Persia and the Greeks 431-414 BC

• The Greeks on both sides had already in the Archidamian War (431-421) thought about gaining the support of Persia
1. King Archidamus, in his speech to the Spartans in 432, had advised the acquisition of new allies who could supply Sparta with a navy and finance, strongly hinting at Persia (Thuc.1.82.1)
2. Both sudes in 431 planned to send embassies to Persia (Thuc.2.7.1) and
3. In 430, a Peloponnesian embassy on the way to the King of Persia to request money and military support was handed over by the son of Sitalces, a ruler in Thrace, to the Athenians who executed these ambassadors
• The Persians themselves were not averse to taking advantage of the Greeks when at war with each other. Pissouthnes was the 'satrap' (provincial governor) of the Persian province in south-western Asia Minor with his capital at Sardis
• Pissouthnes had already intervened and helped the Samian oligarchs at the time of its revolt in 440 BC (Thuc. 1.115) - a clear breach of the Peace of Callias
• In 430 Itamenes, a subordinate of Pissouthnes, had helped the pro-Persian faction in Colophon to seize power and revolt from Athens; and when the Colophonian exiles at Notium clashed with each other, Pissouthnes sent mercenaries to help his supporters in Notium (Thuc. 3.34)
• Although Thucydides has little to say about Greek-Persian affairs before 412 BC, it is clear that the Spartans were still sending embassies to the King of Persia, Artaxerxes. In 425 BC the Persian Artaphernes was intercepted by the Athenians at Eion on his way to Sparta. The King's translated message made interesting reading:
• "Many other points were mentioned but the chief point, with regard to the Spartans, was that he did not know what they wanted. Although many ambassadors had come to him, none were saying the same things. If they wished to make a definite proposal, they should send men to him with Artaphernes" - Thucydides 4.50.2
• Here was the root of the problem for Sparta
• "They knew that the King's price for giving military aid to Sparta would be, at the very least, the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian domination, and there was no way that they could agree to this without destroying their credibility as the self-proclaimed liberators of Greece - hence the Spartans' evasiveness in their dealings with the King"
• The disaster at Pylos and the fear of a helot revolt probably ruined any Spartan plans of winning Persian support, as their whole attention from 425 BC was fixed on regaining the captured Spartans from Athens and taking precautions against the helots
• It was the Athenians, possibly worried by the King's message to the Spartans seeking to establish some concrete grounds for an alliance, who set about improving relations with Persia. Artaphernes was sent back to the King with some Athenian ambassadors, but when they reached Ephesus and learned of Artaxerxes' death, the Athenians returned home (Thuc)
• Thucydides mentions no other negotiations, but the combination of a speech in 391 BC by Andocides (3.29), in which he mentions the presence of his uncle Epilycus at the negotiations that brought about a treaty and a friend-ship forever with Persia, and of a fourth-century copy of a fifth-century decree

Political reasons for this rapprochement between Athens and Persia

• The Athenians' confidence of 425/4 BC had taken a blow  with the defeat at Delium in 424 BC and with Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis and his success at stirring up revolt amongst their allies in the Thraceward region
• If Brasidas were to gain Persian military support, he could strike at the Hellespont, Athens' life-line in respect of the transportation of grain from the Black Sea to the Piraeus - hence the desperate need for peaceful relations with Persia
• The new Persian King, Darius II (also known as Darius the Bastard) had pressing reasons for signing the treaty. Artaxerxes I had fathered one legitimate son from a Persian mother, Xerxes, but also seventeen bastard sons from concubines
• At some time in 424/3 BC Darius II became King of Persia, but his position was tenuous; there were the potential claims of the other bastard sons and of others of pure Persian stock, linked by blood to the royal family
• The last thing that the new king wanted was to alienate the Athenians and drive them into the arms of one of his rivals
• Therefore the treaty of 424/3 was of great benefit to both sides. It was, in essence, probably a renewal of the terms of the 449 Peace of Callias, but included the stronger statement of eternal friendship due to the current military difficulties of both sides
• The Athenians' betrayal of this eternal friendship by supporting the revolt of Amorges, Pissouthnes' son, in 414 BC proved to be a fatal error of judgement