Tuesday, 2 June 2020

The End of the Sicilian Campaign, 413 BC

Athenian Resources
  • The fleet the Athenians dispatched for Sicily was entirely out of proportion to the size of importance of its intended objective. it consisted of
    • 134 triremes with 130 supply boats, a total of over 25,000 men
    • Dozens of merchant vessels decided to accompany the navy, hoping for profits
  • Both citizens and foreigners crowded the shore gazing with astonishment at the armada, which Thucydides say was the most expensive any Greek city had launched until that day
  • The Athenians received less support from the cities of Sicily and southern Italy than they had expected, and even the eager Segestaens turned out not to have the resources they had claimed. Envoys dispatched to Segesta, it proved, had been duped into believing the city was rich when in fact it was poor
Key Battles
  1. Spring 414 BC - the Athenians land at Leon, ascend Epipolai and, after a brief battle, take Euryelos
  2. Summer 414 BC - Gylippos engages the Athenians between the fortifications on Epipolai, and wins the second encounter
  3. Spring 413 BC - Despite losing the first sea battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusans capture Plemmyrion
  4. Summer 413 BC - the Athenians fail to break through the Syracusan boom, eventually losing the fourth sea battle
Problems, Problems, Problems
Just about everything that could have gone wrong with the Sicilian enterprise, did
  1. Lamachus died fighting
  2. Alcibiades was recalled to stand trial, and on the journey managed to jump ship and defect to Sparta
  3. Nicias successfully moved the Athenian fleet into Syracuse's harbour, creating a real possibility of blockading the city
  4. The arrival of Gylippus with reinforcements changed the situation dramatically
  5. The Syracusans, moreover, built a counter-wall that destroyed Athenian chances for a blockade
  6. Nicias was now suffering acutely from kidney disease and asked the Athenians to recall him. They refused
  7. To his horror, the Athenians sent Demosthenes out at the head of the proposed reinforcements. When he arrived with the second fleet and promptly suffered a serious reverse on the Epipolae heights, Demosthenes advocated withdrawal
Religiosity Strikes Again
  • When everything was ready for the Athenians' departure, Thucydides related:
    • "and just as they were about to sail, there was an eclipse of the moon, which happened to be full. The event made most of the Athenians feel uneasy, and they urged their generals to stay; and Nicias, who was too inclined to believe in the interpretation of omens and that sort of thing, refused even to discuss a move until after they had stayed for "three times nine days", as their seers decreed. This was the reason the Athenians stayed on after all their delays!"
 Attack of the Syracusans
  • On learning that the Athenians had been planning to leave, the Syracusans attacked the Athenian feet and blocked the exit from the harbour. A fierce battle ensued, with some two hundred ships rammed together in a tight space. The din made it impossible to hear the calls of the coxswains
  • Unable to make their escape by sea, the Athenians resolved to depart over land, abandoning their sick and wounded. About 40,000 men set out on the dismal trek, the Syracusans hot on their heels. Nicias and Demosthenes became separated; the Syracusans caught up first with Demosthenes, who surrendered in the hope of saving his soldiers' lives. The Syracusans then overtook Nicias' army
The Slaughter of the Athenian Expedition
As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it
At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry. Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after this immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana
- Thucydides

Outcome
  • The Athenians had lost tens of thousands of men and accomplished nothing. For them, the outcome of the campaign was so horrific that they at first refused to believe the appalling news
  • Plutarch claims that word of the disaster first reached Athens by way of a hapless man who had reported it matter-of-factly to a barber in Piraeus as if it were common knowledge: The agitated barber promptly ran the 5 miles to Athens, where he repeated the tale. He was in the very process of being tortured as a troublemaker when messengers arrived to confirm the astonishing story
  • As Thucydides was later to write, "All was lost. Ships. Men. Everything"
Who shall we blame?
Pericles had once said that he did not fear the enemy's strategy, but rather the Athenians' mistakes. No part of the war justifies this view more than the Sicilian expedition
Athenian Assembly:
  • The Assembly ignored Nicias' sound arguments against sending out the expedition
  • It had a vague idea of Sicily and its resources and relied on Segesta to partially fund the expedition
  • It voted too large a force and did not define the expedition's aims clearly
  • Nicias was elected as commander of an expedition of which he so vehemently disapproved
  • Joint leadership was given to three very different personalities
  • It was wrong to send a commander with a charge hanging over his head
  • It made a mistake in recalling Alcibiades, thereby depriving the expedition of the one person who could have brought success. As a result, Alcibiades gave vital help to Sparta
  • It refused to listen to Nicias' please for withdrawal of the expedition and failed to replace him when he was so sick
  • It should not have sent major reinforcements when the Athenians were suffering the effects of the occupation of Decelea
Nicias:
  • Nicias' temperament was not suited to a bold and daring enterprise
  • He wasted time and resources for little or no gain
  • He delayed when immediate action was required
  • He failed to complete the north wall, so allowing Gylippus to enter Syracuse
  • He refused to retreat after the defeat of Demosthenes on Epipolae
  • He allowed the excessive superstition and fear on the part of the Athenian people to affect his judgement
The Effects of the Occupation of Decelea
  • Under the command of King Agis II, the Spartans fortified Decelea, which was visible from Athens and controlled the routes to Boeotia and Euboea. As a result of maintaining this hostile post in Attica, Athens suffered greatly. In fact, according to Thucydides, it was "one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power". The occupation of Decelea meant that:
    1. Athenian lands could no longer be farmed
    2. Food supplies had to be brought the long and expensive way by sea from Euboea
    3. More than 20,000 slaves deserted, many of whom had been mining the silver at Laurium
    4. With the loss of revenue from the mines and the effort of carrying on two wars at one time, Athens suffered acute financial distress
  • The Athenian reaction to the seizure of Decelea was to occupy a post in Laconia, opposite the island of Cythera, where they hoped to undermine Sparta's hold on her helots
Effects of Athens' Failure in Sicily
Athenian reaction
  • After the initial disbelief that such total destruction could have occurred, the Athenians were alarmed at the possibility of the Syracusan fleet appearing off the Piraeus, as they were depleted of men of military age, ships, crews and finances. However, despite feelings of despair, they decided not to give in. The Athenians:
    1. Replaced the Council with a board of ten commissioners (the Probuli) to be chosen annually (this smaller, permanent body would assist in the reorganisation of the Athenian state after the effects of Athens' failure in Sicily
    2. Used the 1000 talents, wisely set aside by Pericles for a naval crisis, to rebuild their navy (the plan was carried our so vigorously that within a year they had 150 new trirems)
    3. Carried out strict economic measures to conserve finances
    4. Withdrew their garrison from Laconia
    5. Fortified Sunium, to give security to their ships rounding the promontory
    6. Imposed a 5 percent tax on imports and exports in all ports of the empire, which replaced the tribute
    7. Attempted to keep a close watch on their allies
Spartan Reaction
  • The Spartans' confidence was at a high level, particularly since they believed that they would soon be joined by their allies from Sicily. They now began to throw themselves into the war without any reservation. They implemented a shipbuilding program, aiming initially at 100 triremes and King Agis set out to raise money from their allies for this purpose
Revolt of Athenian Allies
  • First signs of revolt by Euboea and Lesbos communicated with King Agis at Decelea, indicating their willingness to revolt; at the same time Chios and Erythrae applied directly to Sparta for help in their planned defection from Athens
The Beginning of Persian Intervention
  • The weakening of Athenian naval power gave the Persians, under King Darius II, the opportunity to support a Spartan/Persian attempt to undermine Athenian control in the Aegean and to regain the cities of Asia Minor. Tissaphernes, Satrap of Lydia, Caria and Ionia, and Pharnabazus both promised Persian financial support to Sparta in return for help in their territories. They wanted the tribute from the cities in Ionia and the Hellespont, which was being paid to Athens. Each satrap attempted to make his own arrangements with Sparta, but the members of the Spartan alliance agreed on a policy which they though would satisfy them both. They decided to sail to Chios first, then to Lesbos and finally to the Hellespont

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