End of the Peloponnesian War - 404 BC

The Recall of Alcibiades

• In 412 BC, Alcibiades helped stir up revolt among Athenian allies in Ionia, on the west coast of Asia Minor; with allies such as Euboea and Chios defecting
• But Sparta now turned against him (after he seduced the wife of the King and impregnated her), and he moved to Sardis to exercise his charm on the Persian governor
• When some Athenian officers in the fleet began to plan an oligarchic coup, he held out hopes that if the democracy was overthrown he could secure financial support from Persia
• In this he failed and, discarded by the oligarchs who had seized power, he was recalled by the Athenian fleet, which remained loyal to the democracy and needed his abilities
• With the temporary oligarchic coup at an end, Alcibiades was now back in command of the Athenian navy - with political support back home

Tissaphernes in Persia replaced: Persian Commitment to Sparta

• In 412 BBC, the terms between Sparta and Persia had been negotiated, with mutual support agreed and the financing of the Spartan fleet organised
• However, under Alcibiades' advice, Tissaphernes had deliberately been perfidious in his dealings with the Spartans - refusing to commit to fully paying for the Spartan fleet to keep the balance of power in Greece
• When, therefore, Darius II decided to commit fully to Sparta, and Tissaphernes' actions were discovered, he was replaced with Darius' own son, Cyrus the Younger
• "Then and there they told Cyrus of the deeds of which Tissaphernes had been guilty and begged him to show the utmost zeal in the war. Cyrus had no other intention himself, but would do everything possible; he had brought with him, he said, five hundred talents; if this amount should prove insufficient, he would use his own money, which his father had given him; and if this should prove inadequate, he would go so far as to break up the throne whereon he sat, which was of silver and gold" - Xenophon, 1.5.1-7

Spartan Navy Payment Secured

• With this shift in commitment from Persia, Sparta was now able to pay its fleet, but it was still considered insufficient:
• "The ambassadors thanked him, and urged him to make the wage of each sailor an Arric drachma a day, explaining that if this were made the rate, the sailors of the Athenian fleet would desert their ships, and hence he would spend less money. He replied that their plan was a good one, but that it was not possible for him to act contrary to the King's instructions; besides, the original compact ran in this way: that the King should give thirty minae per month to each ship, whatever number of ships the Lacedaemonians might wish to maintain" - Xenophon 1.5.1-7

Successes of Alcibiades in the Hellespont, 411

• Dissatisfied with Tissaphernes' support and suspicious of his motives, Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, had moved the scene of conflict from Ionia to the Hellespont. For the Spartans owed Pharnabazus, the satrap in the Hellespont region, the help they had promised
• Alcibiades used this situation as an opportunity to achieve a number of naval victories before returning to Athens
• With Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, Alcibiades recovered Athenian control of the Hellespont and secured their vital corn route in battles at Cynossema, Abydos and Cyzicus. Mindarus was killed, the Spartans fleet destroyed and Pharnabazus defeated on land

Effects of His Success

• The Spartans offered peace on the basis of the status quo; that is, as things were at the time. Although Decelea would be given up in return for the evacuation of Pylos, it meant that Athens would lose permanently all those allies who had revolted, including Euboea
• Due to overconfidence from their recent naval victories, it was inevitable that the Assembly, dominated by Cleophon, would scorn the peace proposal
• After further successes on the Propontis and Bosphorus region, Alcibiades returned to Athens as a hero and was elected in 408 BC as commander-in-chief, with absolute powers both on land and sea. Plutarch suggests that many of the leading citizens - knowing Alcibiades' character and reputation - were so afraid he might become a dictator that they wanted him to sail as soon as possible

Enter Lysander

• At this stage, command of the Spartan fleet was entrusted to Lysander, a Spartan of the calibre of Leonidas, Brasidas or Gylippus
• Plutarch outlines his most important qualities:
• He had an ability to win and maintain support from others
• He was not personally corrupted by money
• He was a skilful organiser
• He showed respect and deference towards the great, so long as it achieved his own ends
• He used intrigue to achieve his own ends and was indifferent to oaths and treaties
• He was a brilliant strategist and general, particularly of naval warfare

Turning point in the war

• Lysander, using his charm, convinced Cyrus to raise the money for the sailor's pay:
• "After dinner, when Cyrus drank his health and asked him by what act he could gratify him most, Lysander replied: "By adding an obol to the pay of each sailor" And from this time forth the wage was four obols, whereas it had previously been three. Cyrus also settled the arrears of pay and gave them a month's wage in advance besides, so that the men of the fleet were much more zealous"
• Lysander, appointed as admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, was a skilful organiser with the ability to win and maintain support. He was a thorough and enterprising leader who Alcibiades realised was a danger, since "he inspired such fear that all orders were promptly carried out". He was a keen strategist, but used intrigue to achieve his ends and 'disguised most of his actions in war with various forms of deceit'
• Lysander, stationed at Ephesus, was provided with money to secure ships, sailors and supplies from the cities of the coast

Alcibiades Relieved of the Command

• Alcibiades, with a fleet of 100 ships, took up a position off Notium which controlled the passage in and out of Ephesus, but he left his lieutenant, Antiochus, in charge while he supported Thrasybulus in a brief land operation
• Antiochus disobeyed orders not to engage in battle with Lysander, and lost a large number of ships. The defeat caused the downfall of Alcibiades who was relieved of his command and denounced by his political enemies
• Once again, the Athenians removed their most brilliant and experienced general and the only man who could have saved them at this critical time in the war. He feared for his life if he returned to Athens, so retired to his castle in Thrace where he took no further active part in the war

Lysander Temporarily Replaced

• Since Lysander's term as admiral was over, he was recalled to Sparta and replaced by Callicratidas, who defeated Alcibiades' successor Conon off Lesbos and defeated the Athenian fleet at Mytilene
• The Athenian people responded to this crisis with resolution, raising money and manning their ships with citizens from the most humble to the class of knights, and including subjects, metics and slaves
• However, Callicratides did not have the same charm and character as Lysander - he was an old school Spartans and did not like the idea of playing lap-dog to the Persians:
• "He went to Cyrus and asked for pay for the sailors; Cyrus however, told him to wait for two days. But Callicratides, indignant at being thus put off and driven to anger by having to dance attendance at his gates, declaring that the Greeks were in a sorry plight, toadying to barbarians for the sake of money, and saying that if he reached home in safety he would do his best to reconcile the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, sailed away to Miletus" - Xenophon

Callicratides at Miletus

• When Callicratides arrived at Miletus, he gave the following speech:
• "Upon me, men of Miletus, lies the necessity of obeying the authorities at home; and as for you, I claim that you should show the utmost zeal in this war, because you dwell among barbarians and in the past have suffered many ills at their hands.
• And you should as leaders show the other allies how we may inflict the utmost harm upon the enemy in the shortest time, until the people return from Lacedaemon whom I have sent thither to get money; for the money which Lysander had on hand he gave back to Cyrus, as though it were unneeded surplus, and went his way; and as for Cyrus, whenever I visited him he invariably put off giving me an audience and I could not bring myself to dance attendance at his gates. But I promise you that for whatever good results we achieve while we are waiting for the funds from Sparta I will make you an adequate return. Let us then, with the help of the gods, show the barbarians that even without paying court to them we can punish our enemies" - Xenophon

The Battle of Arginusae, 406 BC

• The Battle of Arginusae was fought in 406 BC in the waters between Mytilene and the mainland and the Athenians were led by eight of their ten generals, including Pericles, the son of Pericles and Aspasia
• It was a disaster for the Spartans, with the loss of 70 ships and approximately 14,000 men. However, in the stormy seas the Athenians general were unable to rescue their shipwrecked crews, which doubled the Athenian casualties
• Callicratides, his ship being rammed in the battle, fell into the water and never recovered

Deaths of the Athenian Generals

• The generals were charged by the resentful masses with negligence, and despite their victory were sentenced to death on a single ballot
• As under Athenian law each man was entitled separate trial, this was an act of senseless and violent injustice. The six generals who returned to stand trial had gone into voluntary exile, were put to death without mercy

Effects of Battle of Arginusae

• The Athenians once again foolishly discarded valuable leaders at a time when they needed to conserve all their resources
• If Sparta were to recover, it would be as a dependant of Persia and to avoid this, the Spartans again offered to make peace with Athens
• The Athenians, led by Cleophon, again refused and must be condemned for their utter stupidity, since Athens was physically and financially exhausted and Lysander had appeared in the Aegean again

The Final Defeat of Athens at Aegospotami, 405 BC

• At the request of Cyrus of Persia and the Greek cities of Asia Minor to reappoint Lysander as admiral, the Spartans sent him out as a deputy, since it was their law not to allow the same man to hold the position twice
• Lysander sailed to the Hellespont and captured the city of Lampsacus in order to intercept the Athenian corn ships, while Conon and the other Athenian generals with the entire fleet of 180 ships took up a position on the opposite shore at a place called Aegospotami
• Observing Lysander's strategy day after day from his stronghold nearby. Alcibiades realised that the Athenians were unaware of their danger. However, when he attempted to warn them and suggested that they move to a safer location along the coast, they rudely rebuffed him
• Each day the Athenians' fleet had crossed over to offer battle and each day Lysander had refused, but on the fifth day, and as the Athenians were disembarking for their evening meal. Lysander attacked. It was not a battle, but a slaughter. He captured 160 Athenian ships and put to death over 3000 Athenian prisoners
  

Effects of the Defeat

"These men, sailing with Lysander in the swift ships, humbled the might of the city of Cecrops and made Lacedaemon of the beautiful choruses the high city of Hellas" - From the inscription on the victory monument erected in Delphi following the victory

• The long war was over. Athens had no choice but to surrender or be starved into submission - she had no men, ships, money, food or allies (except Samos)
• Lysander blockaded the Piraeus while the Spartan king Agis and Pausanias approached the city by land. Provisions began to fail, so the Athenians at last made proposals for peace, but Sparta intimated that the terms would include the destruction of the Long Walls. It was stupidity to resist, but this the Athenians did
• Cleophon had twice before hindered the conclusion of peace when it might have been made with honour (after Cyzicus and Arginusae) and he now hindered it again when it could only be made with humiliation. An absurd decree was passed, that no one should ever propose to accept such terms
• Starvation was imminent when Theramenes and nine others went to Sparta to accept peace terms. Meanwhile, at Athens Cleophon was put to death on a charge of desertion

Peace Terms Accepted by Athens 404 BC

1. Destruction of the Long Walls and the fortifications at Piraeus
2. Loss of all foreign territories, including their cleruchies at Imbros, Lemnos and Scyrus
3. The return of all exiles to Athens
4. Surrender of all triremes except twelve
5. Athens to become an ally of Sparta, pledged to accept her leadership

The Rule of the Thirty Tyrants

• A commission of thirty oligarch, set up to draft a new constitution based on the 'ancient' type, was supported by a Spartan garrison which occupied the Acropolis
• Critias (a returned exile) and other extreme oligarch in the Thirty had no intention of framing a constitution and implemented a policy of violence against the democrats
• The chief democrats were charged with conspiracy, and many thousands of innocent citizens were killed and their property confiscated
• Others fled into exile, from where they organised opposition, and when the democrats seized tge Piraeus a destructive civil war resulted in Critias losing his life
• After the loss of influence of Lysander in Sparta, Pausanias the Spartan king and Thrasybulus, the Athenian democrat, achieved a reconciliation which brought an end to the one and a half years of tyranny, bloodshed and foreign occupation. In 403-402 BC, full democracy was re-established on a base firmer than ever

Reasons for the Defeat of Athens

• At the beginning of the war, led by Pericles, Athens was at the peak of her power. Her military, naval and financial resources together with the strategy laid down by Pericles should have carried her through to victory. Yet in 404, physically and financially exhausted and with her fleet destroyed, she was starved into submission and was forced to accept the humiliation of a Spartan garrison occupying the Acropolis
• Thucydides outlines what he regards as the main reasons for Athens' failure in the war:
1. The death of Pericles early in the war
2. Changes in his strategy
3. Self-interest and ambitions of leaders after Pericles' death
4. The Sicilian campaign
5. The revolt of Athens' allies
6. Persian involvement on the side of Sparta
7. Athens' internal strife
   

Sparta and Athens in Persian Intervention

1. What were the motives of Tissaphernes and the Persians for intervening in the Peloponnesian War?
• Darius II wanted to recover the tribute of the Asiatic Greeks, by siding with Sparta and funding their fleet, which in turn meant that the Persians had to defeat Athens in the Aegean
• Tissaphernes wanted to delay financing the Spartan fleet, allow Sparta and Athens to weaken each other, and then potentially conquer more of Greece than initially planned
  
2. What is the significance of the treaties signed between Sparta and Persia to the conflict?
• Terms of the original treaty between Sparta and Persia (may have been just a draft):
1. All territories previously belongings to the king and his ancestors shall be his
2. All money paid by subjects previously to Athens was to go to the Persian king
3. The war would be carried on jointly
4. Any who revolt from Sparta shall be enemies of Persia
5. Any who revolt from Persia shall be enemies of Sparta
• The first term of the treaty was significant because during the Persian war, most states sided with Persia, including big states such as Thessaly, Macedonia and Thebes. If the Persians were to regain all territories lost they would even have some in mainland Greece. Additionally, it would have been very awkward for the Spartans to give back all these territories when they were supposed to be the liberators of all Greece.
• There were (supposedly) three treaties. This was because the Spartans didn't want to give back all the Greek territories and so in the final treaty they settled on the Asiatic Greeks, while Tissaphernes was to finance the Peloponnesian fleet (still, bit of a betrayal)
  
3. How did relations between Sparta and Persia change during this time?
• Tissaphernes began to break the agreement between Sparta and Persia by delaying financing the Peloponnesian fleet, in the hope that the Spartans and Athenians would eventually weaken themselves enough to be defeated by Persia
• The fact that there was so many treaties signed/drafted shows us that clearly neither side was working with the other out of friendship, but for what they could gain
  
4. What role did Alcibiades have in the events of the Persian intervention?
• Alcibiades was the one who advised Tissaphernes to delay paying for the Spartan fleet. He then convinced the oligarchs in Athens to revolt and overthrow the democracy. He was also the one who convinced Chios to revolt, which was the last ship-building ally of Athens
• The Athenian fleet remained democratic and recalled Alcibiades to lead them.
• The fleet wanted to reinstate the democracy and overthrow the oligarchy
• Alcibiades advised them against this, as if they were to fight a civil war in Athens, there would be nothing stopping the Peloponnesians attacking the empire
• The Peloponnesians sent a fleet to Euboea, which was Athens' chief source of food because of its cleruchies (estates owned by often absent Athenians)
• Since Decelea had been taken, Euboea had become crucial
• The oligarchs sent out what they had left of the fleet to intercept the Peloponnesian fleet
• The Spartans won and the remainder of the oligarchic fleet travelled to Eretria, thinking it friendly, but were massacred, as the Eretrians had defected to Sparta
• The defeat caused the oligarchy of the 400 to be deposed in favour of a new, more moderate oligarchy of 5,000. Within a year, the democracy had been restored and Alcibiades was welcomed home a hero
  
5. What effect did the Persian intervention have on the Athenian empire? 
• The Persian intervention caused the oligarchy to overthrow the democracy and spark a civil war in Athens, which led to the democratic fleet recalling Alcibiades, which in turn meant that Alcibiades was welcomed home to Athens a hero
  

Persia and the Greeks 431-414 BC

• The Greeks on both sides had already in the Archidamian War (431-421) thought about gaining the support of Persia
1. King Archidamus, in his speech to the Spartans in 432, had advised the acquisition of new allies who could supply Sparta with a navy and finance, strongly hinting at Persia (Thuc.1.82.1)
2. Both sudes in 431 planned to send embassies to Persia (Thuc.2.7.1) and
3. In 430, a Peloponnesian embassy on the way to the King of Persia to request money and military support was handed over by the son of Sitalces, a ruler in Thrace, to the Athenians who executed these ambassadors
• The Persians themselves were not averse to taking advantage of the Greeks when at war with each other. Pissouthnes was the 'satrap' (provincial governor) of the Persian province in south-western Asia Minor with his capital at Sardis
• Pissouthnes had already intervened and helped the Samian oligarchs at the time of its revolt in 440 BC (Thuc. 1.115) - a clear breach of the Peace of Callias
• In 430 Itamenes, a subordinate of Pissouthnes, had helped the pro-Persian faction in Colophon to seize power and revolt from Athens; and when the Colophonian exiles at Notium clashed with each other, Pissouthnes sent mercenaries to help his supporters in Notium (Thuc. 3.34)
• Although Thucydides has little to say about Greek-Persian affairs before 412 BC, it is clear that the Spartans were still sending embassies to the King of Persia, Artaxerxes. In 425 BC the Persian Artaphernes was intercepted by the Athenians at Eion on his way to Sparta. The King's translated message made interesting reading:
• "Many other points were mentioned but the chief point, with regard to the Spartans, was that he did not know what they wanted. Although many ambassadors had come to him, none were saying the same things. If they wished to make a definite proposal, they should send men to him with Artaphernes" - Thucydides 4.50.2
• Here was the root of the problem for Sparta
• "They knew that the King's price for giving military aid to Sparta would be, at the very least, the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian domination, and there was no way that they could agree to this without destroying their credibility as the self-proclaimed liberators of Greece - hence the Spartans' evasiveness in their dealings with the King"
• The disaster at Pylos and the fear of a helot revolt probably ruined any Spartan plans of winning Persian support, as their whole attention from 425 BC was fixed on regaining the captured Spartans from Athens and taking precautions against the helots
• It was the Athenians, possibly worried by the King's message to the Spartans seeking to establish some concrete grounds for an alliance, who set about improving relations with Persia. Artaphernes was sent back to the King with some Athenian ambassadors, but when they reached Ephesus and learned of Artaxerxes' death, the Athenians returned home (Thuc)
• Thucydides mentions no other negotiations, but the combination of a speech in 391 BC by Andocides (3.29), in which he mentions the presence of his uncle Epilycus at the negotiations that brought about a treaty and a friend-ship forever with Persia, and of a fourth-century copy of a fifth-century decree

Political reasons for this rapprochement between Athens and Persia

• The Athenians' confidence of 425/4 BC had taken a blow  with the defeat at Delium in 424 BC and with Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis and his success at stirring up revolt amongst their allies in the Thraceward region
• If Brasidas were to gain Persian military support, he could strike at the Hellespont, Athens' life-line in respect of the transportation of grain from the Black Sea to the Piraeus - hence the desperate need for peaceful relations with Persia
• The new Persian King, Darius II (also known as Darius the Bastard) had pressing reasons for signing the treaty. Artaxerxes I had fathered one legitimate son from a Persian mother, Xerxes, but also seventeen bastard sons from concubines
• At some time in 424/3 BC Darius II became King of Persia, but his position was tenuous; there were the potential claims of the other bastard sons and of others of pure Persian stock, linked by blood to the royal family
• The last thing that the new king wanted was to alienate the Athenians and drive them into the arms of one of his rivals
• Therefore the treaty of 424/3 was of great benefit to both sides. It was, in essence, probably a renewal of the terms of the 449 Peace of Callias, but included the stronger statement of eternal friendship due to the current military difficulties of both sides
• The Athenians' betrayal of this eternal friendship by supporting the revolt of Amorges, Pissouthnes' son, in 414 BC proved to be a fatal error of judgement
  

Persian Intervention in the Ionian War, 413-404 BC

• In the spring of 413, possibly as the result of Alcibiades' advice (Thuc. 6.91.6), the Spartans invaded Attica under King Agis and occupied Decelea, a fortified outpost equidistant from Athens and Boeotia (Thuc.7.27): thus this phase of the Peloponnesian War (413-404 BC) is often referred to as the Ionian War

Change in Attitudes

The Spartans were convinced that the Athenians had clearly broken the terms of the Peace of Nicias, and that they were justified in renewing the war (7.18)

1. The Athenians' attacks on the east coast of Laconia in 414 BC (Thuc.6.105.2)
2. The constant raiding from Athenian-held Pylos (Thuc.7.18) and
3. The Athenian refusal to submit these issues to arbitration

This permanent occupation of Decelea caused many problems for the Athenians:

"It did great damage to the Athenians and, by its destruction of property and the loss of men, was one of the chief causes of the decline in Athenian power" - Thucydides 7.27.3

• The invasions in the Archidamian War had only been short affairs, the longest being forty days, but now the Athenians were permanently deprived of most of Attica:
1. the revenue from the silver mines was lost
2. 20,000 slaves escaped - the majority being skilled workmen and vital for the Athenian economy
3. the food supplies from Euboea had to be brought in by the more expensive sea route
4. there was the constant, exhausting guard-duty by day and night (Thuc.7.27-8)
• However, this stand of Spartan strategy, for all its debilitating effects on the Athenians, was insufficient to win the war as King Agis of Sparta so astutely observed as late as 410 BC
• "Agis, seeing from Decelea many corn ships sailing into the Piraeus, said that it was useless for his troops to cut off the Athenians from their land, which had been done for some time now, unless some one were to seize the places from where the grain kept coming in by sea" - Xenophon, Hellenica 1.1.35
• The Spartans had to be far more adventurous and challenge the Athenians at sea in Ionia, and especially in the Hellespont

Key Fact

Only by breaking up the Athenians' sea empire, on which they depended for revenue, and by preventing corn from the Hellespont reaching the beleaguered Athenians could the Spartans win the war

• The destruction of the Athenian fleet in Sicily in 413, however, had fulfilled one of the two pre-conditions for potential Spartan success in Ionia; the other - sufficient finance to pay the crews of a fleet that was large enough to wrest power from the Athenians in the Aegean - required the full involvement of the one power that had the wealth and the desire to destroy the Athenian Empire: Persia
• Persia's financial help to the Spartans, fitful at first but more committed later, gave the Spartans the means to wage war with the Athenians in Ionia: hence 'Ionian War' being the alternative name for the war from 413-404 BC. However, it is essential to see how the Persians were gradually drawn into the Peloponnesian War from the beginning and why the King of Persia chose to support the Spartans in the Ionian War
  

The End of the Sicilian Campaign, 413 BC

Athenian Resources

• The fleet the Athenians dispatched for Sicily was entirely out of proportion to the size of importance of its intended objective. it consisted of
• 134 triremes with 130 supply boats, a total of over 25,000 men
• Dozens of merchant vessels decided to accompany the navy, hoping for profits
• Both citizens and foreigners crowded the shore gazing with astonishment at the armada, which Thucydides say was the most expensive any Greek city had launched until that day
• The Athenians received less support from the cities of Sicily and southern Italy than they had expected, and even the eager Segestaens turned out not to have the resources they had claimed. Envoys dispatched to Segesta, it proved, had been duped into believing the city was rich when in fact it was poor

Key Battles

1. Spring 414 BC - the Athenians land at Leon, ascend Epipolai and, after a brief battle, take Euryelos
2. Summer 414 BC - Gylippos engages the Athenians between the fortifications on Epipolai, and wins the second encounter
3. Spring 413 BC - Despite losing the first sea battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusans capture Plemmyrion
4. Summer 413 BC - the Athenians fail to break through the Syracusan boom, eventually losing the fourth sea battle

Problems, Problems, Problems

Just about everything that could have gone wrong with the Sicilian enterprise, did

1. Lamachus died fighting
2. Alcibiades was recalled to stand trial, and on the journey managed to jump ship and defect to Sparta
3. Nicias successfully moved the Athenian fleet into Syracuse's harbour, creating a real possibility of blockading the city
4. The arrival of Gylippus with reinforcements changed the situation dramatically
5. The Syracusans, moreover, built a counter-wall that destroyed Athenian chances for a blockade
6. Nicias was now suffering acutely from kidney disease and asked the Athenians to recall him. They refused
7. To his horror, the Athenians sent Demosthenes out at the head of the proposed reinforcements. When he arrived with the second fleet and promptly suffered a serious reverse on the Epipolae heights, Demosthenes advocated withdrawal
   

Religiosity Strikes Again

• When everything was ready for the Athenians' departure, Thucydides related:
• "and just as they were about to sail, there was an eclipse of the moon, which happened to be full. The event made most of the Athenians feel uneasy, and they urged their generals to stay; and Nicias, who was too inclined to believe in the interpretation of omens and that sort of thing, refused even to discuss a move until after they had stayed for "three times nine days", as their seers decreed. This was the reason the Athenians stayed on after all their delays!"
  

 Attack of the Syracusans

• On learning that the Athenians had been planning to leave, the Syracusans attacked the Athenian feet and blocked the exit from the harbour. A fierce battle ensued, with some two hundred ships rammed together in a tight space. The din made it impossible to hear the calls of the coxswains
• Unable to make their escape by sea, the Athenians resolved to depart over land, abandoning their sick and wounded. About 40,000 men set out on the dismal trek, the Syracusans hot on their heels. Nicias and Demosthenes became separated; the Syracusans caught up first with Demosthenes, who surrendered in the hope of saving his soldiers' lives. The Syracusans then overtook Nicias' army

The Slaughter of the Athenian Expedition

As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it

At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry. Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after this immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana

- Thucydides

Outcome

• The Athenians had lost tens of thousands of men and accomplished nothing. For them, the outcome of the campaign was so horrific that they at first refused to believe the appalling news
• Plutarch claims that word of the disaster first reached Athens by way of a hapless man who had reported it matter-of-factly to a barber in Piraeus as if it were common knowledge: The agitated barber promptly ran the 5 miles to Athens, where he repeated the tale. He was in the very process of being tortured as a troublemaker when messengers arrived to confirm the astonishing story
• As Thucydides was later to write, "All was lost. Ships. Men. Everything"

Who shall we blame?

Pericles had once said that he did not fear the enemy's strategy, but rather the Athenians' mistakes. No part of the war justifies this view more than the Sicilian expedition

Athenian Assembly:

• The Assembly ignored Nicias' sound arguments against sending out the expedition
• It had a vague idea of Sicily and its resources and relied on Segesta to partially fund the expedition
• It voted too large a force and did not define the expedition's aims clearly
• Nicias was elected as commander of an expedition of which he so vehemently disapproved
• Joint leadership was given to three very different personalities
• It was wrong to send a commander with a charge hanging over his head
• It made a mistake in recalling Alcibiades, thereby depriving the expedition of the one person who could have brought success. As a result, Alcibiades gave vital help to Sparta
• It refused to listen to Nicias' please for withdrawal of the expedition and failed to replace him when he was so sick
• It should not have sent major reinforcements when the Athenians were suffering the effects of the occupation of Decelea

Nicias:

• Nicias' temperament was not suited to a bold and daring enterprise
• He wasted time and resources for little or no gain
• He delayed when immediate action was required
• He failed to complete the north wall, so allowing Gylippus to enter Syracuse
• He refused to retreat after the defeat of Demosthenes on Epipolae
• He allowed the excessive superstition and fear on the part of the Athenian people to affect his judgement

The Effects of the Occupation of Decelea

• Under the command of King Agis II, the Spartans fortified Decelea, which was visible from Athens and controlled the routes to Boeotia and Euboea. As a result of maintaining this hostile post in Attica, Athens suffered greatly. In fact, according to Thucydides, it was "one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power". The occupation of Decelea meant that:
1. Athenian lands could no longer be farmed
2. Food supplies had to be brought the long and expensive way by sea from Euboea
3. More than 20,000 slaves deserted, many of whom had been mining the silver at Laurium
4. With the loss of revenue from the mines and the effort of carrying on two wars at one time, Athens suffered acute financial distress
• The Athenian reaction to the seizure of Decelea was to occupy a post in Laconia, opposite the island of Cythera, where they hoped to undermine Sparta's hold on her helots

Effects of Athens' Failure in Sicily

Athenian reaction

• After the initial disbelief that such total destruction could have occurred, the Athenians were alarmed at the possibility of the Syracusan fleet appearing off the Piraeus, as they were depleted of men of military age, ships, crews and finances. However, despite feelings of despair, they decided not to give in. The Athenians:
1. Replaced the Council with a board of ten commissioners (the Probuli) to be chosen annually (this smaller, permanent body would assist in the reorganisation of the Athenian state after the effects of Athens' failure in Sicily
2. Used the 1000 talents, wisely set aside by Pericles for a naval crisis, to rebuild their navy (the plan was carried our so vigorously that within a year they had 150 new trirems)
3. Carried out strict economic measures to conserve finances
4. Withdrew their garrison from Laconia
5. Fortified Sunium, to give security to their ships rounding the promontory
6. Imposed a 5 percent tax on imports and exports in all ports of the empire, which replaced the tribute
7. Attempted to keep a close watch on their allies

Spartan Reaction

• The Spartans' confidence was at a high level, particularly since they believed that they would soon be joined by their allies from Sicily. They now began to throw themselves into the war without any reservation. They implemented a shipbuilding program, aiming initially at 100 triremes and King Agis set out to raise money from their allies for this purpose

Revolt of Athenian Allies

• First signs of revolt by Euboea and Lesbos communicated with King Agis at Decelea, indicating their willingness to revolt; at the same time Chios and Erythrae applied directly to Sparta for help in their planned defection from Athens

The Beginning of Persian Intervention

• The weakening of Athenian naval power gave the Persians, under King Darius II, the opportunity to support a Spartan/Persian attempt to undermine Athenian control in the Aegean and to regain the cities of Asia Minor. Tissaphernes, Satrap of Lydia, Caria and Ionia, and Pharnabazus both promised Persian financial support to Sparta in return for help in their territories. They wanted the tribute from the cities in Ionia and the Hellespont, which was being paid to Athens. Each satrap attempted to make his own arrangements with Sparta, but the members of the Spartan alliance agreed on a policy which they though would satisfy them both. They decided to sail to Chios first, then to Lesbos and finally to the Hellespont
  

The Sicilian Expedition 415-412

"This was the greatest Hellenic action that took place during this war, and in my opinion, the greatest action that we know of in Hellenic history - to the victors the most brilliant of successes, to the vanquished the most calamitous of defeats" - Thucydides

Background to the Sicilian Campaign

• The Athenians were becoming more interested in western trade and colonisation from the time of Themistocles
• By 446 BC there was trouble in the Athenian empire (Megara and Euboea had revolted)
• Many politicians believed that Athens should make its political influence felt among the Ionian cities of Sicily and Italy
• In 443-442 BC Athens concluded alliances with Rhegium in Italy and Leontini in Sicily, to keep a check on Syracuse:
1. There were city-state rivalries between the Dorians led by the Corinthian Syracuse and the Ionians led by Leontini
2. Athens founded the colony of Thurii in southern Italy in 444 BC - this caused alarm in Syracuse
3. Western trade rivalry with Corinth had been one of the significant causes of conflict leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War
• With the death of Pericles there was a much more aggressive attitude to the west and in 427 BC an embassy from Leontini appealed to the Athenians for help against Syracuse. Leontini wanted to prevent the unification of Sicily under Syracuse, stop any western help getting to Sparta, cut off supplies from Sicily to the Peloponnese and stroke a blow at the trade of their hated rival Corinth - The Athenians agreed
• Laches led the expedition, but achieved little beyond patrolling the straits and renewing the old alliance with Segesta
• Two years later another expedition was dispatched under Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon. It was delayed for some time at Pylos
• Hermocrates, a Syracusan general, appealed to the Sicilians for unity and in 424 BC a conference was held at Gela, where the cities agreed on peace. The Athenians were no longer needed and so returned home. However, public opinion in Athens, influenced by Cleon, fined Eurymedon and banished his colleagues for dereliction of duty
• In 416 BC Segesta appealed to Athens for help in her dispute with Selinus, an ally of Syracuse, and offered to supply the funds to finance the expedition. Athenian envoys, who were sent to investigate the claims of the Segestaeans regarding their wealth, returned with 60 talents as payment for a fleet with considerable enthusiasm about Segesta's resources. They had been deceived

Segesta Appeal to Athenians

• The main argument used by the Segestaeans, was that if Syracuse was left unchecked, it could grow in power, conquering the rest of Sicily and eventually being able to conquer Athens itself
• When the crews of the Athenian ships were received, the Segestaeans had rounded up as many gold and silver cups as they could find in town and the neighbouring cities and presented them at parties as if they belonged to the host
• "Those who had been deceived in turn misled others, and they were all held responsible by the troops when word got out that Segesta did not have any money"

The Athenian Assembly's Decision

• The radical Assembly was easily influenced by Alcibiades, who "persuaded them to abandon these piecemeal attempts, sail out to Sicily and try to subdue the island completely by means of an invasion on the grand scale"
• The people were influenced by:
• The thought of rich rewards (corn, wheat, minerals);
• The hope of striking a decisive blow against the Peloponnesians by cutting them off from valuable supplies and naval support;
• The possibilities of the conquest of the whole of Sicily; many, like Alcibiades, saw Sicily as a stepping stone to further conquests in the western Mediterranean
• The Assembly voted to send a fleet of 60 ships under the joint command of Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus. Plutarch says that the people believed that the experience and caution of Nicias would combine well with the daring of Alcibiades and the forthrightness of Lamachus

Thucydides 6.8 - The Aims of the Expedition

• The Athenians held an assembly, and after receiving a report from the Segestaeans and their own envoys about the state of affairs and money (which was false, as there wasn't actually any money), voted to send 60 ships to Sicily under Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus

Alcibiades vs Nicias

• Nicias "who had been chosen to the command against his will" "came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise"
• Alcibiades "who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent, and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech" was "exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes"

Activity: Debate in Athens Over Sicily

Thucydides 6.12-13 (Nicias) + 6.17-18 (Alcibiades)

• List the reasons Nicias gives as to why the Athenians should not launch an expedition to Sicily
• The danger at home, as many important states such as Corinth had not accepted the peace and were still openly at war with Athens
• The instability of the empire - "We get only a grudging obedience from our subjects"
• The need for Athens to recuperate from the plague and the financial strains of the war- "only recently that we have had a little respite from a great plague and from the war"
• The danger involved in distant alliances and the difficulties of controlling Sicily if the Athenians should be successful
• The folly of listening to an ambitious and reckless young spendthrift who hoped to make great profit out of his appointment - "too young for his post"
• It is for Alcibiades' "selfish reasons" and he is "endangering the state" for "profit"
• "Remember that success comes from foresight"
• "Do not be frightened of being called a coward if you do not vote for war"
  
• List the reasons Alcibiades gives as to why the expedition should be launched
• "We have sworn to help them, and it is our duty to help them"
  
• The prospect of becoming the leader of all Greek cities by using what was gained in Sicily - "We shall become rulers of Hellas using what we gain in Sicily"
• The lack of unity among Sicilians, and their limitations in terms of military resources - "The Sicilian cities have swollen populations made out of all sorts of mixtures, and there are constant changes and rearrangements in the citizen bodies. The result is that they lack the feeling that they are fighting for their own fatherland"
• "As for their hoplites, they have not got so many as they boast of"
  
• "Our security is guaranteed by our navy"
• "We shall also have a number of non-Hellenic people who, through hatred of the Syracusans, will join us in our attack on them"
• "They should be a thorn in the flesh of our enemies in Sicily"
• "There is nothing here to hinder us"
• "The Peloponnesians have never had so little hope of success against us as they have now"
• His youth was irrelevant as he had already managed to deal with the Peloponnesians, and Nicias had a "reputation for being lucky"
  
• The danger to Athens of an "inactive" policy and the setting of young against old

Nicias attempted once again to deter the people, by exaggerating the estimates and men needed, but the Athenians "far from losing their appetite for the voyage because of the difficulties in preparing for it, became more enthusiastic about it than ever" They voted for more than double that which was originally requested. Their overall force was over 30,000

Magnitute of Sicilian Expedition (Thucydides 6.31)

"Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage from home attempted up until that time, and the most ambitious in its objectives considering the resources of those who undertook it...it was more a display of power and resources than an armament against an enemy"

The Mutilation of the Hermae

• Just prior to the fleet sailing an event occurred which the superstitious masses saw as a bad omen for the expedition. It was the mutilation of nearly all the stone busts, or hermae (originally of the god Hermes), which stood outside the entrances to private houses and shrines. The angry populace were convinced that it was "evidence of a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the democracy"
• The enemies of Alcibiades accused him of instigating this, because he is believed once to have taken part in mock celebrations of the Eleusinian mysteries, and because of his unconventional character. "There were those (such as Androcles and Pisander) who were envious of his leadership of the people, and wanted to get rid of him. It is also possible that the whole affair may have been instigated by Corinth, to cripple the Sicilian enterprise

Evil Omen: Mutilation of the Herms (Thucydides 6.27)

"While these preparations were going on, it was found that in one night nearly all the stone Herms in the city of Athens had had their extremities cut off. These are a national institution, the well-known square-cut figures, of which there are great numbers both in the porches of private houses and in the temples. No one knew who had done this, but large rewards were offered by the state in order to find out who the criminals were, and there was also a decree passed guaranteeing immunity to anyone, citizen, alien or slave, who knew of any other sacrilegious act that had taken place and would come forward with information about it. The whole affair, indeed, was taken very seriously, as it was regarded as an omen for the expedition, and at the same time as evidence of a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the democracy"

Aims of the Leaders

Immediate problems in the expedition were emphasised by the differences among the leaders over what could be achieved in Sicily

Nicias: Stick to original objective of liberating Leontini, then sail round Sicily in a show of force: this was too cautious and would not satisfy the wishes of the Athenian assembly, who wanted a full conquest of the island

Alcibiades: Use the size of the roce to win over allies in Sicily that could crush any remaining resistance: a pragmatic strategy but rested on chance they would find ready allies in Sicily

Lamachus: Use the element of surprise to attack and conquer Syracuse: probably the best approach as the Syracusans were by far the biggest threat to the expedition

The Recall of Alcibiades

The enormous armada set out from Athens in 415 BC, sailing round the Peloponnese toward Corcyra. From here they sailed around the southern Italian coast toward Sicily

• 134 Triremes
• 5,100 Hoplites
• 1,000 light armoured troops
• c.30,000 (combined Athenian and allied)
  

• However, shortly after leaving Corcyra, a ship caught up with the armada from Athens, with an arrest warrant for Alcibiades
• He had been charged by his political enemies in his absence - of sacrilege and conspiring to overthrow the democracy
• Alcibiades turned his ship home and began sailing back to Greece, but on the way he slipped away from the escort and defected
• He arrived at Sparta!
  

Alcibiades' Conduct

• [Thucydides, 6.15] "the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at the greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things whatsoever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city"
• [Plutarch, Alcibiades, 16] "At Sparta, he was held in high repute publicly, and privately was no less admired. The multitude was brought under his influence, and was actually bewitched, by his assumption of the Spartan mode of life. When they saw him with his hair untrimmed, taking cold baths, on terms of intimacy with their coarse bread, and supping on black porridge they could scarcely trust their eyes, and doubted whether such a man as he now was had ever had a cook in his own house, had even so much as looked upon a perfumer, or endured the touch of Milesian wool. He had, as they say, one power which transcended all others: that of assimilating and adapting himself to the pursuits and lives of others, thereby assuming more violent changes than the chameleon"

Alcibiades' Advice to the Spartans: The Occupation of Decelea

Now exiled from his own country, Alcibiades acted whole-heartedly against them. He now became an advisor to the Spartans, using his tactical insider knowledge to greatly undermine the Athenian war effort

Thucydides, 6.89-91, Alcibiades' speech to the Spartans

1. How, according to Alcibiades, will the conquest of Sicily be used against the Spartans?
• "In addition to our existing fleet we should have built many more triremes, since Italy is rich in timber, and with all of them we should have blockaded the coast of the Peloponnese, while at the same time our army would be operating on land against your cities, taking some by assault and others by siege"
• Athens wanted to be "the masters of the entire Hellenic world" and would use Sicily's help to achieve this
• Basically, the Athenians would use what they gained in Sicily to destroy Sparta and its allies
  
2. What assistance should the Spartans send to Sicily according to Alcibiades?
• "You must send out to Sicily a force of troops that are able to row the ships themselves and to take the field as hoplites as soon as they land"
• They should send a Spartan officer to mould the forces already there into shape
• They should also continue to wage war in Hellas to strengthen the Syracusan resolve and make it harder for Athens to send reinforcements to Sicily
  
3. Why should the Spartans occupy Decelea? What setbacks will it deal to the Athenians?
• "It is the thing of which the Athenians have always been most frightened"
• "The surest way of harming an enemy is to find out certainly what form of attack he is most frightened of, and then to employ it against him"
• It would also deprive Athens of the revenue from the silver mines
• The revenue from the Athenian allies would be paid less regularly, for they will "lose their awe of Athens"
4. Overall Alcibiades played on the innate Spartan fear of Athenian power
   

The Athenians Seek Allies

With the news of the Athenian approach, cities in Sicily reacted in different ways to the invasion:

• Some advocated resistance (such as Syracuse), others wanted to join the Athenians
• In the winter of 415-414 BC the Athenians sent a delegation to Kamarina, on the southern coast of Sicily, attempting to convince them to join the Athenians
• The Syracusans also sent a delegation, hoping to deter them

Activity: Athenian Speech to Kamarina

Thucydides, 6.82-83

• How do the Athenians justify their presence in Sicily?
• "We have come here to settle matters for our own security, together with our friends; not to enslave anybody, but rather to prevent anybody from being enslaved"
• "So now it is for our own security that we are in Sicily, and we see that here your interests are the same as ours"
• They claim that they simply want to renew their former alliance
• "We therefore looked about for the best means of preserving our independence"
• "It is also because of fear that we have come here to settle matters for our own security"
• "What you do concerns us very much indeed"
• "it is illogical for us to enslave Chalcidians in Hellas and liberate them in Sicily"
• "We therefore deserve the empire which we have, partly because we supplied to the cause of Hellas the largest fleet and a courage that never looked back"
• "This we can prove from what the Syracusans are saying against us and from your suspicions of us which you yourselves, in your rather over-anxious mood, no doubt entertain"
• "Now, we are Ionians and the Peloponnesians are Dorians; they are more numerous than we and they live close to us"
• The Ionians are always the enemies of the Dorians
• "The Syracusans will not find it so easy to do us harm by sending a force to help the Peloponnesians"
• "After the Persian war...we broke free of the Spartan empire and of Sparta's leadership" - bit rich to call Sparta an empire lol
  

The Aftermath of the Peace of Nicias

Nicias knew "that the Spartans had for some time been anxious for peace while the Athenians no longer had the same appetite for war" so he made every effort to reconcile them

Athenian Reasons

• Loss of confidence over recent defeats at Delium and Amphipolis
• Apprehensive about allies - fear of revolts
• Regretting their rejection of peace after Pylos

Spartan Reasons

• Anxiety to get back Spartan prisoners taken during Pylos campaign
• Sparta's territory was being raided from Pylos and Cythera
• Helots likely to revolt
• Thirty Years' Peace with Argos coming to an end

Terms of the Treaty - Thucydides 5.17

1. It was to last 50 years
2. Delphi was to be free
3. Disputes were to be settled by law and alterations to the treaty made by mutual consent
4. Chalcidice was to be independent
5. Amphipolis and Panactum were to be given back to Athens
6. Pylos, Cythera and Methana were to be returned to Sparta
7. All prisoners were to be exchanged

Thucydides' View of the Period: Shifting Alliances 5.25-6

• "The states which had accepted the treaty were at peace; but the Corinthians and some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb the settlement, a fresh agitation was instantly commenced by the allies against Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, became suspected by the Athenians through their not performing some of the provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten months they abstained from invasion of each other's territory, yet abroad an unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the most effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the treaty made after the ten years' war and to have recourse to open hostilities"
• "Only a mistaken judgment can object to including the interval of treaty in the war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be rationally considered a state of peace, where neither party either gave or got back all that they had agreed, apart from the violations of it which occurred on both sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and other instances, and the fact that the allies in the direction of Thrace were in as open hostility as ever, while the Boeotians had only a truce renewed every ten days"
• In Thucydidies' view, though peace was signed, hostility still continued in the Greek world

Changing Alliances 421-416 BC

Discontent of Sparta's Allies

• Refusal to ratify the treaty:
• Corinth - lost possession with no compensation
• Megara - Chief harbour Nisaea still in Athenian hands
• Boeotia - refused to give back Panactum
• Sparta's reactions: Formed an alliance with Athens. The treaty was never fully implemented
1. Amphipolis not returned to Athens [objections by the inhabitants]
2. Pylos not returned to Sparta
• Thucydides 5.17, 5.25

New Alignment of Powers

• The resentment of the Spartan allies lead to political upheaval and alliance reshuffling i.e: joining a secret unofficial alliance with Argos
• "The Corinthians pointed out that Lacedaemon could have no good end in view, but only the subjugation of Peloponnese, or she would never have entered into treaty and alliance with the once detested Athenians, and that the duty of consulting for the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon Argos" - Thucydudes 5.27
• Aware of the coalition Sparta implemented plans to get her allies back - risking a break of the Athenian alliance

In Athens: Alcibiades

• After the death of Cleon at Amphipolis, Nicias held the greatest authority over the Athenians
• However, he would face a new challenge from among the demagogues, in the form of Alcibiades:
• Born into one of the famous aristocratic families of Athens, the Alcmaeonidae (shield-signallers at Marathon)
• Famed for his beauty, charm and wit - he was the student of the famous philosopher Socrates, who saved his life at the Battle of Potidaea
• Pericles acted as a guardian after his father, Cleinias, died at the Battle of Coronea (between Athens and Boeotia during the First Peloponnesian War)

Writers' Views of Alcibiades

• "You shall not rear a lion cub in the city, but if one is brought up, accommodate its ways" - Aristophanes
• "He was exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. The position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on would contribute to the ruin of the Athenian state" - Thucydides
• "Although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city" - Thucydides
• "His character displayed many inconsistencies and marked changes, as was natural amid his vast undertakings and varied fortunes. He was naturally a man of many strong passions, the mightiest of which were the love of rivalry and the love of pre-eminence." - Plutarch

Alcibiades Undermining the Peace

• Aim of Alcibiades - Discard the alliance, win over Argos risking war with Sparta
• Historical thought on Alcibiades' motivation:
• Thucydides - Alcibiades believed the Spartans could not be trusted (5.43)
• Plutarch - Alcibiades aimed to violate the treaty out of sheer jealousy of Nicias' success and fame (14-15)

Thucydides, 5.43

"The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians having gone thus far, the party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty, immediately put themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that personal resentment had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he was offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient connection of his family with them as their proxeni, which, renounced by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his attentions to their prisoners taken at Sphacteria. Being thus, as he thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first instance spoken against the treaty, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, but that they only sough an alliance in order to be enabled by this means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack Athens alone; and now, immediately upon the above occurring, he sent privately to the Argives, telling them to come as quickly as possible to Athens, accompanied by the Mantineans and Eleans, with proposals of alliance; as the moment was propitious and he himself would do all he could to help them."

Athenian/Argive Alliance

• In order to sow discord for Sparta, Alcibiades arranged an agreement between Argos, Athens, Mantinea and Elis
• What is the strategic importance of this manoeuver?
• Corinth and Megara decided to re-join the Spartan Alliance for protection purposes

Role of Agis

• After realising that the Peloponnesian allies were beginning to turn against their Spartan leaders, King Agis of Sparta decided to march against Argos with her full army as well as the Tegeans and some other allies from Arcadia
• They were joined by other Peloponnesian Allies = 11,000 Boeotians, 2,000 Corinthians; Phliasians = entire force
• With such a considerable force, it was thought the Spartan coalition would crush the Argives and reassert Spartan dominance. However, King Agis took an unusual step:
• He met with a few representatives of the Argives and concluded a four month truce without consulting the other Peloponnesian allies
• Consequence - Agis severely criticised and forced to accept a 10 man board of special advisors to prevent further political blunders
• "The Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general out of respect for the law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed Agis for going away from so fair a field (the enemy being hemmed in on every side by infantry and cavalry) without having done anything worthy of their strength" - Thucydides, 5.60

Truce Broken

• Not long after it was signed, the Argives break the truce signed with Agis and the Spartans and continue hostilities. Why?
• "The Argives blamed the persons who had concluded the truce without consulting the people, themselves thinking that they had let escape with the Lacedaemonians an opportunity such as they should never see again; as the struggle would have been under the walls of their city, and by the side of many and brave allies" (5.60)
• "Alcibiades told the Argives and the allies that they had no right to make a truce at all without the consent of their fellow confederates, and now that the Athenians had arrived so opportunely the war ought to be resumed" (5.61)
• The Argives began incursions into Laconia, forcing the Spartans and King Agis once again to march out and meet them - though this time without the support of their other allies, who had all been sent home

Battle of Mantinea 418 BC

• Spartan alliance vs Athenian/Argive Coalition met on the battlefield near Mantinea in 418 BC:
• Spartan Alliance:
• 3,500 Spartiates
• 600 Skiritae
• 2,000 Helots
• Neodamodeis
• 3,000 Tegean infantry and cavalry
• Roughly 9,000 in total
• Argive Alliance:
• 3,000 Argives
• 1,000 Athenians
• 2,000 Mantineans
• 1,000 Arcadian Mercenaries
• 1,000 other allied infantry and cavalry
• Roughly 8,000 in total
• The battle ended with a Spartan victory over Argos and Athens
• "The imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time, whether of cowardice on account of the disaster at Sphacteria, or of mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this single action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men themselves were the same as ever" Thucydides 5.75
• Outcome:
• Sparta and Argos concluded a 50 year alliance [begun 415 BC]
• Mantineans re-join the Spartan Alliance [stronger by 417 BC]