Year 2: Introduction to the Greek State: Sparta

 The Greek Polis

• Self governing autonomous society

Features

1. The acropolis - stronghold of community life
2. The town and city were built around the acropolis
3. The villages and countryside
4. The people of the city and countryside
5. The political, cultural, religious and economic life

Structure of Population

• Citizens [adult males] 43,000
• Women and children - 129,000
• Metics [foreign craftsmen] 28,000
• Slaves - 115,000

Citizenship Restrictions

• Adult males - varied depending on the city i.e: Athens = 18yrs; Sparta 30yrs
• Usually both parents had to be born in the city; sometimes only one was necessary

Obligations and Responsibility

• Every citizen was expected to take his political responsibility seriously and to take pride in the affairs of the polis
• This evoked strong feelings of patriotism
• Difficulties - joint union of the Hellenes

1. Geographical location
2. A need to be free and independent
3. Relations marked by commercial jealousies and rivalries, shifting alliances and interstate wars

Forms of Government

1. Monarchy [governance by kings]
2. Aristocracy [group of nobles]
3. Timocracy [group who owed their political power to wealth]

Overthrown Governments

• On many occasions the oligarchies were overthrown and a tyrant would seize control for a short time
• A tyrant would bring with him many benefits before being overthrown himself and replaced by another form of government, either:
• Oligarchy [where a select elite dew control political power] or
• Democracy [where all citizens have the right to vote, to make laws and be elected to official positions]

Sparta: Prehistory

• Sparta is heavily attested in the mythological canon
• Supposedly the first settlement was made by Lacedaemon, a son of Zeus and the nymph Taygete. He married Sparta, the daughter of Eurotas
• These names would then be co-opted by the Spartans - the city would be Sparta, the country Lacedaemon, the fertile river that flowed through the city Eurotas and the impassable mountains that protected the city Taygetos
• Sparta is central to the Trojan Wars. Helen of Troy was originally Helen of Sparta, and it was the Spartan King Menelaus who together with his brother Agamemnon led the Greeks to war
• The Dorian Invasions of the 11th Century BC brought down the Mycenaean civilisation, and with it Sparta slipped into the Dark Ages alongside the rest of Greece
• Herodotus and other classical scholars claim this had been prophesised, as the son of Heracles (Heraclidae) would return to claim their rightful lands
• The next major events attested in Sparta were their invasions of Messenia, and the enslavement of the Messenian population, who became the Helots
• Around the same time, tradition attests that a legendary lawgiver, Lycurgus, brought a sweeping new set of regulations to the Spartan way of life
• The Spartans collectively prescribed themselves to Lyrcurgus' regulations, focused on military training and personal excellence
• Sparta was born

The Poleis of Sparta [Lakedaemonia]

• Sparta itself was not a traditional city but was a collection of 5 villages:
1. Limnai
2. Pitana
3. Kynosaura
4. Mesoa
5. Amyklai
• The city was skirted by Mt Taygetos to the West and Mt Parnon to the East
• The river Eurotas flowed through the valley, providing rich, agricultural land

"Suppose the city of Sparta to be deserted, and nothing left but the temples and the ground-plan, distant ages would be very unwilling to believe that the power of the Lacedaemonians was at all equal to their fame. Their city is not built continuously and has no splendid temples or other edifices; it rather resembles a group of villages, like the ancient towns of Hellas, and would therefore make a poor show" - Thucydides 1.10

DVD Questions

1. What two things are the Spartans famous for?
• Frugality and fighting
2. What was the aim of the Spartan way of life?
• To create the perfect state
3. What was Sparta the first Greek city to do?
• To define the rights and duties of its citizens
4. What city did Agamemnon rule over?
• Mycenae
5. What percentage of land in Greece cannot be farmed?
• 70%
6. What mountains lied to the west of Sparta?
• Taygetos Mountains
7. What temple was built to honour "the legendary king and his wayward wife"?
• Menelaion, in honour of Menelaus and Helen
8. What did the city states of Greece in this period all have in common?
• They were governed by a set of mutually agreed laws and customs
9. How many kings did Sparta have?
• Two
10.  Who were the kings of Sparta supposedly descended from?
• Heracles
11. What does the word "Periocoi" mean?
• Those who live around
12. What does the word "Helot" translate into?
• Captives
13. How was slavery different in Sparta different than elsewhere in Greece?
• The Spartans enslaved other Greeks
14. Who was Tyrtaeus?
• A Spartan soldier and poet
15. Who served as the hoplites in Ancient Greece?
• The citizens
16. Why was hoplite warfare a "team effort"?
• The Phalanx, co-ordination, discipline and trust were vital
17. When were the Messenians finally enslaved by the Spartans?
• 650 BC
18. What was the aim of the Spartans after they had conquered Messenia? What would they model their society on?
• To create a utopia, modelled on the Hoplit

Sources for Ancient Sparta

• One key issue when studying Ancient Sparta is that they did not have a tradition of recording their history
• There are scant fragmentary papyrys from the 6th century of Spartan poets such as Tyrtaeus and Alcman, but that's about it
• Archaeology of Ancient Sparta has also only recently been conducted in any systematic fashion, and what we have found is minimal (there is a reason for that, but we'll get to that later)
• We are therefore left with one option: to use the wealth of written evidence about Sparta from their main rivals: Athens

Plutarch

• One chief source for Sparta is the historian/biographer/philosopher Plutarch
• He wrote a "biography" of Sparta's legendary lawgiver, Lycurgus, that transcends into a broad sociological study of Classical Sparta
• Plutarch was not a contemporary, wring around 120 AD, 500 years after the fall of Classical Sparta
• At this stage, Sparta was a popular tourist destination, where Romans would visit the city to see "Spartans" re-enact traditions from their glorious past - Plutarch himself says he visited Sparta as a tourist
• By this time Sparta had received wide academic study from other Greeks and the Romans, and Plutarch was able to draw upon this tradition to write his work. We know he used contemporary writers such as Xenophon, Thucydides, Aristotle and Plato

Xenophon

• Xenophon lived and wrote at the end of the Peloponnesian War in the late 5th century BC
• He was an Athenian and a student of Socrates, alongside Plato and Alcibiades
• Many of Athens' intellectuals at this stage were laconophiles - literally "Spartan Lovers" - they interpreted the failures of the Athenian democratic system through contrasting them with the seeming impervious system of the Spartans
• Following the Peloponnesian War, Xenophon served as a commander of a mercenary company known as the "Ten Thousand", who accompanied Cyrus the Younger in a civil war against  his brother, Artaxerxes II
• On his campaigns Xenophon endeared himself to the Spartan King Agesilaus and he later moved to Olympia in the Peloponnese to serve as a Spartan ambassador
• He almost definitely visited Sparta, and there is strong evidence his sons went through the agoge, Sparta's harsh educational programme
• His work, the "Politaea of the Spartans" is a systematic appraisal of most aspects of Sparta's society

Aristotle

• Aristotle was not an Athenian, but he was born in Stagira in Northern Greece
• However, he moved to Athens and studied under Plato in the 4th century BC
• At this stage, Sparta had crumbled under her own internal disorders, as well as a succession of military defeats
• The rose-tinted view of many laconophiles in Athens had therefore been shattered, and Aristotle made a clear break from his intellectual predecessors by viewing Sparta through a critical lens
• His work is a series of lecture notes that he delivered to his students

Other Sources

• Thucydides and Herodotus - both contemporaries to Classical Sparta who provide invaluable details
• Plato and Critias - two other students of Aristotle who made important philosophical notes on the Spartans
• Polybius - a second century BC Greek historian who interprets Sparta through a constitutional framework
• Tyrtaeus and Alcman - the two Spartan writers who offer us a sliver of a glimpse into the real Sparta
• Aristophanes - whose plays provide stereotype Spartans that show us how other Greeks viewed the Spartans
• Archaeology - to corroborate everything

From the Delian League to the Athenian Empire

First Year Greek Themes

• The threat of the Persians
• How Greek states interact with each other
• How different states exploited and controlled each other
• Sparta's fear of Athenian domination
• Changing military tactics throughout the period
• Causes of conflict between states
• The Role of Individuals
• The sources and their utility during this period

Effects of Athenian Leadership: Aristeides creates the Delian League

"Aristeides advised all the allies, who were holding a general meeting, to choose Delos as their common Treasury, to deposit there all the money they collected, and to impose a levy on all the cities according to their means for the war which they suspected would come from Persia. The total collected as a result was 560 talents. Aristeides was put in charge of the tribute assessment, and he shared out the amount so precisely and fairly that all the cities were well pleased. Since he seemed to have accomplished something impossible, Aristeides got the greatest reputation for justice, and because he was so excessively just he was known as 'Aristeides the Just'" - Diodorus

Effects of Athenian Leadership: Policies of later leaders

"As the men of old praised the age of Kronos [as the Golden Age], so the allies of the Athenians sang the praises of Aristeides' assessment as a stroke of good fortune for Greece, and particularly when not long afterwards tribute was doubled and then tripled. To explain, Aristeides' assessment was 460 talents: Pericles added practically a third to this, for Thucydides says [2.13] that at the beginning of the [Peloponnesian] war 600 talents were coming in to the Athenians from their allies; after Pericles' death, the demagogues increased it little by little until they brought the total to 1,300 talents. They did this not so much because of the length and fortunes of war, but because they enticed the people into distributions of money, payments for public shows [theorika], and constructing cult statues and temples" - Plutarch

• Shows that the Athenians exploited their allies for money.
• Pericles was more imperialistic and less fair than Aristeides
  

Effects of Athenian Leadership: the policy of Kimon

"The allies continued paying tribute but failed to provide men and ships according to their assessment, and were already refusing to go on campaign and did not man ships or send men, on the grounds that there was no need for warfare and that they wanted to live quietly and farm, since the barbarians had been removed and were not causing trouble. When Kimon was General he accepted money from those who were not willing to campaign, and empty ships, and he let them be enticed by leisure and spend their time on their own affairs, turning themselves from warriors into money-makers and farmers not fit for war through luxury and folly. As a result of their own shyness of warfare, the allies became accustomed to fearing and flattering the men who were maintained and trained, and were always sailing and handling arms; they failed to realise that they were turning themselves into subjects and slaves" - Plutarch

• When allies would revolt, such as Samos, the Athenians would tear down their walls and take hostages - this is how they would control their allies. However, the above shows that the allies made themselves subservient to the empire. Either Kimon was very sneaky and tricked the allies, or it was just the allies' fault for not maintaining the ability to fight
  

Athenian Control over Allies: Chalkis Decree c. 440s BC

"The Khalkidians are to swear an oath on the following terms: 'I will not revolt from the people of Athens by any means or device whatsoever, neither in word nor in deed, nor will I obey anyone who does revolt, and if anyone revolts, I will denounce him to the Athenians, and I will pay to the Athenians whatever tribute I persuade them to agree, and I will be the best and fairest ally I am able to be and will help and defend the Athenian people in the event of anyone wronging the Athenian people, and I will obey the Athenian people.' All the Khalkidians of military age and above are to swear. If anyone does not swear, he is to be deprived of his civic rights and his property is to be confiscated and a tithe of it dedicated to Olympian Zeus. The People as soon as possible should choose 5 men to go to Khalkis to exact the oaths. And on the matter of hostages, they should reply to the Khalkidians that for the moment the Athenians have decided to leave matters as decreed [so] But whenever they decide, they will deliberate and draw up an agreement [Or exchange] on conditions which seem suitable for the Athenians and the Khalkidians. The foreigners who live in Khalkis and do not pay taxes to Ahtnes, even if they have been given tax exemption by the Athenian people, should pay taxes in Khalkis along with the rest, just like the other Khalkidians"

• Doesn't apply to other states
• A window into how defected states were treated
• Complete and utter loyalty "neither in word nor deed" - so can't even speak out against Athens without being considered revolting
• Only men of military age made to swear as they'd be the ones who posed the greatest risk
• The punishment for not signing is losing civic rights and confiscation of property (financial control)
• Foreigners who didn't previously pay tax now had to
• Pretty heavy handed
• Thuc - "the strong do what they can, the weak endure what they must"
• Pericles - incredibly imperialist
  

Rise of the Demagogues

"And so, as for this city here, when the working folk came out of their farms, they had no idea that they were being sold off and because they were without raisins and loved their figs, they looked to the chattering politicians for help. These crooks, though, knowing full well that the farmers were poor, weak and in need of bread, sent this goddess (Peace) away with screams as sharp as pitchforks. Then they started attacking our allies - the rich and fat ones, accusing them of being sympathisers of Brasidas. So what do you, fools, do? Just like stupid little angry puppies, you jumped on the poor man and damned near tore him to pieces! So the poor folk, pale from fear, sat about waiting for any little thing anyone would offer their grumbling stomachs. The foreigners saw all this. They saw the wounds as they were being made and, to silence the perpetrators, they stuffed their mouths with gold, thus making them rich whilst the Greeks were left totally abandoned - and you knew nothing about it! The one single guilty party of all this, was your leader, that leather beater, Cleon" - Aristophanes, Peace

• Step further than Pericles
• 422 BC - just after Cleon died at the battle of Amphipolis, Aristophanes' play 'Peace' explains why the demagogues rose to power - in the form of satire though so not entirely factual
• Demagogues punished rich states by claiming that they were Brasidas sympathisers so they could exploit them for money
• 'The foreigners' (other states) saw this and 'stuffed their (demagogues) mouths with gold' in order to protect themselves
• Exploiting for own ends
  

Delian League: Military Power

"Then they had an army of thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on home duty at Athens. This was at first the number of men on guard in the event of an invasion: it was composed of the oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens who had heavy armour. The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, before it joined that round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard, although part of it was left without one, viz, that between the Long Wall and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a distance of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned. Lastly, the circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded. Pericles also showed them that they had twelce hundred horses including mounted archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three hundred galleys fit for service! - Thucydides

• 30,000 hoplites in the empire
  

Delian League: Economic Power

"They were not to go out to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also to keep a tight rein on their allies - the strength of Athens being derived from the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending principally upon conduct and capital. Apart from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were still six thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of nine thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public buildings, and for Potidaea. To this Pericles added the treasures of the other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might take even the gold ornaments of Athene herself; for the statue contained forty talents of pure gold and it was all removable. This might be used for self-preservation, and must every penny of it be restored, Such was their financial position - surely a satisfactory one."- Thucydides

• Tight rein on allies
  

The Tribute Lists

• The Tribute lists are inscriptional evidence detailing the phoros (tribute) paid by each state to the Athenian Empire every four years
• The lists are invaluable for showing the dynamic nature of tribute in the Athenian Empire - as well as how much each region paid to Athens
• The most important lessons learned from the lists are:
1. That Tribute was assessed on each individual states' economic strength - for example the island of Thasos was one of the highest paying states despite a low population due to gold mines on the island
2. At the end of the first Peloponnesian War in the 440s BC, and by the end of the Archidamian War in the 420s there are gaps missing in the tribute suggesting the Athenians could not collect tribute those years - showing Athenian economic control coincided with their military control over their allies
3. The tribute corroborates the literary evidence - for example we can see the tribute increasing in the 430s BC under the imperialistic policies of Pericles, as well as in the mid 420s BC when the demagogues seized power after Pericles' death
   

Economic Problems: The Thoudippos Decree

"[As to the tribute, since] it has become less, let [this court] together with the council, hold an assessment during the month of Poseidon (January/February), [just as in the last] term of office, of [all the assessments] proportionately. They shall deal with the matter every day from the beginning of the month [to ensure that] the tribute [is assessed] in Poseidon. [The full Council] is also to deal with the matter [continuously, to ensure that] the assessment happens, provided [that there is no contrary decree of the People - They must not [assess less] tribute for any [city] than the tribute that city [has brought in before now], unless there [seems to be such shortage of resources that] that territory cannot [bring in more]. The Secretary [of the Council is to] write up this on two] stelae and [place one in the] Council Chaamber and one [ on the Acropolis], the Sellers (Poletai) [are to put this out to contract] and the Kolakretai [are to provide the money]

[For the future, notice] about the tribute [is to be given to the] cities [before the] Great [Panathenaia. Whichever prytany] is in office is to introduce [the assessments at the] Panathenaia. [If the prytaneis do not introduce matters] about the [tribute then] to the People [and the Council and the court, or do not deal with it immediately] in their own term of office, [each of the prytaneis is to be fined 100 drachmas sacred to Athena [and 100 drachmas] to the public treasury, and [each of the prytaneis is to face a fine of 1,000 drachmas at their scrutiny]. And if anyone else [proposes a vote on the proposal that the cities not] be assessed at the first prytany [at the Great Panathenaia], let him lose his civil rights and the property [be confiscated and a tenth of it] given to the goddess"

• Assessment held Jan/Feb
• Not allowed to pay less, only more or the same (unless Athens specifically allowed it)
• If the council members took too long or proposed a vote that the cities are not to be assessed at the first prytany, for the former they would be fined 1,200 drachmas (100 to Athena, 100 to the treasury and another 1,000 just because) and for the latter they would lose their civic rights and have their property confiscated
  

This assessment is particularly notable because:

• it was done in a year when reassessment was not due
• of the strength of the language involved
• of the inclusion, at the end of the list, of states that had never previously paid to Athens or which had long ceased paying

Whether the re-assessment also massively increased the tribute demanded from the allies is less clear because little is preserved from the lists from earlier in the war. The way in which the war is cited as creating a need for extra income links this tribute increase with those in Athens who favoured active campaigning against Sparta rather than sitting it out. But a more particular link with Cleon cannot be established as although Thoudippos is a rare name, it is not certain whether or not the Thoudippos who proposed the decree is the same Thoudippos who married Cleon's daughter

End of the Peloponnesian War - 404 BC

The Recall of Alcibiades

• In 412 BC, Alcibiades helped stir up revolt among Athenian allies in Ionia, on the west coast of Asia Minor; with allies such as Euboea and Chios defecting
• But Sparta now turned against him (after he seduced the wife of the King and impregnated her), and he moved to Sardis to exercise his charm on the Persian governor
• When some Athenian officers in the fleet began to plan an oligarchic coup, he held out hopes that if the democracy was overthrown he could secure financial support from Persia
• In this he failed and, discarded by the oligarchs who had seized power, he was recalled by the Athenian fleet, which remained loyal to the democracy and needed his abilities
• With the temporary oligarchic coup at an end, Alcibiades was now back in command of the Athenian navy - with political support back home

Tissaphernes in Persia replaced: Persian Commitment to Sparta

• In 412 BBC, the terms between Sparta and Persia had been negotiated, with mutual support agreed and the financing of the Spartan fleet organised
• However, under Alcibiades' advice, Tissaphernes had deliberately been perfidious in his dealings with the Spartans - refusing to commit to fully paying for the Spartan fleet to keep the balance of power in Greece
• When, therefore, Darius II decided to commit fully to Sparta, and Tissaphernes' actions were discovered, he was replaced with Darius' own son, Cyrus the Younger
• "Then and there they told Cyrus of the deeds of which Tissaphernes had been guilty and begged him to show the utmost zeal in the war. Cyrus had no other intention himself, but would do everything possible; he had brought with him, he said, five hundred talents; if this amount should prove insufficient, he would use his own money, which his father had given him; and if this should prove inadequate, he would go so far as to break up the throne whereon he sat, which was of silver and gold" - Xenophon, 1.5.1-7

Spartan Navy Payment Secured

• With this shift in commitment from Persia, Sparta was now able to pay its fleet, but it was still considered insufficient:
• "The ambassadors thanked him, and urged him to make the wage of each sailor an Arric drachma a day, explaining that if this were made the rate, the sailors of the Athenian fleet would desert their ships, and hence he would spend less money. He replied that their plan was a good one, but that it was not possible for him to act contrary to the King's instructions; besides, the original compact ran in this way: that the King should give thirty minae per month to each ship, whatever number of ships the Lacedaemonians might wish to maintain" - Xenophon 1.5.1-7

Successes of Alcibiades in the Hellespont, 411

• Dissatisfied with Tissaphernes' support and suspicious of his motives, Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, had moved the scene of conflict from Ionia to the Hellespont. For the Spartans owed Pharnabazus, the satrap in the Hellespont region, the help they had promised
• Alcibiades used this situation as an opportunity to achieve a number of naval victories before returning to Athens
• With Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, Alcibiades recovered Athenian control of the Hellespont and secured their vital corn route in battles at Cynossema, Abydos and Cyzicus. Mindarus was killed, the Spartans fleet destroyed and Pharnabazus defeated on land

Effects of His Success

• The Spartans offered peace on the basis of the status quo; that is, as things were at the time. Although Decelea would be given up in return for the evacuation of Pylos, it meant that Athens would lose permanently all those allies who had revolted, including Euboea
• Due to overconfidence from their recent naval victories, it was inevitable that the Assembly, dominated by Cleophon, would scorn the peace proposal
• After further successes on the Propontis and Bosphorus region, Alcibiades returned to Athens as a hero and was elected in 408 BC as commander-in-chief, with absolute powers both on land and sea. Plutarch suggests that many of the leading citizens - knowing Alcibiades' character and reputation - were so afraid he might become a dictator that they wanted him to sail as soon as possible

Enter Lysander

• At this stage, command of the Spartan fleet was entrusted to Lysander, a Spartan of the calibre of Leonidas, Brasidas or Gylippus
• Plutarch outlines his most important qualities:
• He had an ability to win and maintain support from others
• He was not personally corrupted by money
• He was a skilful organiser
• He showed respect and deference towards the great, so long as it achieved his own ends
• He used intrigue to achieve his own ends and was indifferent to oaths and treaties
• He was a brilliant strategist and general, particularly of naval warfare

Turning point in the war

• Lysander, using his charm, convinced Cyrus to raise the money for the sailor's pay:
• "After dinner, when Cyrus drank his health and asked him by what act he could gratify him most, Lysander replied: "By adding an obol to the pay of each sailor" And from this time forth the wage was four obols, whereas it had previously been three. Cyrus also settled the arrears of pay and gave them a month's wage in advance besides, so that the men of the fleet were much more zealous"
• Lysander, appointed as admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, was a skilful organiser with the ability to win and maintain support. He was a thorough and enterprising leader who Alcibiades realised was a danger, since "he inspired such fear that all orders were promptly carried out". He was a keen strategist, but used intrigue to achieve his ends and 'disguised most of his actions in war with various forms of deceit'
• Lysander, stationed at Ephesus, was provided with money to secure ships, sailors and supplies from the cities of the coast

Alcibiades Relieved of the Command

• Alcibiades, with a fleet of 100 ships, took up a position off Notium which controlled the passage in and out of Ephesus, but he left his lieutenant, Antiochus, in charge while he supported Thrasybulus in a brief land operation
• Antiochus disobeyed orders not to engage in battle with Lysander, and lost a large number of ships. The defeat caused the downfall of Alcibiades who was relieved of his command and denounced by his political enemies
• Once again, the Athenians removed their most brilliant and experienced general and the only man who could have saved them at this critical time in the war. He feared for his life if he returned to Athens, so retired to his castle in Thrace where he took no further active part in the war

Lysander Temporarily Replaced

• Since Lysander's term as admiral was over, he was recalled to Sparta and replaced by Callicratidas, who defeated Alcibiades' successor Conon off Lesbos and defeated the Athenian fleet at Mytilene
• The Athenian people responded to this crisis with resolution, raising money and manning their ships with citizens from the most humble to the class of knights, and including subjects, metics and slaves
• However, Callicratides did not have the same charm and character as Lysander - he was an old school Spartans and did not like the idea of playing lap-dog to the Persians:
• "He went to Cyrus and asked for pay for the sailors; Cyrus however, told him to wait for two days. But Callicratides, indignant at being thus put off and driven to anger by having to dance attendance at his gates, declaring that the Greeks were in a sorry plight, toadying to barbarians for the sake of money, and saying that if he reached home in safety he would do his best to reconcile the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, sailed away to Miletus" - Xenophon

Callicratides at Miletus

• When Callicratides arrived at Miletus, he gave the following speech:
• "Upon me, men of Miletus, lies the necessity of obeying the authorities at home; and as for you, I claim that you should show the utmost zeal in this war, because you dwell among barbarians and in the past have suffered many ills at their hands.
• And you should as leaders show the other allies how we may inflict the utmost harm upon the enemy in the shortest time, until the people return from Lacedaemon whom I have sent thither to get money; for the money which Lysander had on hand he gave back to Cyrus, as though it were unneeded surplus, and went his way; and as for Cyrus, whenever I visited him he invariably put off giving me an audience and I could not bring myself to dance attendance at his gates. But I promise you that for whatever good results we achieve while we are waiting for the funds from Sparta I will make you an adequate return. Let us then, with the help of the gods, show the barbarians that even without paying court to them we can punish our enemies" - Xenophon

The Battle of Arginusae, 406 BC

• The Battle of Arginusae was fought in 406 BC in the waters between Mytilene and the mainland and the Athenians were led by eight of their ten generals, including Pericles, the son of Pericles and Aspasia
• It was a disaster for the Spartans, with the loss of 70 ships and approximately 14,000 men. However, in the stormy seas the Athenians general were unable to rescue their shipwrecked crews, which doubled the Athenian casualties
• Callicratides, his ship being rammed in the battle, fell into the water and never recovered

Deaths of the Athenian Generals

• The generals were charged by the resentful masses with negligence, and despite their victory were sentenced to death on a single ballot
• As under Athenian law each man was entitled separate trial, this was an act of senseless and violent injustice. The six generals who returned to stand trial had gone into voluntary exile, were put to death without mercy

Effects of Battle of Arginusae

• The Athenians once again foolishly discarded valuable leaders at a time when they needed to conserve all their resources
• If Sparta were to recover, it would be as a dependant of Persia and to avoid this, the Spartans again offered to make peace with Athens
• The Athenians, led by Cleophon, again refused and must be condemned for their utter stupidity, since Athens was physically and financially exhausted and Lysander had appeared in the Aegean again

The Final Defeat of Athens at Aegospotami, 405 BC

• At the request of Cyrus of Persia and the Greek cities of Asia Minor to reappoint Lysander as admiral, the Spartans sent him out as a deputy, since it was their law not to allow the same man to hold the position twice
• Lysander sailed to the Hellespont and captured the city of Lampsacus in order to intercept the Athenian corn ships, while Conon and the other Athenian generals with the entire fleet of 180 ships took up a position on the opposite shore at a place called Aegospotami
• Observing Lysander's strategy day after day from his stronghold nearby. Alcibiades realised that the Athenians were unaware of their danger. However, when he attempted to warn them and suggested that they move to a safer location along the coast, they rudely rebuffed him
• Each day the Athenians' fleet had crossed over to offer battle and each day Lysander had refused, but on the fifth day, and as the Athenians were disembarking for their evening meal. Lysander attacked. It was not a battle, but a slaughter. He captured 160 Athenian ships and put to death over 3000 Athenian prisoners
  

Effects of the Defeat

"These men, sailing with Lysander in the swift ships, humbled the might of the city of Cecrops and made Lacedaemon of the beautiful choruses the high city of Hellas" - From the inscription on the victory monument erected in Delphi following the victory

• The long war was over. Athens had no choice but to surrender or be starved into submission - she had no men, ships, money, food or allies (except Samos)
• Lysander blockaded the Piraeus while the Spartan king Agis and Pausanias approached the city by land. Provisions began to fail, so the Athenians at last made proposals for peace, but Sparta intimated that the terms would include the destruction of the Long Walls. It was stupidity to resist, but this the Athenians did
• Cleophon had twice before hindered the conclusion of peace when it might have been made with honour (after Cyzicus and Arginusae) and he now hindered it again when it could only be made with humiliation. An absurd decree was passed, that no one should ever propose to accept such terms
• Starvation was imminent when Theramenes and nine others went to Sparta to accept peace terms. Meanwhile, at Athens Cleophon was put to death on a charge of desertion

Peace Terms Accepted by Athens 404 BC

1. Destruction of the Long Walls and the fortifications at Piraeus
2. Loss of all foreign territories, including their cleruchies at Imbros, Lemnos and Scyrus
3. The return of all exiles to Athens
4. Surrender of all triremes except twelve
5. Athens to become an ally of Sparta, pledged to accept her leadership

The Rule of the Thirty Tyrants

• A commission of thirty oligarch, set up to draft a new constitution based on the 'ancient' type, was supported by a Spartan garrison which occupied the Acropolis
• Critias (a returned exile) and other extreme oligarch in the Thirty had no intention of framing a constitution and implemented a policy of violence against the democrats
• The chief democrats were charged with conspiracy, and many thousands of innocent citizens were killed and their property confiscated
• Others fled into exile, from where they organised opposition, and when the democrats seized tge Piraeus a destructive civil war resulted in Critias losing his life
• After the loss of influence of Lysander in Sparta, Pausanias the Spartan king and Thrasybulus, the Athenian democrat, achieved a reconciliation which brought an end to the one and a half years of tyranny, bloodshed and foreign occupation. In 403-402 BC, full democracy was re-established on a base firmer than ever

Reasons for the Defeat of Athens

• At the beginning of the war, led by Pericles, Athens was at the peak of her power. Her military, naval and financial resources together with the strategy laid down by Pericles should have carried her through to victory. Yet in 404, physically and financially exhausted and with her fleet destroyed, she was starved into submission and was forced to accept the humiliation of a Spartan garrison occupying the Acropolis
• Thucydides outlines what he regards as the main reasons for Athens' failure in the war:
1. The death of Pericles early in the war
2. Changes in his strategy
3. Self-interest and ambitions of leaders after Pericles' death
4. The Sicilian campaign
5. The revolt of Athens' allies
6. Persian involvement on the side of Sparta
7. Athens' internal strife
   

Sparta and Athens in Persian Intervention

1. What were the motives of Tissaphernes and the Persians for intervening in the Peloponnesian War?
• Darius II wanted to recover the tribute of the Asiatic Greeks, by siding with Sparta and funding their fleet, which in turn meant that the Persians had to defeat Athens in the Aegean
• Tissaphernes wanted to delay financing the Spartan fleet, allow Sparta and Athens to weaken each other, and then potentially conquer more of Greece than initially planned
  
2. What is the significance of the treaties signed between Sparta and Persia to the conflict?
• Terms of the original treaty between Sparta and Persia (may have been just a draft):
1. All territories previously belongings to the king and his ancestors shall be his
2. All money paid by subjects previously to Athens was to go to the Persian king
3. The war would be carried on jointly
4. Any who revolt from Sparta shall be enemies of Persia
5. Any who revolt from Persia shall be enemies of Sparta
• The first term of the treaty was significant because during the Persian war, most states sided with Persia, including big states such as Thessaly, Macedonia and Thebes. If the Persians were to regain all territories lost they would even have some in mainland Greece. Additionally, it would have been very awkward for the Spartans to give back all these territories when they were supposed to be the liberators of all Greece.
• There were (supposedly) three treaties. This was because the Spartans didn't want to give back all the Greek territories and so in the final treaty they settled on the Asiatic Greeks, while Tissaphernes was to finance the Peloponnesian fleet (still, bit of a betrayal)
  
3. How did relations between Sparta and Persia change during this time?
• Tissaphernes began to break the agreement between Sparta and Persia by delaying financing the Peloponnesian fleet, in the hope that the Spartans and Athenians would eventually weaken themselves enough to be defeated by Persia
• The fact that there was so many treaties signed/drafted shows us that clearly neither side was working with the other out of friendship, but for what they could gain
  
4. What role did Alcibiades have in the events of the Persian intervention?
• Alcibiades was the one who advised Tissaphernes to delay paying for the Spartan fleet. He then convinced the oligarchs in Athens to revolt and overthrow the democracy. He was also the one who convinced Chios to revolt, which was the last ship-building ally of Athens
• The Athenian fleet remained democratic and recalled Alcibiades to lead them.
• The fleet wanted to reinstate the democracy and overthrow the oligarchy
• Alcibiades advised them against this, as if they were to fight a civil war in Athens, there would be nothing stopping the Peloponnesians attacking the empire
• The Peloponnesians sent a fleet to Euboea, which was Athens' chief source of food because of its cleruchies (estates owned by often absent Athenians)
• Since Decelea had been taken, Euboea had become crucial
• The oligarchs sent out what they had left of the fleet to intercept the Peloponnesian fleet
• The Spartans won and the remainder of the oligarchic fleet travelled to Eretria, thinking it friendly, but were massacred, as the Eretrians had defected to Sparta
• The defeat caused the oligarchy of the 400 to be deposed in favour of a new, more moderate oligarchy of 5,000. Within a year, the democracy had been restored and Alcibiades was welcomed home a hero
  
5. What effect did the Persian intervention have on the Athenian empire? 
• The Persian intervention caused the oligarchy to overthrow the democracy and spark a civil war in Athens, which led to the democratic fleet recalling Alcibiades, which in turn meant that Alcibiades was welcomed home to Athens a hero
  

Persia and the Greeks 431-414 BC

• The Greeks on both sides had already in the Archidamian War (431-421) thought about gaining the support of Persia
1. King Archidamus, in his speech to the Spartans in 432, had advised the acquisition of new allies who could supply Sparta with a navy and finance, strongly hinting at Persia (Thuc.1.82.1)
2. Both sudes in 431 planned to send embassies to Persia (Thuc.2.7.1) and
3. In 430, a Peloponnesian embassy on the way to the King of Persia to request money and military support was handed over by the son of Sitalces, a ruler in Thrace, to the Athenians who executed these ambassadors
• The Persians themselves were not averse to taking advantage of the Greeks when at war with each other. Pissouthnes was the 'satrap' (provincial governor) of the Persian province in south-western Asia Minor with his capital at Sardis
• Pissouthnes had already intervened and helped the Samian oligarchs at the time of its revolt in 440 BC (Thuc. 1.115) - a clear breach of the Peace of Callias
• In 430 Itamenes, a subordinate of Pissouthnes, had helped the pro-Persian faction in Colophon to seize power and revolt from Athens; and when the Colophonian exiles at Notium clashed with each other, Pissouthnes sent mercenaries to help his supporters in Notium (Thuc. 3.34)
• Although Thucydides has little to say about Greek-Persian affairs before 412 BC, it is clear that the Spartans were still sending embassies to the King of Persia, Artaxerxes. In 425 BC the Persian Artaphernes was intercepted by the Athenians at Eion on his way to Sparta. The King's translated message made interesting reading:
• "Many other points were mentioned but the chief point, with regard to the Spartans, was that he did not know what they wanted. Although many ambassadors had come to him, none were saying the same things. If they wished to make a definite proposal, they should send men to him with Artaphernes" - Thucydides 4.50.2
• Here was the root of the problem for Sparta
• "They knew that the King's price for giving military aid to Sparta would be, at the very least, the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian domination, and there was no way that they could agree to this without destroying their credibility as the self-proclaimed liberators of Greece - hence the Spartans' evasiveness in their dealings with the King"
• The disaster at Pylos and the fear of a helot revolt probably ruined any Spartan plans of winning Persian support, as their whole attention from 425 BC was fixed on regaining the captured Spartans from Athens and taking precautions against the helots
• It was the Athenians, possibly worried by the King's message to the Spartans seeking to establish some concrete grounds for an alliance, who set about improving relations with Persia. Artaphernes was sent back to the King with some Athenian ambassadors, but when they reached Ephesus and learned of Artaxerxes' death, the Athenians returned home (Thuc)
• Thucydides mentions no other negotiations, but the combination of a speech in 391 BC by Andocides (3.29), in which he mentions the presence of his uncle Epilycus at the negotiations that brought about a treaty and a friend-ship forever with Persia, and of a fourth-century copy of a fifth-century decree

Political reasons for this rapprochement between Athens and Persia

• The Athenians' confidence of 425/4 BC had taken a blow  with the defeat at Delium in 424 BC and with Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis and his success at stirring up revolt amongst their allies in the Thraceward region
• If Brasidas were to gain Persian military support, he could strike at the Hellespont, Athens' life-line in respect of the transportation of grain from the Black Sea to the Piraeus - hence the desperate need for peaceful relations with Persia
• The new Persian King, Darius II (also known as Darius the Bastard) had pressing reasons for signing the treaty. Artaxerxes I had fathered one legitimate son from a Persian mother, Xerxes, but also seventeen bastard sons from concubines
• At some time in 424/3 BC Darius II became King of Persia, but his position was tenuous; there were the potential claims of the other bastard sons and of others of pure Persian stock, linked by blood to the royal family
• The last thing that the new king wanted was to alienate the Athenians and drive them into the arms of one of his rivals
• Therefore the treaty of 424/3 was of great benefit to both sides. It was, in essence, probably a renewal of the terms of the 449 Peace of Callias, but included the stronger statement of eternal friendship due to the current military difficulties of both sides
• The Athenians' betrayal of this eternal friendship by supporting the revolt of Amorges, Pissouthnes' son, in 414 BC proved to be a fatal error of judgement
  

Persian Intervention in the Ionian War, 413-404 BC

• In the spring of 413, possibly as the result of Alcibiades' advice (Thuc. 6.91.6), the Spartans invaded Attica under King Agis and occupied Decelea, a fortified outpost equidistant from Athens and Boeotia (Thuc.7.27): thus this phase of the Peloponnesian War (413-404 BC) is often referred to as the Ionian War

Change in Attitudes

The Spartans were convinced that the Athenians had clearly broken the terms of the Peace of Nicias, and that they were justified in renewing the war (7.18)

1. The Athenians' attacks on the east coast of Laconia in 414 BC (Thuc.6.105.2)
2. The constant raiding from Athenian-held Pylos (Thuc.7.18) and
3. The Athenian refusal to submit these issues to arbitration

This permanent occupation of Decelea caused many problems for the Athenians:

"It did great damage to the Athenians and, by its destruction of property and the loss of men, was one of the chief causes of the decline in Athenian power" - Thucydides 7.27.3

• The invasions in the Archidamian War had only been short affairs, the longest being forty days, but now the Athenians were permanently deprived of most of Attica:
1. the revenue from the silver mines was lost
2. 20,000 slaves escaped - the majority being skilled workmen and vital for the Athenian economy
3. the food supplies from Euboea had to be brought in by the more expensive sea route
4. there was the constant, exhausting guard-duty by day and night (Thuc.7.27-8)
• However, this stand of Spartan strategy, for all its debilitating effects on the Athenians, was insufficient to win the war as King Agis of Sparta so astutely observed as late as 410 BC
• "Agis, seeing from Decelea many corn ships sailing into the Piraeus, said that it was useless for his troops to cut off the Athenians from their land, which had been done for some time now, unless some one were to seize the places from where the grain kept coming in by sea" - Xenophon, Hellenica 1.1.35
• The Spartans had to be far more adventurous and challenge the Athenians at sea in Ionia, and especially in the Hellespont

Key Fact

Only by breaking up the Athenians' sea empire, on which they depended for revenue, and by preventing corn from the Hellespont reaching the beleaguered Athenians could the Spartans win the war

• The destruction of the Athenian fleet in Sicily in 413, however, had fulfilled one of the two pre-conditions for potential Spartan success in Ionia; the other - sufficient finance to pay the crews of a fleet that was large enough to wrest power from the Athenians in the Aegean - required the full involvement of the one power that had the wealth and the desire to destroy the Athenian Empire: Persia
• Persia's financial help to the Spartans, fitful at first but more committed later, gave the Spartans the means to wage war with the Athenians in Ionia: hence 'Ionian War' being the alternative name for the war from 413-404 BC. However, it is essential to see how the Persians were gradually drawn into the Peloponnesian War from the beginning and why the King of Persia chose to support the Spartans in the Ionian War
  

The End of the Sicilian Campaign, 413 BC

Athenian Resources

• The fleet the Athenians dispatched for Sicily was entirely out of proportion to the size of importance of its intended objective. it consisted of
• 134 triremes with 130 supply boats, a total of over 25,000 men
• Dozens of merchant vessels decided to accompany the navy, hoping for profits
• Both citizens and foreigners crowded the shore gazing with astonishment at the armada, which Thucydides say was the most expensive any Greek city had launched until that day
• The Athenians received less support from the cities of Sicily and southern Italy than they had expected, and even the eager Segestaens turned out not to have the resources they had claimed. Envoys dispatched to Segesta, it proved, had been duped into believing the city was rich when in fact it was poor

Key Battles

1. Spring 414 BC - the Athenians land at Leon, ascend Epipolai and, after a brief battle, take Euryelos
2. Summer 414 BC - Gylippos engages the Athenians between the fortifications on Epipolai, and wins the second encounter
3. Spring 413 BC - Despite losing the first sea battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusans capture Plemmyrion
4. Summer 413 BC - the Athenians fail to break through the Syracusan boom, eventually losing the fourth sea battle

Problems, Problems, Problems

Just about everything that could have gone wrong with the Sicilian enterprise, did

1. Lamachus died fighting
2. Alcibiades was recalled to stand trial, and on the journey managed to jump ship and defect to Sparta
3. Nicias successfully moved the Athenian fleet into Syracuse's harbour, creating a real possibility of blockading the city
4. The arrival of Gylippus with reinforcements changed the situation dramatically
5. The Syracusans, moreover, built a counter-wall that destroyed Athenian chances for a blockade
6. Nicias was now suffering acutely from kidney disease and asked the Athenians to recall him. They refused
7. To his horror, the Athenians sent Demosthenes out at the head of the proposed reinforcements. When he arrived with the second fleet and promptly suffered a serious reverse on the Epipolae heights, Demosthenes advocated withdrawal
   

Religiosity Strikes Again

• When everything was ready for the Athenians' departure, Thucydides related:
• "and just as they were about to sail, there was an eclipse of the moon, which happened to be full. The event made most of the Athenians feel uneasy, and they urged their generals to stay; and Nicias, who was too inclined to believe in the interpretation of omens and that sort of thing, refused even to discuss a move until after they had stayed for "three times nine days", as their seers decreed. This was the reason the Athenians stayed on after all their delays!"
  

 Attack of the Syracusans

• On learning that the Athenians had been planning to leave, the Syracusans attacked the Athenian feet and blocked the exit from the harbour. A fierce battle ensued, with some two hundred ships rammed together in a tight space. The din made it impossible to hear the calls of the coxswains
• Unable to make their escape by sea, the Athenians resolved to depart over land, abandoning their sick and wounded. About 40,000 men set out on the dismal trek, the Syracusans hot on their heels. Nicias and Demosthenes became separated; the Syracusans caught up first with Demosthenes, who surrendered in the hope of saving his soldiers' lives. The Syracusans then overtook Nicias' army

The Slaughter of the Athenian Expedition

As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it

At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry. Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after this immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana

- Thucydides

Outcome

• The Athenians had lost tens of thousands of men and accomplished nothing. For them, the outcome of the campaign was so horrific that they at first refused to believe the appalling news
• Plutarch claims that word of the disaster first reached Athens by way of a hapless man who had reported it matter-of-factly to a barber in Piraeus as if it were common knowledge: The agitated barber promptly ran the 5 miles to Athens, where he repeated the tale. He was in the very process of being tortured as a troublemaker when messengers arrived to confirm the astonishing story
• As Thucydides was later to write, "All was lost. Ships. Men. Everything"

Who shall we blame?

Pericles had once said that he did not fear the enemy's strategy, but rather the Athenians' mistakes. No part of the war justifies this view more than the Sicilian expedition

Athenian Assembly:

• The Assembly ignored Nicias' sound arguments against sending out the expedition
• It had a vague idea of Sicily and its resources and relied on Segesta to partially fund the expedition
• It voted too large a force and did not define the expedition's aims clearly
• Nicias was elected as commander of an expedition of which he so vehemently disapproved
• Joint leadership was given to three very different personalities
• It was wrong to send a commander with a charge hanging over his head
• It made a mistake in recalling Alcibiades, thereby depriving the expedition of the one person who could have brought success. As a result, Alcibiades gave vital help to Sparta
• It refused to listen to Nicias' please for withdrawal of the expedition and failed to replace him when he was so sick
• It should not have sent major reinforcements when the Athenians were suffering the effects of the occupation of Decelea

Nicias:

• Nicias' temperament was not suited to a bold and daring enterprise
• He wasted time and resources for little or no gain
• He delayed when immediate action was required
• He failed to complete the north wall, so allowing Gylippus to enter Syracuse
• He refused to retreat after the defeat of Demosthenes on Epipolae
• He allowed the excessive superstition and fear on the part of the Athenian people to affect his judgement

The Effects of the Occupation of Decelea

• Under the command of King Agis II, the Spartans fortified Decelea, which was visible from Athens and controlled the routes to Boeotia and Euboea. As a result of maintaining this hostile post in Attica, Athens suffered greatly. In fact, according to Thucydides, it was "one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power". The occupation of Decelea meant that:
1. Athenian lands could no longer be farmed
2. Food supplies had to be brought the long and expensive way by sea from Euboea
3. More than 20,000 slaves deserted, many of whom had been mining the silver at Laurium
4. With the loss of revenue from the mines and the effort of carrying on two wars at one time, Athens suffered acute financial distress
• The Athenian reaction to the seizure of Decelea was to occupy a post in Laconia, opposite the island of Cythera, where they hoped to undermine Sparta's hold on her helots

Effects of Athens' Failure in Sicily

Athenian reaction

• After the initial disbelief that such total destruction could have occurred, the Athenians were alarmed at the possibility of the Syracusan fleet appearing off the Piraeus, as they were depleted of men of military age, ships, crews and finances. However, despite feelings of despair, they decided not to give in. The Athenians:
1. Replaced the Council with a board of ten commissioners (the Probuli) to be chosen annually (this smaller, permanent body would assist in the reorganisation of the Athenian state after the effects of Athens' failure in Sicily
2. Used the 1000 talents, wisely set aside by Pericles for a naval crisis, to rebuild their navy (the plan was carried our so vigorously that within a year they had 150 new trirems)
3. Carried out strict economic measures to conserve finances
4. Withdrew their garrison from Laconia
5. Fortified Sunium, to give security to their ships rounding the promontory
6. Imposed a 5 percent tax on imports and exports in all ports of the empire, which replaced the tribute
7. Attempted to keep a close watch on their allies

Spartan Reaction

• The Spartans' confidence was at a high level, particularly since they believed that they would soon be joined by their allies from Sicily. They now began to throw themselves into the war without any reservation. They implemented a shipbuilding program, aiming initially at 100 triremes and King Agis set out to raise money from their allies for this purpose

Revolt of Athenian Allies

• First signs of revolt by Euboea and Lesbos communicated with King Agis at Decelea, indicating their willingness to revolt; at the same time Chios and Erythrae applied directly to Sparta for help in their planned defection from Athens

The Beginning of Persian Intervention

• The weakening of Athenian naval power gave the Persians, under King Darius II, the opportunity to support a Spartan/Persian attempt to undermine Athenian control in the Aegean and to regain the cities of Asia Minor. Tissaphernes, Satrap of Lydia, Caria and Ionia, and Pharnabazus both promised Persian financial support to Sparta in return for help in their territories. They wanted the tribute from the cities in Ionia and the Hellespont, which was being paid to Athens. Each satrap attempted to make his own arrangements with Sparta, but the members of the Spartan alliance agreed on a policy which they though would satisfy them both. They decided to sail to Chios first, then to Lesbos and finally to the Hellespont