End of the Peloponnesian War - 404 BC

The Recall of Alcibiades

• In 412 BC, Alcibiades helped stir up revolt among Athenian allies in Ionia, on the west coast of Asia Minor; with allies such as Euboea and Chios defecting
• But Sparta now turned against him (after he seduced the wife of the King and impregnated her), and he moved to Sardis to exercise his charm on the Persian governor
• When some Athenian officers in the fleet began to plan an oligarchic coup, he held out hopes that if the democracy was overthrown he could secure financial support from Persia
• In this he failed and, discarded by the oligarchs who had seized power, he was recalled by the Athenian fleet, which remained loyal to the democracy and needed his abilities
• With the temporary oligarchic coup at an end, Alcibiades was now back in command of the Athenian navy - with political support back home

Tissaphernes in Persia replaced: Persian Commitment to Sparta

• In 412 BBC, the terms between Sparta and Persia had been negotiated, with mutual support agreed and the financing of the Spartan fleet organised
• However, under Alcibiades' advice, Tissaphernes had deliberately been perfidious in his dealings with the Spartans - refusing to commit to fully paying for the Spartan fleet to keep the balance of power in Greece
• When, therefore, Darius II decided to commit fully to Sparta, and Tissaphernes' actions were discovered, he was replaced with Darius' own son, Cyrus the Younger
• "Then and there they told Cyrus of the deeds of which Tissaphernes had been guilty and begged him to show the utmost zeal in the war. Cyrus had no other intention himself, but would do everything possible; he had brought with him, he said, five hundred talents; if this amount should prove insufficient, he would use his own money, which his father had given him; and if this should prove inadequate, he would go so far as to break up the throne whereon he sat, which was of silver and gold" - Xenophon, 1.5.1-7

Spartan Navy Payment Secured

• With this shift in commitment from Persia, Sparta was now able to pay its fleet, but it was still considered insufficient:
• "The ambassadors thanked him, and urged him to make the wage of each sailor an Arric drachma a day, explaining that if this were made the rate, the sailors of the Athenian fleet would desert their ships, and hence he would spend less money. He replied that their plan was a good one, but that it was not possible for him to act contrary to the King's instructions; besides, the original compact ran in this way: that the King should give thirty minae per month to each ship, whatever number of ships the Lacedaemonians might wish to maintain" - Xenophon 1.5.1-7

Successes of Alcibiades in the Hellespont, 411

• Dissatisfied with Tissaphernes' support and suspicious of his motives, Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, had moved the scene of conflict from Ionia to the Hellespont. For the Spartans owed Pharnabazus, the satrap in the Hellespont region, the help they had promised
• Alcibiades used this situation as an opportunity to achieve a number of naval victories before returning to Athens
• With Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, Alcibiades recovered Athenian control of the Hellespont and secured their vital corn route in battles at Cynossema, Abydos and Cyzicus. Mindarus was killed, the Spartans fleet destroyed and Pharnabazus defeated on land

Effects of His Success

• The Spartans offered peace on the basis of the status quo; that is, as things were at the time. Although Decelea would be given up in return for the evacuation of Pylos, it meant that Athens would lose permanently all those allies who had revolted, including Euboea
• Due to overconfidence from their recent naval victories, it was inevitable that the Assembly, dominated by Cleophon, would scorn the peace proposal
• After further successes on the Propontis and Bosphorus region, Alcibiades returned to Athens as a hero and was elected in 408 BC as commander-in-chief, with absolute powers both on land and sea. Plutarch suggests that many of the leading citizens - knowing Alcibiades' character and reputation - were so afraid he might become a dictator that they wanted him to sail as soon as possible

Enter Lysander

• At this stage, command of the Spartan fleet was entrusted to Lysander, a Spartan of the calibre of Leonidas, Brasidas or Gylippus
• Plutarch outlines his most important qualities:
• He had an ability to win and maintain support from others
• He was not personally corrupted by money
• He was a skilful organiser
• He showed respect and deference towards the great, so long as it achieved his own ends
• He used intrigue to achieve his own ends and was indifferent to oaths and treaties
• He was a brilliant strategist and general, particularly of naval warfare

Turning point in the war

• Lysander, using his charm, convinced Cyrus to raise the money for the sailor's pay:
• "After dinner, when Cyrus drank his health and asked him by what act he could gratify him most, Lysander replied: "By adding an obol to the pay of each sailor" And from this time forth the wage was four obols, whereas it had previously been three. Cyrus also settled the arrears of pay and gave them a month's wage in advance besides, so that the men of the fleet were much more zealous"
• Lysander, appointed as admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, was a skilful organiser with the ability to win and maintain support. He was a thorough and enterprising leader who Alcibiades realised was a danger, since "he inspired such fear that all orders were promptly carried out". He was a keen strategist, but used intrigue to achieve his ends and 'disguised most of his actions in war with various forms of deceit'
• Lysander, stationed at Ephesus, was provided with money to secure ships, sailors and supplies from the cities of the coast

Alcibiades Relieved of the Command

• Alcibiades, with a fleet of 100 ships, took up a position off Notium which controlled the passage in and out of Ephesus, but he left his lieutenant, Antiochus, in charge while he supported Thrasybulus in a brief land operation
• Antiochus disobeyed orders not to engage in battle with Lysander, and lost a large number of ships. The defeat caused the downfall of Alcibiades who was relieved of his command and denounced by his political enemies
• Once again, the Athenians removed their most brilliant and experienced general and the only man who could have saved them at this critical time in the war. He feared for his life if he returned to Athens, so retired to his castle in Thrace where he took no further active part in the war

Lysander Temporarily Replaced

• Since Lysander's term as admiral was over, he was recalled to Sparta and replaced by Callicratidas, who defeated Alcibiades' successor Conon off Lesbos and defeated the Athenian fleet at Mytilene
• The Athenian people responded to this crisis with resolution, raising money and manning their ships with citizens from the most humble to the class of knights, and including subjects, metics and slaves
• However, Callicratides did not have the same charm and character as Lysander - he was an old school Spartans and did not like the idea of playing lap-dog to the Persians:
• "He went to Cyrus and asked for pay for the sailors; Cyrus however, told him to wait for two days. But Callicratides, indignant at being thus put off and driven to anger by having to dance attendance at his gates, declaring that the Greeks were in a sorry plight, toadying to barbarians for the sake of money, and saying that if he reached home in safety he would do his best to reconcile the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, sailed away to Miletus" - Xenophon

Callicratides at Miletus

• When Callicratides arrived at Miletus, he gave the following speech:
• "Upon me, men of Miletus, lies the necessity of obeying the authorities at home; and as for you, I claim that you should show the utmost zeal in this war, because you dwell among barbarians and in the past have suffered many ills at their hands.
• And you should as leaders show the other allies how we may inflict the utmost harm upon the enemy in the shortest time, until the people return from Lacedaemon whom I have sent thither to get money; for the money which Lysander had on hand he gave back to Cyrus, as though it were unneeded surplus, and went his way; and as for Cyrus, whenever I visited him he invariably put off giving me an audience and I could not bring myself to dance attendance at his gates. But I promise you that for whatever good results we achieve while we are waiting for the funds from Sparta I will make you an adequate return. Let us then, with the help of the gods, show the barbarians that even without paying court to them we can punish our enemies" - Xenophon

The Battle of Arginusae, 406 BC

• The Battle of Arginusae was fought in 406 BC in the waters between Mytilene and the mainland and the Athenians were led by eight of their ten generals, including Pericles, the son of Pericles and Aspasia
• It was a disaster for the Spartans, with the loss of 70 ships and approximately 14,000 men. However, in the stormy seas the Athenians general were unable to rescue their shipwrecked crews, which doubled the Athenian casualties
• Callicratides, his ship being rammed in the battle, fell into the water and never recovered

Deaths of the Athenian Generals

• The generals were charged by the resentful masses with negligence, and despite their victory were sentenced to death on a single ballot
• As under Athenian law each man was entitled separate trial, this was an act of senseless and violent injustice. The six generals who returned to stand trial had gone into voluntary exile, were put to death without mercy

Effects of Battle of Arginusae

• The Athenians once again foolishly discarded valuable leaders at a time when they needed to conserve all their resources
• If Sparta were to recover, it would be as a dependant of Persia and to avoid this, the Spartans again offered to make peace with Athens
• The Athenians, led by Cleophon, again refused and must be condemned for their utter stupidity, since Athens was physically and financially exhausted and Lysander had appeared in the Aegean again

The Final Defeat of Athens at Aegospotami, 405 BC

• At the request of Cyrus of Persia and the Greek cities of Asia Minor to reappoint Lysander as admiral, the Spartans sent him out as a deputy, since it was their law not to allow the same man to hold the position twice
• Lysander sailed to the Hellespont and captured the city of Lampsacus in order to intercept the Athenian corn ships, while Conon and the other Athenian generals with the entire fleet of 180 ships took up a position on the opposite shore at a place called Aegospotami
• Observing Lysander's strategy day after day from his stronghold nearby. Alcibiades realised that the Athenians were unaware of their danger. However, when he attempted to warn them and suggested that they move to a safer location along the coast, they rudely rebuffed him
• Each day the Athenians' fleet had crossed over to offer battle and each day Lysander had refused, but on the fifth day, and as the Athenians were disembarking for their evening meal. Lysander attacked. It was not a battle, but a slaughter. He captured 160 Athenian ships and put to death over 3000 Athenian prisoners
  

Effects of the Defeat

"These men, sailing with Lysander in the swift ships, humbled the might of the city of Cecrops and made Lacedaemon of the beautiful choruses the high city of Hellas" - From the inscription on the victory monument erected in Delphi following the victory

• The long war was over. Athens had no choice but to surrender or be starved into submission - she had no men, ships, money, food or allies (except Samos)
• Lysander blockaded the Piraeus while the Spartan king Agis and Pausanias approached the city by land. Provisions began to fail, so the Athenians at last made proposals for peace, but Sparta intimated that the terms would include the destruction of the Long Walls. It was stupidity to resist, but this the Athenians did
• Cleophon had twice before hindered the conclusion of peace when it might have been made with honour (after Cyzicus and Arginusae) and he now hindered it again when it could only be made with humiliation. An absurd decree was passed, that no one should ever propose to accept such terms
• Starvation was imminent when Theramenes and nine others went to Sparta to accept peace terms. Meanwhile, at Athens Cleophon was put to death on a charge of desertion

Peace Terms Accepted by Athens 404 BC

1. Destruction of the Long Walls and the fortifications at Piraeus
2. Loss of all foreign territories, including their cleruchies at Imbros, Lemnos and Scyrus
3. The return of all exiles to Athens
4. Surrender of all triremes except twelve
5. Athens to become an ally of Sparta, pledged to accept her leadership

The Rule of the Thirty Tyrants

• A commission of thirty oligarch, set up to draft a new constitution based on the 'ancient' type, was supported by a Spartan garrison which occupied the Acropolis
• Critias (a returned exile) and other extreme oligarch in the Thirty had no intention of framing a constitution and implemented a policy of violence against the democrats
• The chief democrats were charged with conspiracy, and many thousands of innocent citizens were killed and their property confiscated
• Others fled into exile, from where they organised opposition, and when the democrats seized tge Piraeus a destructive civil war resulted in Critias losing his life
• After the loss of influence of Lysander in Sparta, Pausanias the Spartan king and Thrasybulus, the Athenian democrat, achieved a reconciliation which brought an end to the one and a half years of tyranny, bloodshed and foreign occupation. In 403-402 BC, full democracy was re-established on a base firmer than ever

Reasons for the Defeat of Athens

• At the beginning of the war, led by Pericles, Athens was at the peak of her power. Her military, naval and financial resources together with the strategy laid down by Pericles should have carried her through to victory. Yet in 404, physically and financially exhausted and with her fleet destroyed, she was starved into submission and was forced to accept the humiliation of a Spartan garrison occupying the Acropolis
• Thucydides outlines what he regards as the main reasons for Athens' failure in the war:
1. The death of Pericles early in the war
2. Changes in his strategy
3. Self-interest and ambitions of leaders after Pericles' death
4. The Sicilian campaign
5. The revolt of Athens' allies
6. Persian involvement on the side of Sparta
7. Athens' internal strife
   

Sparta and Athens in Persian Intervention

1. What were the motives of Tissaphernes and the Persians for intervening in the Peloponnesian War?
• Darius II wanted to recover the tribute of the Asiatic Greeks, by siding with Sparta and funding their fleet, which in turn meant that the Persians had to defeat Athens in the Aegean
• Tissaphernes wanted to delay financing the Spartan fleet, allow Sparta and Athens to weaken each other, and then potentially conquer more of Greece than initially planned
  
2. What is the significance of the treaties signed between Sparta and Persia to the conflict?
• Terms of the original treaty between Sparta and Persia (may have been just a draft):
1. All territories previously belongings to the king and his ancestors shall be his
2. All money paid by subjects previously to Athens was to go to the Persian king
3. The war would be carried on jointly
4. Any who revolt from Sparta shall be enemies of Persia
5. Any who revolt from Persia shall be enemies of Sparta
• The first term of the treaty was significant because during the Persian war, most states sided with Persia, including big states such as Thessaly, Macedonia and Thebes. If the Persians were to regain all territories lost they would even have some in mainland Greece. Additionally, it would have been very awkward for the Spartans to give back all these territories when they were supposed to be the liberators of all Greece.
• There were (supposedly) three treaties. This was because the Spartans didn't want to give back all the Greek territories and so in the final treaty they settled on the Asiatic Greeks, while Tissaphernes was to finance the Peloponnesian fleet (still, bit of a betrayal)
  
3. How did relations between Sparta and Persia change during this time?
• Tissaphernes began to break the agreement between Sparta and Persia by delaying financing the Peloponnesian fleet, in the hope that the Spartans and Athenians would eventually weaken themselves enough to be defeated by Persia
• The fact that there was so many treaties signed/drafted shows us that clearly neither side was working with the other out of friendship, but for what they could gain
  
4. What role did Alcibiades have in the events of the Persian intervention?
• Alcibiades was the one who advised Tissaphernes to delay paying for the Spartan fleet. He then convinced the oligarchs in Athens to revolt and overthrow the democracy. He was also the one who convinced Chios to revolt, which was the last ship-building ally of Athens
• The Athenian fleet remained democratic and recalled Alcibiades to lead them.
• The fleet wanted to reinstate the democracy and overthrow the oligarchy
• Alcibiades advised them against this, as if they were to fight a civil war in Athens, there would be nothing stopping the Peloponnesians attacking the empire
• The Peloponnesians sent a fleet to Euboea, which was Athens' chief source of food because of its cleruchies (estates owned by often absent Athenians)
• Since Decelea had been taken, Euboea had become crucial
• The oligarchs sent out what they had left of the fleet to intercept the Peloponnesian fleet
• The Spartans won and the remainder of the oligarchic fleet travelled to Eretria, thinking it friendly, but were massacred, as the Eretrians had defected to Sparta
• The defeat caused the oligarchy of the 400 to be deposed in favour of a new, more moderate oligarchy of 5,000. Within a year, the democracy had been restored and Alcibiades was welcomed home a hero
  
5. What effect did the Persian intervention have on the Athenian empire? 
• The Persian intervention caused the oligarchy to overthrow the democracy and spark a civil war in Athens, which led to the democratic fleet recalling Alcibiades, which in turn meant that Alcibiades was welcomed home to Athens a hero
  

Persia and the Greeks 431-414 BC

• The Greeks on both sides had already in the Archidamian War (431-421) thought about gaining the support of Persia
1. King Archidamus, in his speech to the Spartans in 432, had advised the acquisition of new allies who could supply Sparta with a navy and finance, strongly hinting at Persia (Thuc.1.82.1)
2. Both sudes in 431 planned to send embassies to Persia (Thuc.2.7.1) and
3. In 430, a Peloponnesian embassy on the way to the King of Persia to request money and military support was handed over by the son of Sitalces, a ruler in Thrace, to the Athenians who executed these ambassadors
• The Persians themselves were not averse to taking advantage of the Greeks when at war with each other. Pissouthnes was the 'satrap' (provincial governor) of the Persian province in south-western Asia Minor with his capital at Sardis
• Pissouthnes had already intervened and helped the Samian oligarchs at the time of its revolt in 440 BC (Thuc. 1.115) - a clear breach of the Peace of Callias
• In 430 Itamenes, a subordinate of Pissouthnes, had helped the pro-Persian faction in Colophon to seize power and revolt from Athens; and when the Colophonian exiles at Notium clashed with each other, Pissouthnes sent mercenaries to help his supporters in Notium (Thuc. 3.34)
• Although Thucydides has little to say about Greek-Persian affairs before 412 BC, it is clear that the Spartans were still sending embassies to the King of Persia, Artaxerxes. In 425 BC the Persian Artaphernes was intercepted by the Athenians at Eion on his way to Sparta. The King's translated message made interesting reading:
• "Many other points were mentioned but the chief point, with regard to the Spartans, was that he did not know what they wanted. Although many ambassadors had come to him, none were saying the same things. If they wished to make a definite proposal, they should send men to him with Artaphernes" - Thucydides 4.50.2
• Here was the root of the problem for Sparta
• "They knew that the King's price for giving military aid to Sparta would be, at the very least, the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian domination, and there was no way that they could agree to this without destroying their credibility as the self-proclaimed liberators of Greece - hence the Spartans' evasiveness in their dealings with the King"
• The disaster at Pylos and the fear of a helot revolt probably ruined any Spartan plans of winning Persian support, as their whole attention from 425 BC was fixed on regaining the captured Spartans from Athens and taking precautions against the helots
• It was the Athenians, possibly worried by the King's message to the Spartans seeking to establish some concrete grounds for an alliance, who set about improving relations with Persia. Artaphernes was sent back to the King with some Athenian ambassadors, but when they reached Ephesus and learned of Artaxerxes' death, the Athenians returned home (Thuc)
• Thucydides mentions no other negotiations, but the combination of a speech in 391 BC by Andocides (3.29), in which he mentions the presence of his uncle Epilycus at the negotiations that brought about a treaty and a friend-ship forever with Persia, and of a fourth-century copy of a fifth-century decree

Political reasons for this rapprochement between Athens and Persia

• The Athenians' confidence of 425/4 BC had taken a blow  with the defeat at Delium in 424 BC and with Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis and his success at stirring up revolt amongst their allies in the Thraceward region
• If Brasidas were to gain Persian military support, he could strike at the Hellespont, Athens' life-line in respect of the transportation of grain from the Black Sea to the Piraeus - hence the desperate need for peaceful relations with Persia
• The new Persian King, Darius II (also known as Darius the Bastard) had pressing reasons for signing the treaty. Artaxerxes I had fathered one legitimate son from a Persian mother, Xerxes, but also seventeen bastard sons from concubines
• At some time in 424/3 BC Darius II became King of Persia, but his position was tenuous; there were the potential claims of the other bastard sons and of others of pure Persian stock, linked by blood to the royal family
• The last thing that the new king wanted was to alienate the Athenians and drive them into the arms of one of his rivals
• Therefore the treaty of 424/3 was of great benefit to both sides. It was, in essence, probably a renewal of the terms of the 449 Peace of Callias, but included the stronger statement of eternal friendship due to the current military difficulties of both sides
• The Athenians' betrayal of this eternal friendship by supporting the revolt of Amorges, Pissouthnes' son, in 414 BC proved to be a fatal error of judgement
  

Persian Intervention in the Ionian War, 413-404 BC

• In the spring of 413, possibly as the result of Alcibiades' advice (Thuc. 6.91.6), the Spartans invaded Attica under King Agis and occupied Decelea, a fortified outpost equidistant from Athens and Boeotia (Thuc.7.27): thus this phase of the Peloponnesian War (413-404 BC) is often referred to as the Ionian War

Change in Attitudes

The Spartans were convinced that the Athenians had clearly broken the terms of the Peace of Nicias, and that they were justified in renewing the war (7.18)

1. The Athenians' attacks on the east coast of Laconia in 414 BC (Thuc.6.105.2)
2. The constant raiding from Athenian-held Pylos (Thuc.7.18) and
3. The Athenian refusal to submit these issues to arbitration

This permanent occupation of Decelea caused many problems for the Athenians:

"It did great damage to the Athenians and, by its destruction of property and the loss of men, was one of the chief causes of the decline in Athenian power" - Thucydides 7.27.3

• The invasions in the Archidamian War had only been short affairs, the longest being forty days, but now the Athenians were permanently deprived of most of Attica:
1. the revenue from the silver mines was lost
2. 20,000 slaves escaped - the majority being skilled workmen and vital for the Athenian economy
3. the food supplies from Euboea had to be brought in by the more expensive sea route
4. there was the constant, exhausting guard-duty by day and night (Thuc.7.27-8)
• However, this stand of Spartan strategy, for all its debilitating effects on the Athenians, was insufficient to win the war as King Agis of Sparta so astutely observed as late as 410 BC
• "Agis, seeing from Decelea many corn ships sailing into the Piraeus, said that it was useless for his troops to cut off the Athenians from their land, which had been done for some time now, unless some one were to seize the places from where the grain kept coming in by sea" - Xenophon, Hellenica 1.1.35
• The Spartans had to be far more adventurous and challenge the Athenians at sea in Ionia, and especially in the Hellespont

Key Fact

Only by breaking up the Athenians' sea empire, on which they depended for revenue, and by preventing corn from the Hellespont reaching the beleaguered Athenians could the Spartans win the war

• The destruction of the Athenian fleet in Sicily in 413, however, had fulfilled one of the two pre-conditions for potential Spartan success in Ionia; the other - sufficient finance to pay the crews of a fleet that was large enough to wrest power from the Athenians in the Aegean - required the full involvement of the one power that had the wealth and the desire to destroy the Athenian Empire: Persia
• Persia's financial help to the Spartans, fitful at first but more committed later, gave the Spartans the means to wage war with the Athenians in Ionia: hence 'Ionian War' being the alternative name for the war from 413-404 BC. However, it is essential to see how the Persians were gradually drawn into the Peloponnesian War from the beginning and why the King of Persia chose to support the Spartans in the Ionian War
  

The End of the Sicilian Campaign, 413 BC

Athenian Resources

• The fleet the Athenians dispatched for Sicily was entirely out of proportion to the size of importance of its intended objective. it consisted of
• 134 triremes with 130 supply boats, a total of over 25,000 men
• Dozens of merchant vessels decided to accompany the navy, hoping for profits
• Both citizens and foreigners crowded the shore gazing with astonishment at the armada, which Thucydides say was the most expensive any Greek city had launched until that day
• The Athenians received less support from the cities of Sicily and southern Italy than they had expected, and even the eager Segestaens turned out not to have the resources they had claimed. Envoys dispatched to Segesta, it proved, had been duped into believing the city was rich when in fact it was poor

Key Battles

1. Spring 414 BC - the Athenians land at Leon, ascend Epipolai and, after a brief battle, take Euryelos
2. Summer 414 BC - Gylippos engages the Athenians between the fortifications on Epipolai, and wins the second encounter
3. Spring 413 BC - Despite losing the first sea battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusans capture Plemmyrion
4. Summer 413 BC - the Athenians fail to break through the Syracusan boom, eventually losing the fourth sea battle

Problems, Problems, Problems

Just about everything that could have gone wrong with the Sicilian enterprise, did

1. Lamachus died fighting
2. Alcibiades was recalled to stand trial, and on the journey managed to jump ship and defect to Sparta
3. Nicias successfully moved the Athenian fleet into Syracuse's harbour, creating a real possibility of blockading the city
4. The arrival of Gylippus with reinforcements changed the situation dramatically
5. The Syracusans, moreover, built a counter-wall that destroyed Athenian chances for a blockade
6. Nicias was now suffering acutely from kidney disease and asked the Athenians to recall him. They refused
7. To his horror, the Athenians sent Demosthenes out at the head of the proposed reinforcements. When he arrived with the second fleet and promptly suffered a serious reverse on the Epipolae heights, Demosthenes advocated withdrawal
   

Religiosity Strikes Again

• When everything was ready for the Athenians' departure, Thucydides related:
• "and just as they were about to sail, there was an eclipse of the moon, which happened to be full. The event made most of the Athenians feel uneasy, and they urged their generals to stay; and Nicias, who was too inclined to believe in the interpretation of omens and that sort of thing, refused even to discuss a move until after they had stayed for "three times nine days", as their seers decreed. This was the reason the Athenians stayed on after all their delays!"
  

 Attack of the Syracusans

• On learning that the Athenians had been planning to leave, the Syracusans attacked the Athenian feet and blocked the exit from the harbour. A fierce battle ensued, with some two hundred ships rammed together in a tight space. The din made it impossible to hear the calls of the coxswains
• Unable to make their escape by sea, the Athenians resolved to depart over land, abandoning their sick and wounded. About 40,000 men set out on the dismal trek, the Syracusans hot on their heels. Nicias and Demosthenes became separated; the Syracusans caught up first with Demosthenes, who surrendered in the hope of saving his soldiers' lives. The Syracusans then overtook Nicias' army

The Slaughter of the Athenian Expedition

As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it

At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry. Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after this immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana

- Thucydides

Outcome

• The Athenians had lost tens of thousands of men and accomplished nothing. For them, the outcome of the campaign was so horrific that they at first refused to believe the appalling news
• Plutarch claims that word of the disaster first reached Athens by way of a hapless man who had reported it matter-of-factly to a barber in Piraeus as if it were common knowledge: The agitated barber promptly ran the 5 miles to Athens, where he repeated the tale. He was in the very process of being tortured as a troublemaker when messengers arrived to confirm the astonishing story
• As Thucydides was later to write, "All was lost. Ships. Men. Everything"

Who shall we blame?

Pericles had once said that he did not fear the enemy's strategy, but rather the Athenians' mistakes. No part of the war justifies this view more than the Sicilian expedition

Athenian Assembly:

• The Assembly ignored Nicias' sound arguments against sending out the expedition
• It had a vague idea of Sicily and its resources and relied on Segesta to partially fund the expedition
• It voted too large a force and did not define the expedition's aims clearly
• Nicias was elected as commander of an expedition of which he so vehemently disapproved
• Joint leadership was given to three very different personalities
• It was wrong to send a commander with a charge hanging over his head
• It made a mistake in recalling Alcibiades, thereby depriving the expedition of the one person who could have brought success. As a result, Alcibiades gave vital help to Sparta
• It refused to listen to Nicias' please for withdrawal of the expedition and failed to replace him when he was so sick
• It should not have sent major reinforcements when the Athenians were suffering the effects of the occupation of Decelea

Nicias:

• Nicias' temperament was not suited to a bold and daring enterprise
• He wasted time and resources for little or no gain
• He delayed when immediate action was required
• He failed to complete the north wall, so allowing Gylippus to enter Syracuse
• He refused to retreat after the defeat of Demosthenes on Epipolae
• He allowed the excessive superstition and fear on the part of the Athenian people to affect his judgement

The Effects of the Occupation of Decelea

• Under the command of King Agis II, the Spartans fortified Decelea, which was visible from Athens and controlled the routes to Boeotia and Euboea. As a result of maintaining this hostile post in Attica, Athens suffered greatly. In fact, according to Thucydides, it was "one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power". The occupation of Decelea meant that:
1. Athenian lands could no longer be farmed
2. Food supplies had to be brought the long and expensive way by sea from Euboea
3. More than 20,000 slaves deserted, many of whom had been mining the silver at Laurium
4. With the loss of revenue from the mines and the effort of carrying on two wars at one time, Athens suffered acute financial distress
• The Athenian reaction to the seizure of Decelea was to occupy a post in Laconia, opposite the island of Cythera, where they hoped to undermine Sparta's hold on her helots

Effects of Athens' Failure in Sicily

Athenian reaction

• After the initial disbelief that such total destruction could have occurred, the Athenians were alarmed at the possibility of the Syracusan fleet appearing off the Piraeus, as they were depleted of men of military age, ships, crews and finances. However, despite feelings of despair, they decided not to give in. The Athenians:
1. Replaced the Council with a board of ten commissioners (the Probuli) to be chosen annually (this smaller, permanent body would assist in the reorganisation of the Athenian state after the effects of Athens' failure in Sicily
2. Used the 1000 talents, wisely set aside by Pericles for a naval crisis, to rebuild their navy (the plan was carried our so vigorously that within a year they had 150 new trirems)
3. Carried out strict economic measures to conserve finances
4. Withdrew their garrison from Laconia
5. Fortified Sunium, to give security to their ships rounding the promontory
6. Imposed a 5 percent tax on imports and exports in all ports of the empire, which replaced the tribute
7. Attempted to keep a close watch on their allies

Spartan Reaction

• The Spartans' confidence was at a high level, particularly since they believed that they would soon be joined by their allies from Sicily. They now began to throw themselves into the war without any reservation. They implemented a shipbuilding program, aiming initially at 100 triremes and King Agis set out to raise money from their allies for this purpose

Revolt of Athenian Allies

• First signs of revolt by Euboea and Lesbos communicated with King Agis at Decelea, indicating their willingness to revolt; at the same time Chios and Erythrae applied directly to Sparta for help in their planned defection from Athens

The Beginning of Persian Intervention

• The weakening of Athenian naval power gave the Persians, under King Darius II, the opportunity to support a Spartan/Persian attempt to undermine Athenian control in the Aegean and to regain the cities of Asia Minor. Tissaphernes, Satrap of Lydia, Caria and Ionia, and Pharnabazus both promised Persian financial support to Sparta in return for help in their territories. They wanted the tribute from the cities in Ionia and the Hellespont, which was being paid to Athens. Each satrap attempted to make his own arrangements with Sparta, but the members of the Spartan alliance agreed on a policy which they though would satisfy them both. They decided to sail to Chios first, then to Lesbos and finally to the Hellespont