Persia and the Greeks 431-414 BC

• The Greeks on both sides had already in the Archidamian War (431-421) thought about gaining the support of Persia
1. King Archidamus, in his speech to the Spartans in 432, had advised the acquisition of new allies who could supply Sparta with a navy and finance, strongly hinting at Persia (Thuc.1.82.1)
2. Both sudes in 431 planned to send embassies to Persia (Thuc.2.7.1) and
3. In 430, a Peloponnesian embassy on the way to the King of Persia to request money and military support was handed over by the son of Sitalces, a ruler in Thrace, to the Athenians who executed these ambassadors
• The Persians themselves were not averse to taking advantage of the Greeks when at war with each other. Pissouthnes was the 'satrap' (provincial governor) of the Persian province in south-western Asia Minor with his capital at Sardis
• Pissouthnes had already intervened and helped the Samian oligarchs at the time of its revolt in 440 BC (Thuc. 1.115) - a clear breach of the Peace of Callias
• In 430 Itamenes, a subordinate of Pissouthnes, had helped the pro-Persian faction in Colophon to seize power and revolt from Athens; and when the Colophonian exiles at Notium clashed with each other, Pissouthnes sent mercenaries to help his supporters in Notium (Thuc. 3.34)
• Although Thucydides has little to say about Greek-Persian affairs before 412 BC, it is clear that the Spartans were still sending embassies to the King of Persia, Artaxerxes. In 425 BC the Persian Artaphernes was intercepted by the Athenians at Eion on his way to Sparta. The King's translated message made interesting reading:
• "Many other points were mentioned but the chief point, with regard to the Spartans, was that he did not know what they wanted. Although many ambassadors had come to him, none were saying the same things. If they wished to make a definite proposal, they should send men to him with Artaphernes" - Thucydides 4.50.2
• Here was the root of the problem for Sparta
• "They knew that the King's price for giving military aid to Sparta would be, at the very least, the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian domination, and there was no way that they could agree to this without destroying their credibility as the self-proclaimed liberators of Greece - hence the Spartans' evasiveness in their dealings with the King"
• The disaster at Pylos and the fear of a helot revolt probably ruined any Spartan plans of winning Persian support, as their whole attention from 425 BC was fixed on regaining the captured Spartans from Athens and taking precautions against the helots
• It was the Athenians, possibly worried by the King's message to the Spartans seeking to establish some concrete grounds for an alliance, who set about improving relations with Persia. Artaphernes was sent back to the King with some Athenian ambassadors, but when they reached Ephesus and learned of Artaxerxes' death, the Athenians returned home (Thuc)
• Thucydides mentions no other negotiations, but the combination of a speech in 391 BC by Andocides (3.29), in which he mentions the presence of his uncle Epilycus at the negotiations that brought about a treaty and a friend-ship forever with Persia, and of a fourth-century copy of a fifth-century decree

Political reasons for this rapprochement between Athens and Persia

• The Athenians' confidence of 425/4 BC had taken a blow  with the defeat at Delium in 424 BC and with Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis and his success at stirring up revolt amongst their allies in the Thraceward region
• If Brasidas were to gain Persian military support, he could strike at the Hellespont, Athens' life-line in respect of the transportation of grain from the Black Sea to the Piraeus - hence the desperate need for peaceful relations with Persia
• The new Persian King, Darius II (also known as Darius the Bastard) had pressing reasons for signing the treaty. Artaxerxes I had fathered one legitimate son from a Persian mother, Xerxes, but also seventeen bastard sons from concubines
• At some time in 424/3 BC Darius II became King of Persia, but his position was tenuous; there were the potential claims of the other bastard sons and of others of pure Persian stock, linked by blood to the royal family
• The last thing that the new king wanted was to alienate the Athenians and drive them into the arms of one of his rivals
• Therefore the treaty of 424/3 was of great benefit to both sides. It was, in essence, probably a renewal of the terms of the 449 Peace of Callias, but included the stronger statement of eternal friendship due to the current military difficulties of both sides
• The Athenians' betrayal of this eternal friendship by supporting the revolt of Amorges, Pissouthnes' son, in 414 BC proved to be a fatal error of judgement
  

Persian Intervention in the Ionian War, 413-404 BC

• In the spring of 413, possibly as the result of Alcibiades' advice (Thuc. 6.91.6), the Spartans invaded Attica under King Agis and occupied Decelea, a fortified outpost equidistant from Athens and Boeotia (Thuc.7.27): thus this phase of the Peloponnesian War (413-404 BC) is often referred to as the Ionian War

Change in Attitudes

The Spartans were convinced that the Athenians had clearly broken the terms of the Peace of Nicias, and that they were justified in renewing the war (7.18)

1. The Athenians' attacks on the east coast of Laconia in 414 BC (Thuc.6.105.2)
2. The constant raiding from Athenian-held Pylos (Thuc.7.18) and
3. The Athenian refusal to submit these issues to arbitration

This permanent occupation of Decelea caused many problems for the Athenians:

"It did great damage to the Athenians and, by its destruction of property and the loss of men, was one of the chief causes of the decline in Athenian power" - Thucydides 7.27.3

• The invasions in the Archidamian War had only been short affairs, the longest being forty days, but now the Athenians were permanently deprived of most of Attica:
1. the revenue from the silver mines was lost
2. 20,000 slaves escaped - the majority being skilled workmen and vital for the Athenian economy
3. the food supplies from Euboea had to be brought in by the more expensive sea route
4. there was the constant, exhausting guard-duty by day and night (Thuc.7.27-8)
• However, this stand of Spartan strategy, for all its debilitating effects on the Athenians, was insufficient to win the war as King Agis of Sparta so astutely observed as late as 410 BC
• "Agis, seeing from Decelea many corn ships sailing into the Piraeus, said that it was useless for his troops to cut off the Athenians from their land, which had been done for some time now, unless some one were to seize the places from where the grain kept coming in by sea" - Xenophon, Hellenica 1.1.35
• The Spartans had to be far more adventurous and challenge the Athenians at sea in Ionia, and especially in the Hellespont

Key Fact

Only by breaking up the Athenians' sea empire, on which they depended for revenue, and by preventing corn from the Hellespont reaching the beleaguered Athenians could the Spartans win the war

• The destruction of the Athenian fleet in Sicily in 413, however, had fulfilled one of the two pre-conditions for potential Spartan success in Ionia; the other - sufficient finance to pay the crews of a fleet that was large enough to wrest power from the Athenians in the Aegean - required the full involvement of the one power that had the wealth and the desire to destroy the Athenian Empire: Persia
• Persia's financial help to the Spartans, fitful at first but more committed later, gave the Spartans the means to wage war with the Athenians in Ionia: hence 'Ionian War' being the alternative name for the war from 413-404 BC. However, it is essential to see how the Persians were gradually drawn into the Peloponnesian War from the beginning and why the King of Persia chose to support the Spartans in the Ionian War
  

The End of the Sicilian Campaign, 413 BC

Athenian Resources

• The fleet the Athenians dispatched for Sicily was entirely out of proportion to the size of importance of its intended objective. it consisted of
• 134 triremes with 130 supply boats, a total of over 25,000 men
• Dozens of merchant vessels decided to accompany the navy, hoping for profits
• Both citizens and foreigners crowded the shore gazing with astonishment at the armada, which Thucydides say was the most expensive any Greek city had launched until that day
• The Athenians received less support from the cities of Sicily and southern Italy than they had expected, and even the eager Segestaens turned out not to have the resources they had claimed. Envoys dispatched to Segesta, it proved, had been duped into believing the city was rich when in fact it was poor

Key Battles

1. Spring 414 BC - the Athenians land at Leon, ascend Epipolai and, after a brief battle, take Euryelos
2. Summer 414 BC - Gylippos engages the Athenians between the fortifications on Epipolai, and wins the second encounter
3. Spring 413 BC - Despite losing the first sea battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusans capture Plemmyrion
4. Summer 413 BC - the Athenians fail to break through the Syracusan boom, eventually losing the fourth sea battle

Problems, Problems, Problems

Just about everything that could have gone wrong with the Sicilian enterprise, did

1. Lamachus died fighting
2. Alcibiades was recalled to stand trial, and on the journey managed to jump ship and defect to Sparta
3. Nicias successfully moved the Athenian fleet into Syracuse's harbour, creating a real possibility of blockading the city
4. The arrival of Gylippus with reinforcements changed the situation dramatically
5. The Syracusans, moreover, built a counter-wall that destroyed Athenian chances for a blockade
6. Nicias was now suffering acutely from kidney disease and asked the Athenians to recall him. They refused
7. To his horror, the Athenians sent Demosthenes out at the head of the proposed reinforcements. When he arrived with the second fleet and promptly suffered a serious reverse on the Epipolae heights, Demosthenes advocated withdrawal
   

Religiosity Strikes Again

• When everything was ready for the Athenians' departure, Thucydides related:
• "and just as they were about to sail, there was an eclipse of the moon, which happened to be full. The event made most of the Athenians feel uneasy, and they urged their generals to stay; and Nicias, who was too inclined to believe in the interpretation of omens and that sort of thing, refused even to discuss a move until after they had stayed for "three times nine days", as their seers decreed. This was the reason the Athenians stayed on after all their delays!"
  

 Attack of the Syracusans

• On learning that the Athenians had been planning to leave, the Syracusans attacked the Athenian feet and blocked the exit from the harbour. A fierce battle ensued, with some two hundred ships rammed together in a tight space. The din made it impossible to hear the calls of the coxswains
• Unable to make their escape by sea, the Athenians resolved to depart over land, abandoning their sick and wounded. About 40,000 men set out on the dismal trek, the Syracusans hot on their heels. Nicias and Demosthenes became separated; the Syracusans caught up first with Demosthenes, who surrendered in the hope of saving his soldiers' lives. The Syracusans then overtook Nicias' army

The Slaughter of the Athenian Expedition

As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it

At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry. Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after this immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana

- Thucydides

Outcome

• The Athenians had lost tens of thousands of men and accomplished nothing. For them, the outcome of the campaign was so horrific that they at first refused to believe the appalling news
• Plutarch claims that word of the disaster first reached Athens by way of a hapless man who had reported it matter-of-factly to a barber in Piraeus as if it were common knowledge: The agitated barber promptly ran the 5 miles to Athens, where he repeated the tale. He was in the very process of being tortured as a troublemaker when messengers arrived to confirm the astonishing story
• As Thucydides was later to write, "All was lost. Ships. Men. Everything"

Who shall we blame?

Pericles had once said that he did not fear the enemy's strategy, but rather the Athenians' mistakes. No part of the war justifies this view more than the Sicilian expedition

Athenian Assembly:

• The Assembly ignored Nicias' sound arguments against sending out the expedition
• It had a vague idea of Sicily and its resources and relied on Segesta to partially fund the expedition
• It voted too large a force and did not define the expedition's aims clearly
• Nicias was elected as commander of an expedition of which he so vehemently disapproved
• Joint leadership was given to three very different personalities
• It was wrong to send a commander with a charge hanging over his head
• It made a mistake in recalling Alcibiades, thereby depriving the expedition of the one person who could have brought success. As a result, Alcibiades gave vital help to Sparta
• It refused to listen to Nicias' please for withdrawal of the expedition and failed to replace him when he was so sick
• It should not have sent major reinforcements when the Athenians were suffering the effects of the occupation of Decelea

Nicias:

• Nicias' temperament was not suited to a bold and daring enterprise
• He wasted time and resources for little or no gain
• He delayed when immediate action was required
• He failed to complete the north wall, so allowing Gylippus to enter Syracuse
• He refused to retreat after the defeat of Demosthenes on Epipolae
• He allowed the excessive superstition and fear on the part of the Athenian people to affect his judgement

The Effects of the Occupation of Decelea

• Under the command of King Agis II, the Spartans fortified Decelea, which was visible from Athens and controlled the routes to Boeotia and Euboea. As a result of maintaining this hostile post in Attica, Athens suffered greatly. In fact, according to Thucydides, it was "one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power". The occupation of Decelea meant that:
1. Athenian lands could no longer be farmed
2. Food supplies had to be brought the long and expensive way by sea from Euboea
3. More than 20,000 slaves deserted, many of whom had been mining the silver at Laurium
4. With the loss of revenue from the mines and the effort of carrying on two wars at one time, Athens suffered acute financial distress
• The Athenian reaction to the seizure of Decelea was to occupy a post in Laconia, opposite the island of Cythera, where they hoped to undermine Sparta's hold on her helots

Effects of Athens' Failure in Sicily

Athenian reaction

• After the initial disbelief that such total destruction could have occurred, the Athenians were alarmed at the possibility of the Syracusan fleet appearing off the Piraeus, as they were depleted of men of military age, ships, crews and finances. However, despite feelings of despair, they decided not to give in. The Athenians:
1. Replaced the Council with a board of ten commissioners (the Probuli) to be chosen annually (this smaller, permanent body would assist in the reorganisation of the Athenian state after the effects of Athens' failure in Sicily
2. Used the 1000 talents, wisely set aside by Pericles for a naval crisis, to rebuild their navy (the plan was carried our so vigorously that within a year they had 150 new trirems)
3. Carried out strict economic measures to conserve finances
4. Withdrew their garrison from Laconia
5. Fortified Sunium, to give security to their ships rounding the promontory
6. Imposed a 5 percent tax on imports and exports in all ports of the empire, which replaced the tribute
7. Attempted to keep a close watch on their allies

Spartan Reaction

• The Spartans' confidence was at a high level, particularly since they believed that they would soon be joined by their allies from Sicily. They now began to throw themselves into the war without any reservation. They implemented a shipbuilding program, aiming initially at 100 triremes and King Agis set out to raise money from their allies for this purpose

Revolt of Athenian Allies

• First signs of revolt by Euboea and Lesbos communicated with King Agis at Decelea, indicating their willingness to revolt; at the same time Chios and Erythrae applied directly to Sparta for help in their planned defection from Athens

The Beginning of Persian Intervention

• The weakening of Athenian naval power gave the Persians, under King Darius II, the opportunity to support a Spartan/Persian attempt to undermine Athenian control in the Aegean and to regain the cities of Asia Minor. Tissaphernes, Satrap of Lydia, Caria and Ionia, and Pharnabazus both promised Persian financial support to Sparta in return for help in their territories. They wanted the tribute from the cities in Ionia and the Hellespont, which was being paid to Athens. Each satrap attempted to make his own arrangements with Sparta, but the members of the Spartan alliance agreed on a policy which they though would satisfy them both. They decided to sail to Chios first, then to Lesbos and finally to the Hellespont
  

The Sicilian Expedition 415-412

"This was the greatest Hellenic action that took place during this war, and in my opinion, the greatest action that we know of in Hellenic history - to the victors the most brilliant of successes, to the vanquished the most calamitous of defeats" - Thucydides

Background to the Sicilian Campaign

• The Athenians were becoming more interested in western trade and colonisation from the time of Themistocles
• By 446 BC there was trouble in the Athenian empire (Megara and Euboea had revolted)
• Many politicians believed that Athens should make its political influence felt among the Ionian cities of Sicily and Italy
• In 443-442 BC Athens concluded alliances with Rhegium in Italy and Leontini in Sicily, to keep a check on Syracuse:
1. There were city-state rivalries between the Dorians led by the Corinthian Syracuse and the Ionians led by Leontini
2. Athens founded the colony of Thurii in southern Italy in 444 BC - this caused alarm in Syracuse
3. Western trade rivalry with Corinth had been one of the significant causes of conflict leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War
• With the death of Pericles there was a much more aggressive attitude to the west and in 427 BC an embassy from Leontini appealed to the Athenians for help against Syracuse. Leontini wanted to prevent the unification of Sicily under Syracuse, stop any western help getting to Sparta, cut off supplies from Sicily to the Peloponnese and stroke a blow at the trade of their hated rival Corinth - The Athenians agreed
• Laches led the expedition, but achieved little beyond patrolling the straits and renewing the old alliance with Segesta
• Two years later another expedition was dispatched under Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon. It was delayed for some time at Pylos
• Hermocrates, a Syracusan general, appealed to the Sicilians for unity and in 424 BC a conference was held at Gela, where the cities agreed on peace. The Athenians were no longer needed and so returned home. However, public opinion in Athens, influenced by Cleon, fined Eurymedon and banished his colleagues for dereliction of duty
• In 416 BC Segesta appealed to Athens for help in her dispute with Selinus, an ally of Syracuse, and offered to supply the funds to finance the expedition. Athenian envoys, who were sent to investigate the claims of the Segestaeans regarding their wealth, returned with 60 talents as payment for a fleet with considerable enthusiasm about Segesta's resources. They had been deceived

Segesta Appeal to Athenians

• The main argument used by the Segestaeans, was that if Syracuse was left unchecked, it could grow in power, conquering the rest of Sicily and eventually being able to conquer Athens itself
• When the crews of the Athenian ships were received, the Segestaeans had rounded up as many gold and silver cups as they could find in town and the neighbouring cities and presented them at parties as if they belonged to the host
• "Those who had been deceived in turn misled others, and they were all held responsible by the troops when word got out that Segesta did not have any money"

The Athenian Assembly's Decision

• The radical Assembly was easily influenced by Alcibiades, who "persuaded them to abandon these piecemeal attempts, sail out to Sicily and try to subdue the island completely by means of an invasion on the grand scale"
• The people were influenced by:
• The thought of rich rewards (corn, wheat, minerals);
• The hope of striking a decisive blow against the Peloponnesians by cutting them off from valuable supplies and naval support;
• The possibilities of the conquest of the whole of Sicily; many, like Alcibiades, saw Sicily as a stepping stone to further conquests in the western Mediterranean
• The Assembly voted to send a fleet of 60 ships under the joint command of Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus. Plutarch says that the people believed that the experience and caution of Nicias would combine well with the daring of Alcibiades and the forthrightness of Lamachus

Thucydides 6.8 - The Aims of the Expedition

• The Athenians held an assembly, and after receiving a report from the Segestaeans and their own envoys about the state of affairs and money (which was false, as there wasn't actually any money), voted to send 60 ships to Sicily under Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus

Alcibiades vs Nicias

• Nicias "who had been chosen to the command against his will" "came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise"
• Alcibiades "who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent, and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech" was "exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes"

Activity: Debate in Athens Over Sicily

Thucydides 6.12-13 (Nicias) + 6.17-18 (Alcibiades)

• List the reasons Nicias gives as to why the Athenians should not launch an expedition to Sicily
• The danger at home, as many important states such as Corinth had not accepted the peace and were still openly at war with Athens
• The instability of the empire - "We get only a grudging obedience from our subjects"
• The need for Athens to recuperate from the plague and the financial strains of the war- "only recently that we have had a little respite from a great plague and from the war"
• The danger involved in distant alliances and the difficulties of controlling Sicily if the Athenians should be successful
• The folly of listening to an ambitious and reckless young spendthrift who hoped to make great profit out of his appointment - "too young for his post"
• It is for Alcibiades' "selfish reasons" and he is "endangering the state" for "profit"
• "Remember that success comes from foresight"
• "Do not be frightened of being called a coward if you do not vote for war"
  
• List the reasons Alcibiades gives as to why the expedition should be launched
• "We have sworn to help them, and it is our duty to help them"
  
• The prospect of becoming the leader of all Greek cities by using what was gained in Sicily - "We shall become rulers of Hellas using what we gain in Sicily"
• The lack of unity among Sicilians, and their limitations in terms of military resources - "The Sicilian cities have swollen populations made out of all sorts of mixtures, and there are constant changes and rearrangements in the citizen bodies. The result is that they lack the feeling that they are fighting for their own fatherland"
• "As for their hoplites, they have not got so many as they boast of"
  
• "Our security is guaranteed by our navy"
• "We shall also have a number of non-Hellenic people who, through hatred of the Syracusans, will join us in our attack on them"
• "They should be a thorn in the flesh of our enemies in Sicily"
• "There is nothing here to hinder us"
• "The Peloponnesians have never had so little hope of success against us as they have now"
• His youth was irrelevant as he had already managed to deal with the Peloponnesians, and Nicias had a "reputation for being lucky"
  
• The danger to Athens of an "inactive" policy and the setting of young against old

Nicias attempted once again to deter the people, by exaggerating the estimates and men needed, but the Athenians "far from losing their appetite for the voyage because of the difficulties in preparing for it, became more enthusiastic about it than ever" They voted for more than double that which was originally requested. Their overall force was over 30,000

Magnitute of Sicilian Expedition (Thucydides 6.31)

"Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage from home attempted up until that time, and the most ambitious in its objectives considering the resources of those who undertook it...it was more a display of power and resources than an armament against an enemy"

The Mutilation of the Hermae

• Just prior to the fleet sailing an event occurred which the superstitious masses saw as a bad omen for the expedition. It was the mutilation of nearly all the stone busts, or hermae (originally of the god Hermes), which stood outside the entrances to private houses and shrines. The angry populace were convinced that it was "evidence of a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the democracy"
• The enemies of Alcibiades accused him of instigating this, because he is believed once to have taken part in mock celebrations of the Eleusinian mysteries, and because of his unconventional character. "There were those (such as Androcles and Pisander) who were envious of his leadership of the people, and wanted to get rid of him. It is also possible that the whole affair may have been instigated by Corinth, to cripple the Sicilian enterprise

Evil Omen: Mutilation of the Herms (Thucydides 6.27)

"While these preparations were going on, it was found that in one night nearly all the stone Herms in the city of Athens had had their extremities cut off. These are a national institution, the well-known square-cut figures, of which there are great numbers both in the porches of private houses and in the temples. No one knew who had done this, but large rewards were offered by the state in order to find out who the criminals were, and there was also a decree passed guaranteeing immunity to anyone, citizen, alien or slave, who knew of any other sacrilegious act that had taken place and would come forward with information about it. The whole affair, indeed, was taken very seriously, as it was regarded as an omen for the expedition, and at the same time as evidence of a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the democracy"

Aims of the Leaders

Immediate problems in the expedition were emphasised by the differences among the leaders over what could be achieved in Sicily

Nicias: Stick to original objective of liberating Leontini, then sail round Sicily in a show of force: this was too cautious and would not satisfy the wishes of the Athenian assembly, who wanted a full conquest of the island

Alcibiades: Use the size of the roce to win over allies in Sicily that could crush any remaining resistance: a pragmatic strategy but rested on chance they would find ready allies in Sicily

Lamachus: Use the element of surprise to attack and conquer Syracuse: probably the best approach as the Syracusans were by far the biggest threat to the expedition

The Recall of Alcibiades

The enormous armada set out from Athens in 415 BC, sailing round the Peloponnese toward Corcyra. From here they sailed around the southern Italian coast toward Sicily

• 134 Triremes
• 5,100 Hoplites
• 1,000 light armoured troops
• c.30,000 (combined Athenian and allied)
  

• However, shortly after leaving Corcyra, a ship caught up with the armada from Athens, with an arrest warrant for Alcibiades
• He had been charged by his political enemies in his absence - of sacrilege and conspiring to overthrow the democracy
• Alcibiades turned his ship home and began sailing back to Greece, but on the way he slipped away from the escort and defected
• He arrived at Sparta!
  

Alcibiades' Conduct

• [Thucydides, 6.15] "the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at the greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things whatsoever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city"
• [Plutarch, Alcibiades, 16] "At Sparta, he was held in high repute publicly, and privately was no less admired. The multitude was brought under his influence, and was actually bewitched, by his assumption of the Spartan mode of life. When they saw him with his hair untrimmed, taking cold baths, on terms of intimacy with their coarse bread, and supping on black porridge they could scarcely trust their eyes, and doubted whether such a man as he now was had ever had a cook in his own house, had even so much as looked upon a perfumer, or endured the touch of Milesian wool. He had, as they say, one power which transcended all others: that of assimilating and adapting himself to the pursuits and lives of others, thereby assuming more violent changes than the chameleon"

Alcibiades' Advice to the Spartans: The Occupation of Decelea

Now exiled from his own country, Alcibiades acted whole-heartedly against them. He now became an advisor to the Spartans, using his tactical insider knowledge to greatly undermine the Athenian war effort

Thucydides, 6.89-91, Alcibiades' speech to the Spartans

1. How, according to Alcibiades, will the conquest of Sicily be used against the Spartans?
• "In addition to our existing fleet we should have built many more triremes, since Italy is rich in timber, and with all of them we should have blockaded the coast of the Peloponnese, while at the same time our army would be operating on land against your cities, taking some by assault and others by siege"
• Athens wanted to be "the masters of the entire Hellenic world" and would use Sicily's help to achieve this
• Basically, the Athenians would use what they gained in Sicily to destroy Sparta and its allies
  
2. What assistance should the Spartans send to Sicily according to Alcibiades?
• "You must send out to Sicily a force of troops that are able to row the ships themselves and to take the field as hoplites as soon as they land"
• They should send a Spartan officer to mould the forces already there into shape
• They should also continue to wage war in Hellas to strengthen the Syracusan resolve and make it harder for Athens to send reinforcements to Sicily
  
3. Why should the Spartans occupy Decelea? What setbacks will it deal to the Athenians?
• "It is the thing of which the Athenians have always been most frightened"
• "The surest way of harming an enemy is to find out certainly what form of attack he is most frightened of, and then to employ it against him"
• It would also deprive Athens of the revenue from the silver mines
• The revenue from the Athenian allies would be paid less regularly, for they will "lose their awe of Athens"
4. Overall Alcibiades played on the innate Spartan fear of Athenian power
   

The Athenians Seek Allies

With the news of the Athenian approach, cities in Sicily reacted in different ways to the invasion:

• Some advocated resistance (such as Syracuse), others wanted to join the Athenians
• In the winter of 415-414 BC the Athenians sent a delegation to Kamarina, on the southern coast of Sicily, attempting to convince them to join the Athenians
• The Syracusans also sent a delegation, hoping to deter them

Activity: Athenian Speech to Kamarina

Thucydides, 6.82-83

• How do the Athenians justify their presence in Sicily?
• "We have come here to settle matters for our own security, together with our friends; not to enslave anybody, but rather to prevent anybody from being enslaved"
• "So now it is for our own security that we are in Sicily, and we see that here your interests are the same as ours"
• They claim that they simply want to renew their former alliance
• "We therefore looked about for the best means of preserving our independence"
• "It is also because of fear that we have come here to settle matters for our own security"
• "What you do concerns us very much indeed"
• "it is illogical for us to enslave Chalcidians in Hellas and liberate them in Sicily"
• "We therefore deserve the empire which we have, partly because we supplied to the cause of Hellas the largest fleet and a courage that never looked back"
• "This we can prove from what the Syracusans are saying against us and from your suspicions of us which you yourselves, in your rather over-anxious mood, no doubt entertain"
• "Now, we are Ionians and the Peloponnesians are Dorians; they are more numerous than we and they live close to us"
• The Ionians are always the enemies of the Dorians
• "The Syracusans will not find it so easy to do us harm by sending a force to help the Peloponnesians"
• "After the Persian war...we broke free of the Spartan empire and of Sparta's leadership" - bit rich to call Sparta an empire lol
  

The Aftermath of the Peace of Nicias

Nicias knew "that the Spartans had for some time been anxious for peace while the Athenians no longer had the same appetite for war" so he made every effort to reconcile them

Athenian Reasons

• Loss of confidence over recent defeats at Delium and Amphipolis
• Apprehensive about allies - fear of revolts
• Regretting their rejection of peace after Pylos

Spartan Reasons

• Anxiety to get back Spartan prisoners taken during Pylos campaign
• Sparta's territory was being raided from Pylos and Cythera
• Helots likely to revolt
• Thirty Years' Peace with Argos coming to an end

Terms of the Treaty - Thucydides 5.17

1. It was to last 50 years
2. Delphi was to be free
3. Disputes were to be settled by law and alterations to the treaty made by mutual consent
4. Chalcidice was to be independent
5. Amphipolis and Panactum were to be given back to Athens
6. Pylos, Cythera and Methana were to be returned to Sparta
7. All prisoners were to be exchanged

Thucydides' View of the Period: Shifting Alliances 5.25-6

• "The states which had accepted the treaty were at peace; but the Corinthians and some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb the settlement, a fresh agitation was instantly commenced by the allies against Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, became suspected by the Athenians through their not performing some of the provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten months they abstained from invasion of each other's territory, yet abroad an unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the most effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the treaty made after the ten years' war and to have recourse to open hostilities"
• "Only a mistaken judgment can object to including the interval of treaty in the war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be rationally considered a state of peace, where neither party either gave or got back all that they had agreed, apart from the violations of it which occurred on both sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and other instances, and the fact that the allies in the direction of Thrace were in as open hostility as ever, while the Boeotians had only a truce renewed every ten days"
• In Thucydidies' view, though peace was signed, hostility still continued in the Greek world

Changing Alliances 421-416 BC

Discontent of Sparta's Allies

• Refusal to ratify the treaty:
• Corinth - lost possession with no compensation
• Megara - Chief harbour Nisaea still in Athenian hands
• Boeotia - refused to give back Panactum
• Sparta's reactions: Formed an alliance with Athens. The treaty was never fully implemented
1. Amphipolis not returned to Athens [objections by the inhabitants]
2. Pylos not returned to Sparta
• Thucydides 5.17, 5.25

New Alignment of Powers

• The resentment of the Spartan allies lead to political upheaval and alliance reshuffling i.e: joining a secret unofficial alliance with Argos
• "The Corinthians pointed out that Lacedaemon could have no good end in view, but only the subjugation of Peloponnese, or she would never have entered into treaty and alliance with the once detested Athenians, and that the duty of consulting for the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon Argos" - Thucydudes 5.27
• Aware of the coalition Sparta implemented plans to get her allies back - risking a break of the Athenian alliance

In Athens: Alcibiades

• After the death of Cleon at Amphipolis, Nicias held the greatest authority over the Athenians
• However, he would face a new challenge from among the demagogues, in the form of Alcibiades:
• Born into one of the famous aristocratic families of Athens, the Alcmaeonidae (shield-signallers at Marathon)
• Famed for his beauty, charm and wit - he was the student of the famous philosopher Socrates, who saved his life at the Battle of Potidaea
• Pericles acted as a guardian after his father, Cleinias, died at the Battle of Coronea (between Athens and Boeotia during the First Peloponnesian War)

Writers' Views of Alcibiades

• "You shall not rear a lion cub in the city, but if one is brought up, accommodate its ways" - Aristophanes
• "He was exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. The position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on would contribute to the ruin of the Athenian state" - Thucydides
• "Although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city" - Thucydides
• "His character displayed many inconsistencies and marked changes, as was natural amid his vast undertakings and varied fortunes. He was naturally a man of many strong passions, the mightiest of which were the love of rivalry and the love of pre-eminence." - Plutarch

Alcibiades Undermining the Peace

• Aim of Alcibiades - Discard the alliance, win over Argos risking war with Sparta
• Historical thought on Alcibiades' motivation:
• Thucydides - Alcibiades believed the Spartans could not be trusted (5.43)
• Plutarch - Alcibiades aimed to violate the treaty out of sheer jealousy of Nicias' success and fame (14-15)

Thucydides, 5.43

"The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians having gone thus far, the party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty, immediately put themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that personal resentment had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he was offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient connection of his family with them as their proxeni, which, renounced by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his attentions to their prisoners taken at Sphacteria. Being thus, as he thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first instance spoken against the treaty, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, but that they only sough an alliance in order to be enabled by this means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack Athens alone; and now, immediately upon the above occurring, he sent privately to the Argives, telling them to come as quickly as possible to Athens, accompanied by the Mantineans and Eleans, with proposals of alliance; as the moment was propitious and he himself would do all he could to help them."

Athenian/Argive Alliance

• In order to sow discord for Sparta, Alcibiades arranged an agreement between Argos, Athens, Mantinea and Elis
• What is the strategic importance of this manoeuver?
• Corinth and Megara decided to re-join the Spartan Alliance for protection purposes

Role of Agis

• After realising that the Peloponnesian allies were beginning to turn against their Spartan leaders, King Agis of Sparta decided to march against Argos with her full army as well as the Tegeans and some other allies from Arcadia
• They were joined by other Peloponnesian Allies = 11,000 Boeotians, 2,000 Corinthians; Phliasians = entire force
• With such a considerable force, it was thought the Spartan coalition would crush the Argives and reassert Spartan dominance. However, King Agis took an unusual step:
• He met with a few representatives of the Argives and concluded a four month truce without consulting the other Peloponnesian allies
• Consequence - Agis severely criticised and forced to accept a 10 man board of special advisors to prevent further political blunders
• "The Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general out of respect for the law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed Agis for going away from so fair a field (the enemy being hemmed in on every side by infantry and cavalry) without having done anything worthy of their strength" - Thucydides, 5.60

Truce Broken

• Not long after it was signed, the Argives break the truce signed with Agis and the Spartans and continue hostilities. Why?
• "The Argives blamed the persons who had concluded the truce without consulting the people, themselves thinking that they had let escape with the Lacedaemonians an opportunity such as they should never see again; as the struggle would have been under the walls of their city, and by the side of many and brave allies" (5.60)
• "Alcibiades told the Argives and the allies that they had no right to make a truce at all without the consent of their fellow confederates, and now that the Athenians had arrived so opportunely the war ought to be resumed" (5.61)
• The Argives began incursions into Laconia, forcing the Spartans and King Agis once again to march out and meet them - though this time without the support of their other allies, who had all been sent home

Battle of Mantinea 418 BC

• Spartan alliance vs Athenian/Argive Coalition met on the battlefield near Mantinea in 418 BC:
• Spartan Alliance:
• 3,500 Spartiates
• 600 Skiritae
• 2,000 Helots
• Neodamodeis
• 3,000 Tegean infantry and cavalry
• Roughly 9,000 in total
• Argive Alliance:
• 3,000 Argives
• 1,000 Athenians
• 2,000 Mantineans
• 1,000 Arcadian Mercenaries
• 1,000 other allied infantry and cavalry
• Roughly 8,000 in total
• The battle ended with a Spartan victory over Argos and Athens
• "The imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time, whether of cowardice on account of the disaster at Sphacteria, or of mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this single action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men themselves were the same as ever" Thucydides 5.75
• Outcome:
• Sparta and Argos concluded a 50 year alliance [begun 415 BC]
• Mantineans re-join the Spartan Alliance [stronger by 417 BC]

Brasidas and the Thracian Campaign: 424 - 422 BC

Role of Brasidas: The Spartans Change Tactics
Brasidas, the Spartan general, with a Peloponnesian force of 1700 hoplites (including 700 helots), marched north to Thrace in 424 BC at the request of Perdiccas of Macedonia and the Thracian towns, who were alarmed at Athenian success
Brasidas had already distinguished himself numerous times up to this point:

• He rescued the town of Methone from an Athenian sea raid in the first year of the war
• He was elected Eponymous Ephor (head of state) in 430 BC - likely as a result of his victory at Methone
• He led the Spartan assault upon the Athenian beach positions at Pylos, suffering a near-mortal wound in the process
• He saved Megara from an Athenian surprise attack that almost captured the entire city
• He planned a night raid on Piraeus and planned to sneak into Athens, but his plans were detected and instead he defeated Athenian forces on Salamis

Activity

Thucydides 4.80-81

1. What were the reasons for the Spartans sending Brasidas north into Thrace?
• "Largely because it was his own wish"
• They welcomed the opportunity to send away a bunch of helots
• Chalcidians were "eager to have him"
• Side note - they had the helots select their best men, convinced them that they were being freed, but then killed them all as they were the most dangerous
2. What personal strengths are identified in Brasidas? How did these become advantageous to the Spartans?
• "His upright and moderate conduct towards the cities which caused most of them to revolt and enabled him to take over by treachery"
• His reputation "left a conviction on both sides that the rest were like him" - suggesting that he helped to heal Sparta's reputation
• Said to have "gallantry"
• Created "pro Spartan feeling" in the Athenian allies
• "valuable to his country"

Initial Successes

• Brasidas won over the town of Acanthus by oratory and diplomacy
• He then took the important Athenian city of Amphipolis by offering moderate terms, guaranteeing the people full political rights and continued possession of their property
• Any who wished to leave were free to do so within five days
• Many more Athenian allies joined Brasidas, spurred on by the moderate terms he was offering
• He also always claimed he was there as a liberator, unlike the Athenians who had enslaved them through force

The Role of Thucydides

• Thucydides, who at the time was an Athenian general stationed at Thasos, was keeping an eye on Athens' interests in the north-west when Brasidas made his attempt on Amphipolis
• Thucydides failed to prevent this and the Athenians banished him, but his exile enabled him to write his great history of the Peloponnesian War
• Brasidas appealed for reinforcements and began building triremes. Torone went over to Sparta by treachery, but once Brasidas entered the city he guaranteed the citizens their civil rights, with no reprisals

Activity: The Fall of Amphipolis

Thucydides 4.108

1. Why did the fall of Amphipolis cause great alarm for the Athenians?
• The place was "useful" as it supplied timber for shipbuilding and brought in revenue
• The Spartans could travel no further than Strymon unless they controlled the bridge, due to Athenian triremes and the great lake they had to cross. "Now, however, the difficulties appeared to have been removed"
• They feared that their allies would revolt
2. How did Athenian allies in the region react to the fall of Amphipolis to Brasidas?
• They "eagerly embraced the idea of a change" and so wanted Brasidas to come into their territories
• They were excited at the thought of liberation
• "the excitement of the moment" the chance to see the Spartans act "with real energy"
• "They made overtures to him, begging him to march on into their territory, and vied with each other in being the first to revolt"
• Thucydides believed that their confidence that Athens would do nothing was "wishful thinking" due to the Athenians being defeated in Boeoti and an "untrue but attractive" claim from Brasidas that they had not dared to attack his army
3. Why did the Spartans not send reinforcements to Brasidas despite his successes?
• "Their leading men were jealous of him"
• "What they really wanted was to recover the prisoners made on the island and to end the war"

Allies Revolt

• In 423 an armistice was signed between Athens and Sparta
• 'The Athenians calculated that in this way Brasidas would not be able to win over any more of their dependencies before they had had time to take measures for their security'
• However, while these negotiations were in progress, the people of Scione revolted against Athens. Brasidas praised them for their courage and resolution and assured them that as such loyal friends of Sparta, he would honour them in every way
• When news of the truce arrived Brasidas refused to give up to Scione, even though it had been taken after the armistice was signed. The Athenians were furious; Cleon proposed that it should be recaptured and the death penalty be imposed upon the inhabitants

Cleon's Failure

• Mende also revolted against Athens and Brasidas accepted the citizens as allies, despite the infringement of the truce. The Athenians made preparations, under Nicias, to attack both cities. Mende was retaken (the Athenian troops had to be restrained from slaughtering the inhabitants) and Scione was placed under siege
• After the armistice, Cleon sailed out with a force of 1500 against the Thracian towns. During Brasidas' absence, he took Torone and made slaves of the women and children, while the men were sent to Athens
• In 422 BC Cleon attempted to besiege the city of Amphipolis, but when he marched in front of the walls he realised his position was too exposed and turned his phalanx to retreat - Brasidas, who was waiting in ambush nearby, launched a surprise attack on Cleon's flank with his picked Spartan forces
• The battle for Amphipolis was lost by Cleon and the Athenians, who were disorganised, panic-stricken and thrown off balance by the audacity of Brasidas. Both Brasidas and Cleon died - one in battle and the other, according to Thucydides, fleeing from the scene. Now "Cleon and Brasidas were dead - the two people who on each side had been most opposed to peace"

The Peace of Nicias 421 BC

• The disaster at Amphipolis completely changed Athenian public opinion on the war, and with Cleon dead, the main proponent of continuing the war was gone from Athenian politics
• The Athenians also suffered defeat at Delium against the Boeotians, in a battle that recorded the the first instances of friendly fire and a flamethrower in history
• Soon after delegates from Sparta arrived in Athens, and talks for peace began
• Within a few months, peace was agreed upon, named the "Peace of Nicias" after the Athenian general and politician Nicias, who had led the "peace faction" in Athens during Cleon's time in power, and who now negotiated the peace with Sparta

Activity

Thucydides 5.13-17

1. Outline the reasons why both Athens and Sparta desired peace at this stage of the war
• Athens:
• As Brasidas had died, reinforcements "turned back home, thinking that the time for action had passed"
• "They themselves were not capable of carrying out the plans which Brasidas had had in mind"
• The Athenians had suffered a "serious blow" at Delium, and another at Amphipolis
• "They no longer possessed the same confidence in their strength which had induced them to reject previous offers of peace"
• "They were also apprehensive about the allies, fearing that they might be encouraged by these defeats to revolt on a more serious scale"
• Sparta:
• Sparta was collapsing from the inside, as more and more Helots deserted them
• The Spartans "had found that the war had gone very differently from what they had imagined" - they had thought that they could have destroyed the power of Athens in a few years, simply by laying waste her land
• The Thirty Years Peace Treaty between Sparta and Argos was expiring. The Spartans suspected that some of the states in the Peloponnese would switch sides.
• They didn't want to fight both Athens and Argos at once
• They were "desperate" to get their men back who had been captured at Pylos

1. Why did both Brasidas and Cleon wish for the war to continue?
• Brasidas:
• "because of the success and honour which had come to him through war"
• Cleon:
• "because he thought that in a time of peace and quiet people would be more likely to notice his evil doings and less likely to believe his slander of others"
2. What were the motives of the two new leaders Nicias and Pleistoanax behind desiring peace?
• Nicias:
• Had an "unblemished" career and wanted to keep it that way, but could only do that by "leaving as little to fortune as possible" which was only possible in peace time
• "to find immediate release from toil and trouble both for himself and his fellow citizens, and to leave behind the name of one whose service to the state was successful from start to finish"
• Pleistoanax:
• Was being accused and slandered constantly and believed that in peace time such accusations would stop and that with the prisoners back, his opponents wouldn't be able to blame him for their captivity
• "enemies would have no bases from which to attack him"
• He had taken a bribe from Pericles years previously and had been exiled because of it.

The Battle of Pylos and Sphacteria

In the years following the death of Pericles and Archidamus, the war escalated in its brutality, 428-425 BC:
Sparta

• When Archidamus dies c. 428 BC, command of the war passed to his son King Agis
• Agis was young and energetic, and decided to attempt more daring strategies against the Athenians, whilst sticking to the invasion tactics of his father
• In 428-427 BC the Spartans and Thebans attacked Plataea, hoping to draw the Athenians out to help their oldest ally
• The Plataeans pleaded with the Spartans, drawing on the fact they had served loyally during the Persian wars. The Spartans promised to leave Plataea alone so long as they remained neutral
• Plataea instead remained loyal to Athens, and with no possible assistance after a bloody siege Plataea was captured, the Thebans destroyed the city and many of the defenders were massacred

Athens

• With the death of Pericles, the democracy turned to the demagogues, led by Cleon 
• Cleon had risen in Athens' political scene by setting himself up as anti-Periclean in his strategy, and was known for "the violence of his character" according to Thucydides
• In 427 BC the city of Mytilene on Lesbos revolted from the Delian League
• Cleon advised that the Athenians make an example of Mytilene and massacre the entire population - men, women and children
• Amazingly the Athenians voted for this. But the next day had a change of conscience and recalled the assembly to vote again
• After a heated debate, the Athenians (thankfully) changed their minds and cancelled the plan

Overview

• The battle of Sphacteria (425 BC) was the second part of a two-part battle which shocked Sparta and the Greek world
• The chain of events that led to this almost unprecedented disaster began when an Athenian force under the command of Demosthenes landed on the rocky headland of Pylos, in the south-west of the Peloponnese and fortified their position after weathering a storm
• The Peloponnesian army under King Agis abandoned their short invasion of Attica and returned to the Peloponnese, while the forces already at Sparta moved west to deal with the new threat

Initial Problems

• For a brief period Demosthenes was in serious trouble:
• The Spartans summoned their fleet to Pylos, and he found himself besieged by land and sea
• The Athenian position was on a headland at one end of the Bay of Pylos
• The island of Sphacteria ran across the mouth of the bay, and was occupied by the Spartans The Spartan fleet moved into the bay, trapping the Athenians and preventing any supplies from reaching them
• In the resulting battle of Pylos the Athenians managed to hold off a two-pronged Spartan assault, but they were really saved by the arrival of an Athenian fleet
• This fleet inflicted a heavy defeat on the Spartan fleet inside the bay, in the process lifting the blockade of Pylos
• The tables were not turned on the Spartans. A force of 420 Spartan hoplites, under the command of Epitades, son of Molobrus was trapped on Sphacteria
• The Spartans responded by sending senior members of their government to Pylos to examine the situation. When it becomes clear that they could not hope to get supplies onto the island or rescue the hoplites, they asked the Athenians for an armistice
• The biggest weakness in the Spartan system was the shortage of full citizens, and they could hardly afford to lose 420 full Spartans. This was reflected in the terms they agreed with the Athenians:
• Every warship that had taken part in the earlier fighting and every warship in Laconia was to be handed over to the Athenians for the duration of the armistice
• The Spartans were to stop all attacks on Pylos, while the Athenians stopped attacking Sphacteria, and allowed a fixed amount of food onto the island
• The armistice would stay in place while Spartan representatives went to Athens to offer peace terms

Activity: Spartan Negotiation

Thucydides, 4.19-20

What arguments do the Spartans make as to why peace should be made?

•  "if peace was ever desirable for both parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally"
• "No lasting settlement can be made in a spirit of revenge"
• "thinking it better for both sides that the affair should not proceed to the bitter end"
• "if we, Athens and Sparta, stand together, you can be sure that the rest of Hellas, in its inferior position...will show us every possible mark of honour"
• "for sense of honour... and men are more inclined to act in this way towards their greatest enemies"
• "for this they will think that it is you rather than we whom they have to thank"
• "the enemy is already under obligation to pay back good for good"
• "while you have won glory and can have our friendship as well"
• "by accepting our proposals you can have the firm friendship of Sparta"
• "when one side gets the better of things in war and forces its opponent to swear to carry out the terms of an unequal treaty"

Failed Negotiations

• The peace negotiations and their aftermath do not reflect well on the Athenians. They demanded the return of lands lost at the end of the First Peloponnesian War, and when the negotiations broke down they refused to honour the terms of the armistice and kept the Spartan warships. The armistice lasted twenty days
• After the failure of the negotiations the fighting resumed. The Spartans continued their attacks on the Athenians on Pylos, while the Athenians maintained the naval blockade of Sphacteria
• Both sides were effectively under siege, but at first it was the Spartans who put the most effort into getting supplies to their troops. Volunteers were asked to try and get supplies onto the island, with a cash reward for free men and freedom as the rewards for helots. Any boats used in the operation were valued beforehand, so it did not matter if they were lost. Some men waited for the right weather and effectively rammed the island at full speed, damaging their boats but winning the reward. Others swam in under water, towing supplies protected by skins

Cleon and Nicias

• As the siege dragged on the Athenian people became concerned that the Spartans would escape
• The politician Cleon, who had played a major role in convincing the people to reject the Spartan peace offer, became increasingly unpopular. In an attempt to restore his popularity he tried to blame the general, Nicias (son of Niceratus) for the failures, claiming that a true leader would have easily captured the island by now. This badly backfired, for the Athenian people began to ask why Cleon was not leading the army if it was that simple
• Nicias added to his problems by giving him permission to take any troops that he required and take command of the siege. Eventually Cleon was backed into a corner, and had no other choice than to go to Sphacteria. He now raised the stakes once again by announcing that he would take the island in twenty days, without using any fresh Athenian troops
• Cleon times his arrival at Sphacteria perfectly. Demosthenes had been unwilling to risk a landing on the island because it was covered in thick woodland, with no paths, and he believed that this would give the Spartans too big an advantage
• Just before Cleon arrived, one of the Spartans accidently set the woods on fire, and most of the trees burnt down. The fire also revealed a number of landing points, and that there were more Spartans on the island than previously believed, making them an even bigger prize
• The two Athenian generals began by sending a herald to the island to ask the Spartans to surrender on generous terms. When this offer was rejected, they waited for a day and then launched a surprise attack on the island
• The Spartans were divided into three camps
• The main camp, under their commander Epitades, was in the centre of the island. This was both the most level and best provided with water
• A guard of thirty hoplites was at the end of the island the Athenians chose to attack (probably the southern end)
• Another small detachment was posted at the opposite end, facing the headland of Pylos. This was the rockiest end of the island, and was topped with an old fort that the Spartans hoped to use as a final refuge
• This attack came on the seventy-second day after the naval battle that had trapped the Spartans

New Tactics

• The Athenians caught the Spartans out by loading their 800 hoplites onto the ships while it was still dark. The ships then put out to sea as if they were about to mount their normal daily patrols, but instead landed on the island
• The first Spartan post was overwhelmed. This allowed Demosthenes to bring over the rest of his army - 800 archers, at least 800 peltasts, the Allied contingents and the crews of the seventy Athenian warships. This army was them divided into groups of around 200, and these groups were posted on high ground all around the main Spartan position
• The Greeks are often accused of being unimaginative in warfare, relying entirely on simple clashes between hoplites, but here we see Demosthenes using a different tactic. The Spartans would find themselves in a trap. If they attempted to attack any part of the Athenian line they would be exposed to attack from the rear, while the lightly armed Athenian troops would be able to retreat from the heavily armoured Spartan hoplites
• When Epitades realised that the Athenians had landed on the island he formed up his men and moved to attack the Athenian hoplites, expected the standard clash between two lines of similar troops
• Instead the Spartans found themselves being harried from both flanks by the bowmen, peltasts and stone throwers. The Athenian hoplites refused to come forward and fight, so the Spartans were denied their main target. They were sometimes able to close up with the light troops, but not crush them
• Eventually they were forced to retreat back up the island to the fort. The Athenians followed, and launched a series of frontal assaults on the fort, but this time the advantages were with the Spartans, and these attacks failed to push the Spartans out of their final defensive lines before the fort itself
• The stalemate was broken by the commander of the Messenian contingent. He asked Cleon and Demosthenes to give him some archers and light troops. He then picked his way around the rocky coastline of the island, until he was in position on some high ground behind the fort. When these troops appeared behind them the Spartans abandoned their outer lines and pulled back

Round 2: Negotiations

• At this point Cleon and Demosthenes called a halt to the fighting, and once again sent a herald to offer surrender terms
• By now the Spartans had lost Epitades, who had been killed, while their second in command, Hippagretas was badly wounded and believed falsely to be dead. This left the third in command, Styphon son of Pharax, in charge
• According to Thucydides most of the Spartans lowered their shields and made it clear that they wanted to surrender when they first heard the heralds, so Styphon had no choice other than to enter into surrender negotiations. After consulting with the Spartans on the mainland, who gave him no useful advice ("make your own decision about yourselves, so long as you do nothing dishonourable"), Styphon and the Spartans decided, to the shock of the entire Greek world, to surrender

Activity: The Effects of the Battle

Thucydides 4.40-1

What were the effects of the battle of Sphacteria for Sparta?

•  The Greek world was shocked, as the Spartans were renowned for never surrendering
• "It was hard to believe that those who had surrendered were the same sort of people as those who had fallen"
• The Spartans repeatedly sent representatives to Athens to try and get their 120 soldiers back, but returned every time empty handed
• If the Peloponnesians attacked, the Athenians would kill the Spartan prisoners
• Delian troops carried out raids using the tactic of epiteichismos.They were helped by the fact that they spoke the same dialect, as Pylos was in what used to be Messania The Spartans had no experience of this type of guerrilla warfare, and as the helots began to desert "they feared the spread of a revolution... and became exceedingly uneasy about it" 

Effects of Surrender

• The Athenians had captured a very valuable prize. Of the 440 hoplites who had been trapped on the island, 292 were captured and taken to Athens. Of these 120 were full Spartans, a sizable proportion of a very small group
• The surrender of the Spartans caused shockwaves across the Greek world. Spartans were not expected to surrender, but to fight to the death, regardless of the odds against them
• The surrender also caused great despondency in Sparta, and triggered a series of peace offers. The prisoners were still a major factor four years later, when the Peace of Nicias (421 BC) did actually end the war for a short period. One of the clauses of the peace treaty saw the Athenians return all Spartans in prison in Athens or in any Athenian dominion