting them off from valuable supplies and naval support;
• The possibilities of the conquest of the whole of Sicily; many, like Alcibiades, saw Sicily as a stepping stone to further conquests in the western Mediterranean
• The Assembly voted to send a fleet of 60 ships under the joint command of Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus. Plutarch says that the people believed that the experience and caution of Nicias would combine well with the daring of Alcibiades and the forthrightness of Lamachus

Thucydides 6.8 - The Aims of the Expedition

• The Athenians held an assembly, and after receiving a report from the Segestaeans and their own envoys about the state of affairs and money (which was false, as there wasn't actually any money), voted to send 60 ships to Sicily under Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus

Alcibiades vs Nicias

• Nicias "who had been chosen to the command against his will" "came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise"
• Alcibiades "who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent, and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech" was "exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes"

Activity: Debate in Athens Over Sicily

Thucydides 6.12-13 (Nicias) + 6.17-18 (Alcibiades)

• List the reasons Nicias gives as to why the Athenians should not launch an expedition to Sicily
• The danger at home, as many important states such as Corinth had not accepted the peace and were still openly at war with Athens
• The instability of the empire - "We get only a grudging obedience from our subjects"
• The need for Athens to recuperate from the plague and the financial strains of the war- "only recently that we have had a little respite from a great plague and from the war"
• The danger involved in distant alliances and the difficulties of controlling Sicily if the Athenians should be successful
• The folly of listening to an ambitious and reckless young spendthrift who hoped to make great profit out of his appointment - "too young for his post"
• It is for Alcibiades' "selfish reasons" and he is "endangering the state" for "profit"
• "Remember that success comes from foresight"
• "Do not be frightened of being called a coward if you do not vote for war"
  
• List the reasons Alcibiades gives as to why the expedition should be launched
• "We have sworn to help them, and it is our duty to help them"
  
• The prospect of becoming the leader of all Greek cities by using what was gained in Sicily - "We shall become rulers of Hellas using what we gain in Sicily"
• The lack of unity among Sicilians, and their limitations in terms of military resources - "The Sicilian cities have swollen populations made out of all sorts of mixtures, and there are constant changes and rearrangements in the citizen bodies. The result is that they lack the feeling that they are fighting for their own fatherland"
• "As for their hoplites, they have not got so many as they boast of"
  
• "Our security is guaranteed by our navy"
• "We shall also have a number of non-Hellenic people who, through hatred of the Syracusans, will join us in our attack on them"
• "They should be a thorn in the flesh of our enemies in Sicily"
• "There is nothing here to hinder us"
• "The Peloponnesians have never had so little hope of success against us as they have now"
• His youth was irrelevant as he had already managed to deal with the Peloponnesians, and Nicias had a "reputation for being lucky"
  
• The danger to Athens of an "inactive" policy and the setting of young against old

Nicias attempted once again to deter the people, by exaggerating the estimates and men needed, but the Athenians "far from losing their appetite for the voyage because of the difficulties in preparing for it, became more enthusiastic about it than ever" They voted for more than double that which was originally requested. Their overall force was over 30,000

Magnitute of Sicilian Expedition (Thucydides 6.31)

"Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage from home attempted up until that time, and the most ambitious in its objectives considering the resources of those who undertook it...it was more a display of power and resources than an armament against an enemy"

The Mutilation of the Hermae

• Just prior to the fleet sailing an event occurred which the superstitious masses saw as a bad omen for the expedition. It was the mutilation of nearly all the stone busts, or hermae (originally of the god Hermes), which stood outside the entrances to private houses and shrines. The angry populace were convinced that it was "evidence of a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the democracy"
• The enemies of Alcibiades accused him of instigating this, because he is believed once to have taken part in mock celebrations of the Eleusinian mysteries, and because of his unconventional character. "There were those (such as Androcles and Pisander) who were envious of his leadership of the people, and wanted to get rid of him. It is also possible that the whole affair may have been instigated by Corinth, to cripple the Sicilian enterprise

Evil Omen: Mutilation of the Herms (Thucydides 6.27)

"While these preparations were going on, it was found that in one night nearly all the stone Herms in the city of Athens had had their extremities cut off. These are a national institution, the well-known square-cut figures, of which there are great numbers both in the porches of private houses and in the temples. No one knew who had done this, but large rewards were offered by the state in order to find out who the criminals were, and there was also a decree passed guaranteeing immunity to anyone, citizen, alien or slave, who knew of any other sacrilegious act that had taken place and would come forward with information about it. The whole affair, indeed, was taken very seriously, as it was regarded as an omen for the expedition, and at the same time as evidence of a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the democracy"

Aims of the Leaders

Immediate problems in the expedition were emphasised by the differences among the leaders over what could be achieved in Sicily

Nicias: Stick to original objective of liberating Leontini, then sail round Sicily in a show of force: this was too cautious and would not satisfy the wishes of the Athenian assembly, who wanted a full conquest of the island

Alcibiades: Use the size of the roce to win over allies in Sicily that could crush any remaining resistance: a pragmatic strategy but rested on chance they would find ready allies in Sicily

Lamachus: Use the element of surprise to attack and conquer Syracuse: probably the best approach as the Syracusans were by far the biggest threat to the expedition

The Recall of Alcibiades

The enormous armada set out from Athens in 415 BC, sailing round the Peloponnese toward Corcyra. From here they sailed around the southern Italian coast toward Sicily

• 134 Triremes
• 5,100 Hoplites
• 1,000 light armoured troops
• c.30,000 (combined Athenian and allied)
  

• However, shortly after leaving Corcyra, a ship caught up with the armada from Athens, with an arrest warrant for Alcibiades
• He had been charged by his political enemies in his absence - of sacrilege and conspiring to overthrow the democracy
• Alcibiades turned his ship home and began sailing back to Greece, but on the way he slipped away from the escort and defected
• He arrived at Sparta!
  

Alcibiades' Conduct

• [Thucydides, 6.15] "the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at the greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things whatsoever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city"
• [Plutarch, Alcibiades, 16] "At Sparta, he was held in high repute publicly, and privately was no less admired. The multitude was brought under his influence, and was actually bewitched, by his assumption of the Spartan mode of life. When they saw him with his hair untrimmed, taking cold baths, on terms of intimacy with their coarse bread, and supping on black porridge they could scarcely trust their eyes, and doubted whether such a man as he now was had ever had a cook in his own house, had even so much as looked upon a perfumer, or endured the touch of Milesian wool. He had, as they say, one power which transcended all others: that of assimilating and adapting himself to the pursuits and lives of others, thereby assuming more violent changes than the chameleon"

Alcibiades' Advice to the Spartans: The Occupation of Decelea

Now exiled from his own country, Alcibiades acted whole-heartedly against them. He now became an advisor to the Spartans, using his tactical insider knowledge to greatly undermine the Athenian war effort

Thucydides, 6.89-91, Alcibiades' speech to the Spartans

1. How, according to Alcibiades, will the conquest of Sicily be used against the Spartans?
• "In addition to our existing fleet we should have built many more triremes, since Italy is rich in timber, and with all of them we should have blockaded the coast of the Peloponnese, while at the same time our army would be operating on land against your cities, taking some by assault and others by siege"
• Athens wanted to be "the masters of the entire Hellenic world" and would use Sicily's help to achieve this
• Basically, the Athenians would use what they gained in Sicily to destroy Sparta and its allies
  
2. What assistance should the Spartans send to Sicily according to Alcibiades?
• "You must send out to Sicily a force of troops that are able to row the ships themselves and to take the field as hoplites as soon as they land"
• They should send a Spartan officer to mould the forces already there into shape
• They should also continue to wage war in Hellas to strengthen the Syracusan resolve and make it harder for Athens to send reinforcements to Sicily
  
3. Why should the Spartans occupy Decelea? What setbacks will it deal to the Athenians?
• "It is the thing of which the Athenians have always been most frightened"
• "The surest way of harming an enemy is to find out certainly what form of attack he is most frightened of, and then to employ it against him"
• It would also deprive Athens of the revenue from the silver mines
• The revenue from the Athenian allies would be paid less regularly, for they will "lose their awe of Athens"
4. Overall Alcibiades played on the innate Spartan fear of Athenian power
   

The Athenians Seek Allies

With the news of the Athenian approach, cities in Sicily reacted in different ways to the invasion:

• Some advocated resistance (such as Syracuse), others wanted to join the Athenians
• In the winter of 415-414 BC the Athenians sent a delegation to Kamarina, on the southern coast of Sicily, attempting to convince them to join the Athenians
• The Syracusans also sent a delegation, hoping to deter them

Activity: Athenian Speech to Kamarina

Thucydides, 6.82-83

• How do the Athenians justify their presence in Sicily?
• "We have come here to settle matters for our own security, together with our friends; not to enslave anybody, but rather to prevent anybody from being enslaved"
• "So now it is for our own security that we are in Sicily, and we see that here your interests are the same as ours"
• They claim that they simply want to renew their former alliance
• "We therefore looked about for the best means of preserving our independence"
• "It is also because of fear that we have come here to settle matters for our own security"
• "What you do concerns us very much indeed"
• "it is illogical for us to enslave Chalcidians in Hellas and liberate them in Sicily"
• "We therefore deserve the empire which we have, partly because we supplied to the cause of Hellas the largest fleet and a courage that never looked back"
• "This we can prove from what the Syracusans are saying against us and from your suspicions of us which you yourselves, in your rather over-anxious mood, no doubt entertain"
• "Now, we are Ionians and the Peloponnesians are Dorians; they are more numerous than we and they live close to us"
• The Ionians are always the enemies of the Dorians
• "The Syracusans will not find it so easy to do us harm by sending a force to help the Peloponnesians"
• "After the Persian war...we broke free of the Spartan empire and of Sparta's leadership" - bit rich to call Sparta an empire lol
  

The Aftermath of the Peace of Nicias

Nicias knew "that the Spartans had for some time been anxious for peace while the Athenians no longer had the same appetite for war" so he made every effort to reconcile them

Athenian Reasons

• Loss of confidence over recent defeats at Delium and Amphipolis
• Apprehensive about allies - fear of revolts
• Regretting their rejection of peace after Pylos

Spartan Reasons

• Anxiety to get back Spartan prisoners taken during Pylos campaign
• Sparta's territory was being raided from Pylos and Cythera
• Helots likely to revolt
• Thirty Years' Peace with Argos coming to an end

Terms of the Treaty - Thucydides 5.17

1. It was to last 50 years
2. Delphi was to be free
3. Disputes were to be settled by law and alterations to the treaty made by mutual consent
4. Chalcidice was to be independent
5. Amphipolis and Panactum were to be given back to Athens
6. Pylos, Cythera and Methana were to be returned to Sparta
7. All prisoners were to be exchanged

Thucydides' View of the Period: Shifting Alliances 5.25-6

• "The states which had accepted the treaty were at peace; but the Corinthians and some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb the settlement, a fresh agitation was instantly commenced by the allies against Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, became suspected by the Athenians through their not performing some of the provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten months they abstained from invasion of each other's territory, yet abroad an unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the most effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the treaty made after the ten years' war and to have recourse to open hostilities"
• "Only a mistaken judgment can object to including the interval of treaty in the war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be rationally considered a state of peace, where neither party either gave or got back all that they had agreed, apart from the violations of it which occurred on both sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and other instances, and the fact that the allies in the direction of Thrace were in as open hostility as ever, while the Boeotians had only a truce renewed every ten days"
• In Thucydidies' view, though peace was signed, hostility still continued in the Greek world

Changing Alliances 421-416 BC

Discontent of Sparta's Allies

• Refusal to ratify the treaty:
• Corinth - lost possession with no compensation
• Megara - Chief harbour Nisaea still in Athenian hands
• Boeotia - refused to give back Panactum
• Sparta's reactions: Formed an alliance with Athens. The treaty was never fully implemented
1. Amphipolis not returned to Athens [objections by the inhabitants]
2. Pylos not returned to Sparta
• Thucydides 5.17, 5.25

New Alignment of Powers

• The resentment of the Spartan allies lead to political upheaval and alliance reshuffling i.e: joining a secret unofficial alliance with Argos
• "The Corinthians pointed out that Lacedaemon could have no good end in view, but only the subjugation of Peloponnese, or she would never have entered into treaty and alliance with the once detested Athenians, and that the duty of consulting for the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon Argos" - Thucydudes 5.27
• Aware of the coalition Sparta implemented plans to get her allies back - risking a break of the Athenian alliance

In Athens: Alcibiades

• After the death of Cleon at Amphipolis, Nicias held the greatest authority over the Athenians
• However, he would face a new challenge from among the demagogues, in the form of Alcibiades:
• Born into one of the famous aristocratic families of Athens, the Alcmaeonidae (shield-signallers at Marathon)
• Famed for his beauty, charm and wit - he was the student of the famous philosopher Socrates, who saved his life at the Battle of Potidaea
• Pericles acted as a guardian after his father, Cleinias, died at the Battle of Coronea (between Athens and Boeotia during the First Peloponnesian War)

Writers' Views of Alcibiades

• "You shall not rear a lion cub in the city, but if one is brought up, accommodate its ways" - Aristophanes
• "He was exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. The position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on would contribute to the ruin of the Athenian state" - Thucydides
• "Although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city" - Thucydides
• "His character displayed many inconsistencies and marked changes, as was natural amid his vast undertakings and varied fortunes. He was naturally a man of many strong passions, the mightiest of which were the love of rivalry and the love of pre-eminence." - Plutarch

Alcibiades Undermining the Peace

• Aim of Alcibiades - Discard the alliance, win over Argos risking war with Sparta
• Historical thought on Alcibiades' motivation:
• Thucydides - Alcibiades believed the Spartans could not be trusted (5.43)
• Plutarch - Alcibiades aimed to violate the treaty out of sheer jealousy of Nicias' success and fame (14-15)

Thucydides, 5.43

"The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians having gone thus far, the party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty, immediately put themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that personal resentment had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he was offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient connection of his family with them as their proxeni, which, renounced by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his attentions to their prisoners taken at Sphacteria. Being thus, as he thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first instance spoken against the treaty, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, but that they only sough an alliance in order to be enabled by this means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack Athens alone; and now, immediately upon the above occurring, he sent privately to the Argives, telling them to come as quickly as possible to Athens, accompanied by the Mantineans and Eleans, with proposals of alliance; as the moment was propitious and he himself would do all he could to help them."

Athenian/Argive Alliance

• In order to sow discord for Sparta, Alcibiades arranged an agreement between Argos, Athens, Mantinea and Elis
• What is the strategic importance of this manoeuver?
• Corinth and Megara decided to re-join the Spartan Alliance for protection purposes

Role of Agis

• After realising that the Peloponnesian allies were beginning to turn against their Spartan leaders, King Agis of Sparta decided to march against Argos with her full army as well as the Tegeans and some other allies from Arcadia
• They were joined by other Peloponnesian Allies = 11,000 Boeotians, 2,000 Corinthians; Phliasians = entire force
• With such a considerable force, it was thought the Spartan coalition would crush the Argives and reassert Spartan dominance. However, King Agis took an unusual step:
• He met with a few representatives of the Argives and concluded a four month truce without consulting the other Peloponnesian allies
• Consequence - Agis severely criticised and forced to accept a 10 man board of special advisors to prevent further political blunders
• "The Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general out of respect for the law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed Agis for going away from so fair a field (the enemy being hemmed in on every side by infantry and cavalry) without having done anything worthy of their strength" - Thucydides, 5.60

Truce Broken

• Not long after it was signed, the Argives break the truce signed with Agis and the Spartans and continue hostilities. Why?
• "The Argives blamed the persons who had concluded the truce without consulting the people, themselves thinking that they had let escape with the Lacedaemonians an opportunity such as they should never see again; as the struggle would have been under the walls of their city, and by the side of many and brave allies" (5.60)
• "Alcibiades told the Argives and the allies that they had no right to make a truce at all without the consent of their fellow confederates, and now that the Athenians had arrived so opportunely the war ought to be resumed" (5.61)
• The Argives began incursions into Laconia, forcing the Spartans and King Agis once again to march out and meet them - though this time without the support of their other allies, who had all been sent home

Battle of Mantinea 418 BC

• Spartan alliance vs Athenian/Argive Coalition met on the battlefield near Mantinea in 418 BC:
• Spartan Alliance:
• 3,500 Spartiates
• 600 Skiritae
• 2,000 Helots
• Neodamodeis
• 3,000 Tegean infantry and cavalry
• Roughly 9,000 in total
• Argive Alliance:
• 3,000 Argives
• 1,000 Athenians
• 2,000 Mantineans
• 1,000 Arcadian Mercenaries
• 1,000 other allied infantry and cavalry
• Roughly 8,000 in total
• The battle ended with a Spartan victory over Argos and Athens
• "The imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time, whether of cowardice on account of the disaster at Sphacteria, or of mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this single action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men themselves were the same as ever" Thucydides 5.75
• Outcome:
• Sparta and Argos concluded a 50 year alliance [begun 415 BC]
• Mantineans re-join the Spartan Alliance [stronger by 417 BC]

Brasidas and the Thracian Campaign: 424 - 422 BC

Role of Brasidas: The Spartans Change Tactics
Brasidas, the Spartan general, with a Peloponnesian force of 1700 hoplites (including 700 helots), marched north to Thrace in 424 BC at the request of Perdiccas of Macedonia and the Thracian towns, who were alarmed at Athenian success
Brasidas had already distinguished himself numerous times up to this point:

• He rescued the town of Methone from an Athenian sea raid in the first year of the war
• He was elected Eponymous Ephor (head of state) in 430 BC - likely as a result of his victory at Methone
• He led the Spartan assault upon the Athenian beach positions at Pylos, suffering a near-mortal wound in the process
• He saved Megara from an Athenian surprise attack that almost captured the entire city
• He planned a night raid on Piraeus and planned to sneak into Athens, but his plans were detected and instead he defeated Athenian forces on Salamis

Activity

Thucydides 4.80-81

1. What were the reasons for the Spartans sending Brasidas north into Thrace?
• "Largely because it was his own wish"
• They welcomed the opportunity to send away a bunch of helots
• Chalcidians were "eager to have him"
• Side note - they had the helots select their best men, convinced them that they were being freed, but then killed them all as they were the most dangerous
2. What personal strengths are identified in Brasidas? How did these become advantageous to the Spartans?
• "His upright and moderate conduct towards the cities which caused most of them to revolt and enabled him to take over by treachery"
• His reputation "left a conviction on both sides that the rest were like him" - suggesting that he helped to heal Sparta's reputation
• Said to have "gallantry"
• Created "pro Spartan feeling" in the Athenian allies
• "valuable to his country"

Initial Successes

• Brasidas won over the town of Acanthus by oratory and diplomacy
• He then took the important Athenian city of Amphipolis by offering moderate terms, guaranteeing the people full political rights and continued possession of their property
• Any who wished to leave were free to do so within five days
• Many more Athenian allies joined Brasidas, spurred on by the moderate terms he was offering
• He also always claimed he was there as a liberator, unlike the Athenians who had enslaved them through force

The Role of Thucydides

• Thucydides, who at the time was an Athenian general stationed at Thasos, was keeping an eye on Athens' interests in the north-west when Brasidas made his attempt on Amphipolis
• Thucydides failed to prevent this and the Athenians banished him, but his exile enabled him to write his great history of the Peloponnesian War
• Brasidas appealed for reinforcements and began building triremes. Torone went over to Sparta by treachery, but once Brasidas entered the city he guaranteed the citizens their civil rights, with no reprisals

Activity: The Fall of Amphipolis

Thucydides 4.108

1. Why did the fall of Amphipolis cause great alarm for the Athenians?
• The place was "useful" as it supplied timber for shipbuilding and brought in revenue
• The Spartans could travel no further than Strymon unless they controlled the bridge, due to Athenian triremes and the great lake they had to cross. "Now, however, the difficulties appeared to have been removed"
• They feared that their allies would revolt
2. How did Athenian allies in the region react to the fall of Amphipolis to Brasidas?
• They "eagerly embraced the idea of a change" and so wanted Brasidas to come into their territories
• They were excited at the thought of liberation
• "the excitement of the moment" the chance to see the Spartans act "with real energy"
• "They made overtures to him, begging him to march on into their territory, and vied with each other in being the first to revolt"
• Thucydides believed that their confidence that Athens would do nothing was "wishful thinking" due to the Athenians being defeated in Boeoti and an "untrue but attractive" claim from Brasidas that they had not dared to attack his army
3. Why did the Spartans not send reinforcements to Brasidas despite his successes?
• "Their leading men were jealous of him"
• "What they really wanted was to recover the prisoners made on the island and to end the war"

Allies Revolt

• In 423 an armistice was signed between Athens and Sparta
• 'The Athenians calculated that in this way Brasidas would not be able to win over any more of their dependencies before they had had time to take measures for their security'
• However, while these negotiations were in progress, the people of Scione revolted against Athens. Brasidas praised them for their courage and resolution and assured them that as such loyal friends of Sparta, he would honour them in every way
• When news of the truce arrived Brasidas refused to give up to Scione, even though it had been taken after the armistice was signed. The Athenians were furious; Cleon proposed that it should be recaptured and the death penalty be imposed upon the inhabitants

Cleon's Failure

• Mende also revolted against Athens and Brasidas accepted the citizens as allies, despite the infringement of the truce. The Athenians made preparations, under Nicias, to attack both cities. Mende was retaken (the Athenian troops had to be restrained from slaughtering the inhabitants) and Scione was placed under siege
• After the armistice, Cleon sailed out with a force of 1500 against the Thracian towns. During Brasidas' absence, he took Torone and made slaves of the women and children, while the men were sent to Athens
• In 422 BC Cleon attempted to besiege the city of Amphipolis, but when he marched in front of the walls he realised his position was too exposed and turned his phalanx to retreat - Brasidas, who was waiting in ambush nearby, launched a surprise attack on Cleon's flank with his picked Spartan forces
• The battle for Amphipolis was lost by Cleon and the Athenians, who were disorganised, panic-stricken and thrown off balance by the audacity of Brasidas. Both Brasidas and Cleon died - one in battle and the other, according to Thucydides, fleeing from the scene. Now "Cleon and Brasidas were dead - the two people who on each side had been most opposed to peace"

The Peace of Nicias 421 BC

• The disaster at Amphipolis completely changed Athenian public opinion on the war, and with Cleon dead, the main proponent of continuing the war was gone from Athenian politics
• The Athenians also suffered defeat at Delium against the Boeotians, in a battle that recorded the the first instances of friendly fire and a flamethrower in history
• Soon after delegates from Sparta arrived in Athens, and talks for peace began
• Within a few months, peace was agreed upon, named the "Peace of Nicias" after the Athenian general and politician Nicias, who had led the "peace faction" in Athens during Cleon's time in power, and who now negotiated the peace with Sparta

Activity

Thucydides 5.13-17

1. Outline the reasons why both Athens and Sparta desired peace at this stage of the war
• Athens:
• As Brasidas had died, reinforcements "turned back home, thinking that the time for action had passed"
• "They themselves were not capable of carrying out the plans which Brasidas had had in mind"
• The Athenians had suffered a "serious blow" at Delium, and another at Amphipolis
• "They no longer possessed the same confidence in their strength which had induced them to reject previous offers of peace"
• "They were also apprehensive about the allies, fearing that they might be encouraged by these defeats to revolt on a more serious scale"
• Sparta:
• Sparta was collapsing from the inside, as more and more Helots deserted them
• The Spartans "had found that the war had gone very differently from what they had imagined" - they had thought that they could have destroyed the power of Athens in a few years, simply by laying waste her land
• The Thirty Years Peace Treaty between Sparta and Argos was expiring. The Spartans suspected that some of the states in the Peloponnese would switch sides.
• They didn't want to fight both Athens and Argos at once
• They were "desperate" to get their men back who had been captured at Pylos

1. Why did both Brasidas and Cleon wish for the war to continue?
• Brasidas:
• "because of the success and honour which had come to him through war"
• Cleon:
• "because he thought that in a time of peace and quiet people would be more likely to notice his evil doings and less likely to believe his slander of others"
2. What were the motives of the two new leaders Nicias and Pleistoanax behind desiring peace?
• Nicias:
• Had an "unblemished" career and wanted to keep it that way, but could only do that by "leaving as little to fortune as possible" which was only possible in peace time
• "to find immediate release from toil and trouble both for himself and his fellow citizens, and to leave behind the name of one whose service to the state was successful from start to finish"
• Pleistoanax:
• Was being accused and slandered constantly and believed that in peace time such accusations would stop and that with the prisoners back, his opponents wouldn't be able to blame him for their captivity
• "enemies would have no bases from which to attack him"
• He had taken a bribe from Pericles years previously and had been exiled because of it.

The Battle of Pylos and Sphacteria

In the years following the death of Pericles and Archidamus, the war escalated in its brutality, 428-425 BC:
Sparta

• When Archidamus dies c. 428 BC, command of the war passed to his son King Agis
• Agis was young and energetic, and decided to attempt more daring strategies against the Athenians, whilst sticking to the invasion tactics of his father
• In 428-427 BC the Spartans and Thebans attacked Plataea, hoping to draw the Athenians out to help their oldest ally
• The Plataeans pleaded with the Spartans, drawing on the fact they had served loyally during the Persian wars. The Spartans promised to leave Plataea alone so long as they remained neutral
• Plataea instead remained loyal to Athens, and with no possible assistance after a bloody siege Plataea was captured, the Thebans destroyed the city and many of the defenders were massacred

Athens

• With the death of Pericles, the democracy turned to the demagogues, led by Cleon 
• Cleon had risen in Athens' political scene by setting himself up as anti-Periclean in his strategy, and was known for "the violence of his character" according to Thucydides
• In 427 BC the city of Mytilene on Lesbos revolted from the Delian League
• Cleon advised that the Athenians make an example of Mytilene and massacre the entire population - men, women and children
• Amazingly the Athenians voted for this. But the next day had a change of conscience and recalled the assembly to vote again
• After a heated debate, the Athenians (thankfully) changed their minds and cancelled the plan

Overview

• The battle of Sphacteria (425 BC) was the second part of a two-part battle which shocked Sparta and the Greek world
• The chain of events that led to this almost unprecedented disaster began when an Athenian force under the command of Demosthenes landed on the rocky headland of Pylos, in the south-west of the Peloponnese and fortified their position after weathering a storm
• The Peloponnesian army under King Agis abandoned their short invasion of Attica and returned to the Peloponnese, while the forces already at Sparta moved west to deal with the new threat

Initial Problems

• For a brief period Demosthenes was in serious trouble:
• The Spartans summoned their fleet to Pylos, and he found himself besieged by land and sea
• The Athenian position was on a headland at one end of the Bay of Pylos
• The island of Sphacteria ran across the mouth of the bay, and was occupied by the Spartans The Spartan fleet moved into the bay, trapping the Athenians and preventing any supplies from reaching them
• In the resulting battle of Pylos the Athenians managed to hold off a two-pronged Spartan assault, but they were really saved by the arrival of an Athenian fleet
• This fleet inflicted a heavy defeat on the Spartan fleet inside the bay, in the process lifting the blockade of Pylos
• The tables were not turned on the Spartans. A force of 420 Spartan hoplites, under the command of Epitades, son of Molobrus was trapped on Sphacteria
• The Spartans responded by sending senior members of their government to Pylos to examine the situation. When it becomes clear that they could not hope to get supplies onto the island or rescue the hoplites, they asked the Athenians for an armistice
• The biggest weakness in the Spartan system was the shortage of full citizens, and they could hardly afford to lose 420 full Spartans. This was reflected in the terms they agreed with the Athenians:
• Every warship that had taken part in the earlier fighting and every warship in Laconia was to be handed over to the Athenians for the duration of the armistice
• The Spartans were to stop all attacks on Pylos, while the Athenians stopped attacking Sphacteria, and allowed a fixed amount of food onto the island
• The armistice would stay in place while Spartan representatives went to Athens to offer peace terms

Activity: Spartan Negotiation

Thucydides, 4.19-20

What arguments do the Spartans make as to why peace should be made?

•  "if peace was ever desirable for both parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally"
• "No lasting settlement can be made in a spirit of revenge"
• "thinking it better for both sides that the affair should not proceed to the bitter end"
• "if we, Athens and Sparta, stand together, you can be sure that the rest of Hellas, in its inferior position...will show us every possible mark of honour"
• "for sense of honour... and men are more inclined to act in this way towards their greatest enemies"
• "for this they will think that it is you rather than we whom they have to thank"
• "the enemy is already under obligation to pay back good for good"
• "while you have won glory and can have our friendship as well"
• "by accepting our proposals you can have the firm friendship of Sparta"
• "when one side gets the better of things in war and forces its opponent to swear to carry out the terms of an unequal treaty"

Failed Negotiations

• The peace negotiations and their aftermath do not reflect well on the Athenians. They demanded the return of lands lost at the end of the First Peloponnesian War, and when the negotiations broke down they refused to honour the terms of the armistice and kept the Spartan warships. The armistice lasted twenty days
• After the failure of the negotiations the fighting resumed. The Spartans continued their attacks on the Athenians on Pylos, while the Athenians maintained the naval blockade of Sphacteria
• Both sides were effectively under siege, but at first it was the Spartans who put the most effort into getting supplies to their troops. Volunteers were asked to try and get supplies onto the island, with a cash reward for free men and freedom as the rewards for helots. Any boats used in the operation were valued beforehand, so it did not matter if they were lost. Some men waited for the right weather and effectively rammed the island at full speed, damaging their boats but winning the reward. Others swam in under water, towing supplies protected by skins

Cleon and Nicias

• As the siege dragged on the Athenian people became concerned that the Spartans would escape
• The politician Cleon, who had played a major role in convincing the people to reject the Spartan peace offer, became increasingly unpopular. In an attempt to restore his popularity he tried to blame the general, Nicias (son of Niceratus) for the failures, claiming that a true leader would have easily captured the island by now. This badly backfired, for the Athenian people began to ask why Cleon was not leading the army if it was that simple
• Nicias added to his problems by giving him permission to take any troops that he required and take command of the siege. Eventually Cleon was backed into a corner, and had no other choice than to go to Sphacteria. He now raised the stakes once again by announcing that he would take the island in twenty days, without using any fresh Athenian troops
• Cleon times his arrival at Sphacteria perfectly. Demosthenes had been unwilling to risk a landing on the island because it was covered in thick woodland, with no paths, and he believed that this would give the Spartans too big an advantage
• Just before Cleon arrived, one of the Spartans accidently set the woods on fire, and most of the trees burnt down. The fire also revealed a number of landing points, and that there were more Spartans on the island than previously believed, making them an even bigger prize
• The two Athenian generals began by sending a herald to the island to ask the Spartans to surrender on generous terms. When this offer was rejected, they waited for a day and then launched a surprise attack on the island
• The Spartans were divided into three camps
• The main camp, under their commander Epitades, was in the centre of the island. This was both the most level and best provided with water
• A guard of thirty hoplites was at the end of the island the Athenians chose to attack (probably the southern end)
• Another small detachment was posted at the opposite end, facing the headland of Pylos. This was the rockiest end of the island, and was topped with an old fort that the Spartans hoped to use as a final refuge
• This attack came on the seventy-second day after the naval battle that had trapped the Spartans

New Tactics

• The Athenians caught the Spartans out by loading their 800 hoplites onto the ships while it was still dark. The ships then put out to sea as if they were about to mount their normal daily patrols, but instead landed on the island
• The first Spartan post was overwhelmed. This allowed Demosthenes to bring over the rest of his army - 800 archers, at least 800 peltasts, the Allied contingents and the crews of the seventy Athenian warships. This army was them divided into groups of around 200, and these groups were posted on high ground all around the main Spartan position
• The Greeks are often accused of being unimaginative in warfare, relying entirely on simple clashes between hoplites, but here we see Demosthenes using a different tactic. The Spartans would find themselves in a trap. If they attempted to attack any part of the Athenian line they would be exposed to attack from the rear, while the lightly armed Athenian troops would be able to retreat from the heavily armoured Spartan hoplites
• When Epitades realised that the Athenians had landed on the island he formed up his men and moved to attack the Athenian hoplites, expected the standard clash between two lines of similar troops
• Instead the Spartans found themselves being harried from both flanks by the bowmen, peltasts and stone throwers. The Athenian hoplites refused to come forward and fight, so the Spartans were denied their main target. They were sometimes able to close up with the light troops, but not crush them
• Eventually they were forced to retreat back up the island to the fort. The Athenians followed, and launched a series of frontal assaults on the fort, but this time the advantages were with the Spartans, and these attacks failed to push the Spartans out of their final defensive lines before the fort itself
• The stalemate was broken by the commander of the Messenian contingent. He asked Cleon and Demosthenes to give him some archers and light troops. He then picked his way around the rocky coastline of the island, until he was in position on some high ground behind the fort. When these troops appeared behind them the Spartans abandoned their outer lines and pulled back

Round 2: Negotiations

• At this point Cleon and Demosthenes called a halt to the fighting, and once again sent a herald to offer surrender terms
• By now the Spartans had lost Epitades, who had been killed, while their second in command, Hippagretas was badly wounded and believed falsely to be dead. This left the third in command, Styphon son of Pharax, in charge
• According to Thucydides most of the Spartans lowered their shields and made it clear that they wanted to surrender when they first heard the heralds, so Styphon had no choice other than to enter into surrender negotiations. After consulting with the Spartans on the mainland, who gave him no useful advice ("make your own decision about yourselves, so long as you do nothing dishonourable"), Styphon and the Spartans decided, to the shock of the entire Greek world, to surrender

Activity: The Effects of the Battle

Thucydides 4.40-1

What were the effects of the battle of Sphacteria for Sparta?

•  The Greek world was shocked, as the Spartans were renowned for never surrendering
• "It was hard to believe that those who had surrendered were the same sort of people as those who had fallen"
• The Spartans repeatedly sent representatives to Athens to try and get their 120 soldiers back, but returned every time empty handed
• If the Peloponnesians attacked, the Athenians would kill the Spartan prisoners
• Delian troops carried out raids using the tactic of epiteichismos.They were helped by the fact that they spoke the same dialect, as Pylos was in what used to be Messania The Spartans had no experience of this type of guerrilla warfare, and as the helots began to desert "they feared the spread of a revolution... and became exceedingly uneasy about it" 

Effects of Surrender

• The Athenians had captured a very valuable prize. Of the 440 hoplites who had been trapped on the island, 292 were captured and taken to Athens. Of these 120 were full Spartans, a sizable proportion of a very small group
• The surrender of the Spartans caused shockwaves across the Greek world. Spartans were not expected to surrender, but to fight to the death, regardless of the odds against them
• The surrender also caused great despondency in Sparta, and triggered a series of peace offers. The prisoners were still a major factor four years later, when the Peace of Nicias (421 BC) did actually end the war for a short period. One of the clauses of the peace treaty saw the Athenians return all Spartans in prison in Athens or in any Athenian dominion

The Archidamian War: 431-421 BC

• The Archidamian War was the first phase of the second Peloponnesian War
• Named the "Archidamian" war after the King who led the Spartans during the first phases of the war, King Archidamus
• The Archidamian War composes the bulk of the second Peloponnesian War

Timeline

• 431-429 BC - Pericles vs Archidamus
• 429 BC - Plague in Athens and the deaths of Pericles and Archidamus
• 428-426 BC - Rise of the Demagogues
• 425 BC - the Battle of Pylos and Sphacteria
• 424-422 BC - Cleon vs Brasidas
• 422 BC - The Battle of Amphipolis
• 421 BC - The Peace of Nicias

Zeal for War

The war between Sparta and Athens stirred all of Greece into a frenzy - the two greatest powers of the Greek world were fighting for supremacy:

"And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this particular occasion the Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading cities. No private or public effort that could help them in speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not himself see to it. So general was the indignation felt against Athens, whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were apprehensive of being absorbed by it." - Thucydides, 2.8

Strategies: Archidamus vs Pericles

Archidamus' Strategy:

• To gather the entire Peloponnesian army (some 60,000 men) and march straight into Attica
• Operate a scorch-earth policy: burn Athenian crops and farmsteads, crush any towns around Athens that resisted
• Force the Athenian army out into the open plain in defence of their city
• Defeat the Athenian army in a pitched-battle
• Reliance on Sparta's land-based military power

Pericles' Strategy:

• Rely on the long-walls of Athens and the fact the Spartan army was inexperienced in siege warfare
• Bring imports of grain and food from the sea and into the Piraeus to make up for losses in Attica
• Whilst the Peloponnesian Army wasted time in Attica, the Athenian navy could sail out and attack the Peloponnesian coast
• Reliance on Athenian naval power and her superior wealth

First Invasion of Attica

• When King Archidamus of Sparta led the Peloponnesians into Attica for the first time, the Athenians took Pericles' advice and brought their women, children and household property into Athens, where most of them...
• "had to settle down in those parts of the city that had not been built over and in the temples and shrines of the heroes except the Acropolis, in the temple of Eleusinian Demeter, and some other places that were strictly forbidden" - Thucydides
• A number also settled in the towers of the walls, between the Long Walls and in the Piraeus. They sent their livestock to Euboea
• However, when they saw that 'their land was being laid waste in front of their very eyes', they felt outraged - especially the young, who wanted to march out and stop it. Violent discussions ensued and the city was in a thoroughly excited state. The Athenian people were furious with Pericles
• According to Plutarch, Pericles:
• 'behaved like the helmsman of a ship, who, when a storm sweeps down upon it in the open sea, makes everything fast, takes in sail and relies on his own skill and takes no notice of the fears and entreaties of the sea-sick and terrified passengers' - Plutarch
• Thucydides said that Pericles was so 'convinced of the rightness of his views about not going out to battle' that he endured the criticisms calmly and did not summon any assemblies for fear the people would make some foolish decision in their anger. He then sent out minor cavalry patrols, saw to the defences of the city and sent off a fleet of 100 ships to raid the coast of the Peloponnese
• Archidamus, realising the Athenians would not come out to face the Peloponnesians in the field, stuck to his own strategy of burning the Attic countryside, and did not make an attack upon Athens
• 'This delay brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of the war he had credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half measures he had advocated' - Thucydides 2.18
• Both leaders were clearly struggling against their own people as well as each-other

Pattern of War

• Between 431 and 425 the conduct of the war followed a basic pattern:
• Sparta used her superior military forces in land-based actions, including the annual invasions of Attica (except in 429 and 426)
• Athens, following Pericles' strategy of relying on her long walls and her navy, refused to meet Sparta on land, but made raids on the coast of the Peloponnese and on the coasts of Sparta's allies. The fleet, active on the coasts of western Greece, won over Cephallenia and some coastal towns of Acarnania

Disaster Strikes Athens: Plague 429

Despite the initial successes of Pericles' strategy, an unexpected plague would ravage Athens two years into the war in 429 BC

• This was exacerbated by Pericles' strategy, which crammed Athens to its maximum capacity
• Up to 1/5 of the entire male population of Athens was killed in a year, the Spartans did not even invade Attica after hearing word of the outbreak
• Bubonic plague, typhus or typhoid have been the assumed culprits, although we are uncertain
• Thucydides himself suffered from the plague, and it ultimately killed Pericles
• Its effects on Athens' morale were devastated
• 'Its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to endure. Heavily did it weigh on the Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without' - Thucydides 2.54

Pericles Under Attack

• The Athenian people, angered by Pericles' strategy and its seemingly detrimental effect on Athens, turned on their leader
• Terrified that the attacks now being levied against him would lead to his own ostracism from the city. Pericles stood in front of the Athenian assembly and addressed the people:

What arguments does Pericles make to justify his strategy and leadership to the Athenian people? Thucydides 2.61-63

• His plan involved suffering - the long term effects hadn't been felt yet
• In times of crisis people panic and rash decisions will be made as a result - he does acknowledge that the plague was a crisis
• The Athenians took his advice and followed it consciously - they voted for him knowing what they were in for
• "You took my advice when you had not suffered misfortune"
• "Your empire is now a tyranny. It may have been wrong to take it, it is now certainly dangerous to give it up"
• "With your navy as it is today nobody can stop you"
• "Those who are politically apathetic can only survive if they are supported by those who take action"
• "You Athenians cannot enjoy the privileges of an empire unless you also shoulder the burden"

The Death of Pericles

• Pericles' arguments subsided the Athenian's hatred of him, however he was still fined for misconduct . Ironically, he was then reinstated as strategos for the war.
• In a rather terrible sense of irony, the plague, which was still ravaging Athens, eventually claimed Pericles' life

Thucydides 2.65

1. What strengths does Thucydides identify in Pericles as a leader?
• Pericles had 'wisely led and firmly guarded' Athens for years. He had 'accurately estimated' Athens' strength at the start of the war, and his foresight continued to persist. He knew Athens should continue to take care of its navy, not attempt to expand the empire during the war, and not risk the city
• 'Pericles, because of his position, his intelligence, his known integrity, could respect the liberty of the people and at the same time hold them in check'.
• 'He never sought power for any wrong motive' so was able to speak frankly and honestly to the Athenians. He would cheer them up when they were too discouraged, and make them aware of danger when they were too optimistic
• While Athens was normally a democracy, 'power was really in the hands of the First Citizen'. 'He led them rather than being led by them'
2. What does Thucydides say happened to Athenian political and military leadership following Pericles' death?
• They went after personal glory and profit. When their policies were successful, they benefitted individuals, but when they failed they endangered the whole state. They fought and quarrelled, each in pursuit of the top spot, confusing state policy in the process. They were led by the people, rather than leading the people
• 'his successors...adopted methods of demagogy which resulted in their losing control over the actual conduct of affairs

The Beginning of the Second Peloponnesian War: Preparations

Spartan and Corinthian Preparation

Athenian Preparations

Archidamus suggested they invade and ravage Attica, drawing the Athenians out so that they could be defeated The Corinthians emphasised caution, not getting too confident They suggested building fortified positions in Athenian territory from which to launch raids (Epiteichismus) Build up Peloponnesian naval power (Corinthians had the most ships in the Peloponnese with about 100, Athens had 300-400) In the short term, entice Athens' foreign and mercenary sailors to defect with higher pay Finally begin to contribute money to the Peloponnesian League for a navy Foster revolts among Athens' allies to cut off their revenue

Pericles realised that if Archidamus spared his property, he would be under suspicion, so he declared that he would donate all of his property to the state if it were spared Pericles said that they should remain in the city, using the Long Walls for defence, and use their huge financial reserves (including 6,000 talents in savings and a golden statue) to ride out the war until the Spartans couldn't afford to carry on They should abandon the countryside; this completely counters Sparta's tactic Use the navy to keep a 'firm hand' on their allies; again, countering the Corinthian plan of inciting revolt They had thousands of soldiers and 300 triremes Thucydides was a general. His account of Athens' preparations can therefore be trusted

The Debate at Sparta and the Spartan Ultimatum

The Debate at Sparta

• Purpose of assembly = to hear the complaints of Sparta's allies and anyone who claimed to have suffered Athenian aggression
• The Spartans and the Peloponnesian League could then consider whether war against the Athenians and the Delian League was justified
• Key term in the Thirty Years Peace: "Neither side was allowed to make an armed attack on the other, if the latter wished to go to arbitration"

Corinth Denounces Athenian Imperialism (1.69)

"For all this you (Sparta) are responsible. You it was who first allowed them to fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect the long walls-you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not only those who have as yet been your allies. For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not so much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it but has the means to prevent it"

Who do the Corinthians blame for Athenian imperialism? Does this seem like a legitamate charge from the Corinthians based on what we have seen?

Corinth Speech Continued: The "National Character" of Sparta and Athens (1.70)

"The great contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as far as we can see, you have little perception, having never yet considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough... they are never at home, you are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil from a reverse. Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their country's cause; their intellect they jealously husband to be employed in her service"

Athens: Innovators, swift in executing plans, never at home (brave), swift to follow up success, sacrifice themselves for their country

Sparta: Procrastinators, too conservative, slow to act, too scared of losses

What contrasts does Corinth make between Sparta and Athens? Why do you think they deliberately characterise both states in this way?

Corinth's Threat

"Do not sacrifice friends and kindred peoples to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance"

• The Corinthians clearly hint towards the Delian League as the "other alliance", suggesting that if the Spartans do not act now the Athenians will begin to conquer Peloponnesian allies too
• This clearly plays to Sparta's fears of Athenian imperialism, and strongly hints at Corinthian manipulation of the Spartans in foreign policy

Athenian Rebuttal (1.75)

"Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed during the Persian Wars, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command. And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest afterwards came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest"

What arguments do the Athenians make to justify their empire?

Athenian Justification of their Empire

"You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been law that the strong do what they can and the weak endure what they must. Men's resentment, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior. At all events they contrived to put up with much worse treatment than this from the Persians, yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least is certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and taking our place, you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us has invested you, if your policy of today is at all to tally with the sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command against the Mede. Not only is your life at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible with those of others, but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognised by the rest of Hellas"

What arguments do the Athenians make to justify their empire?

Spartan Discussion following the Congress

Discussion took place but ended in divided opinion

1. Athens' alliance with Corcyra could not be considered illegal in the light of the Peace of 445 BC
2. Potidaea was a complicated issue: if there was to be someone to blame it was Corinth

King Archidamus and the Doves

"A man who had a reputation for both intelligence and moderation"

• He pointed out the dangers in rushing unprepared into a war against a much wealthier, better-armed naval power
• He suggested that the Spartans should not declare war immediately - rather approach Athens with their allies' grievances and in the meantime make new allies with financial and naval forces

"And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise moderation"

Sthenelaidas and the Hawks

"The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they are injuring our allies and the Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double punishment for having ceased being good and for having become bad. We meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise, disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put of till tomorrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer today. Others have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up to the Athenians"

What arguments does the Spartan Sthenelaidas make as to why war should be declared?

Final Decision put to the Assembly of Sparta

• Majority of Spartan votes indicated their belief that the Thirty Years' Peace had been broken
• War could only be declared by a majority decision of the Peloponnesian League - this was immediately called

"The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them" (1.88)

Sparta's Main Concern

• There were no legal grounds for Sparta to declare war
• Athenian ambitions were to be feared and Athens had shown an unfriendly attitude towards Megara and the influence it could already exert across the Aegean
• What influenced Sparta was the need to maintain her own prestige with an ascendancy over her allies
• Her allies had been so insistent about Sparta staying inactive that if this were to continue she could no longer be their leader

The Spartan Ultimatum

Though war had been decided upon, the Spartans headed to Athens with one last ultimatum which:

1. "Ordered Athens to raise the siege of Potidaea"
2. Demanded that Athens "respect the independence of Aegina"
3. Said "That war may be prevented by the revocation of the Megarian Decree"
4. Ordered them to drive out the "Curse of the Alcmaeonidae" as in the family, of which Pericles was a member

Pericles Convinces the Athenian Assembly to Reject the Ultimatum

"There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold dearest, and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. Now it was clear before that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still more clear now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping the tone of reason and adopting that of command. I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals"

What reasons does Pericles give as to why the Spartan ultimatum must be rejected by Athens?

Athenian Refusal

• Athens sent the Spartan envoys away with the message that:
1. They would give the Megarians access to their markets when Sparta ceased expelling strangers from her cities and restored full independence to her own allies
2. They offered to accept arbitration on the various complaints under the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace Treaty on a fair and equal basis
• The Spartan envoys never returned to Athens, and could not submit to arbitration as she had declared the treaty was broken and would not risk the loss of her allies by taking such a step

War

War broke out in 431 BC when Thebans attacked Athens' ally Plataea

"In this affair of Plataea the treaty had quite obviously been broken, and now the Athenians made ready for war, as did the Spartans and their allies"